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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE HISTORIAN
Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Soviet 
leaders have viewed the field of history as the most political 
of the social sciences. Soviet historiography, as a result, 
has been conditioned by political events; and Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, also affected by politics, has been used as its 
philosophical justification.
As early as 1899, Lenin recognized that Karl Marx had 
merely laid the foundation for scientific socialism and that 
socialists in the future must reinterpret this doctrine in 
light of changing circumstances.1 Lenin's doctrine has been 
one of the major characteristics of Soviet ideology. Whether 
in the guise of Marxism, Leninism, or Stalinism, Soviet 
ideology has been highly flexible and inextricably linked
1George Friedman, ’’Revolt Against Formalism in the 
Soviet Union.1’ Science and Society, II (Summer, 1938), 
p. 300; Lenin's views can be found in later editorials:
Pod Znamenem Marksizma, No. 4-5 (1943), p. 13; and in Bol­
shevik, No. 1 (January, 1945), p. 2.
1
2with changes that have occurred on the foreign and domestic 
2scene.
The flexibility of Soviet ideology has created an 
almost insurmountable obstacle for the historian. The ra­
tionale behind historical scholarship has been and still is 
utility, with the historian being used as a tool in support 
of ideological or political platforms proposed by the Party. 
As an employee of the state, the historian has found it 
practically impossible to work independently of party policy 
or to circumvent it; and just precisely what party policy 
might be at any given moment has presented even more complex 
problems. Often unaware, and even when aware, the historian 
has been unable to comprehend the reasons for sudden tactical
2
Several articles in leading Western Journals express 
this point of view. The following is by no means a complete 
list: J-S, "Changements en U.S.S.R.," Le Monde Slave, IV
(October, 1936), pp. 161-180; Hans Jonas, "Die Entwicklung 
der Geschichtsforschung in der Soviet-Union Seit Ausgang 
des Weltkrieqes," Zeitschrift fur Osteuropaische Geschichte,
V (1931), pp. 66-83, 386-396; George Kagan, "La Crise de 
la Science Historique Russe," Revue Historique, LXV (April 
1940), pp. 1-35; Anatole G. Mazour, "Party Line History," 
American Scholar, XXII (Summer, 1953), pp. 293-303; Anatole 
G. Mazour, and Herman E. Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet 
Historiography," Journal of Modern History, XXIV (March, 1952), 
pp. 56-68; Philip E. Mosely, "Freedom of Artistic Expression 
and Scientific Inquiry in Russia," The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, CC "TNovember'J 1938) , 
pp. 254-T74; R. Salomon, "Zur Lage der Geschichtswissenschaft 
in Russland," Zeitschrift fur Osteuropaische Geschiclqte, VI 
(1932), pp. 385-402; Gunther Stdkl, "Historiker auf Generallinie 
Geschichtswissenschaft und Partei in vier Jahrzehnten Sowjet- 
union," Wort und Wahrheit, XII (1957), pp. 511-26; Stuart R. 
Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," The Slavonic
3shifts in domestic and foreign policy which has placed him
3
at the mercy of the Party* Consequently, the non-party and 
even the party historian who has been writing acceptable history 
may suddenly find himself accused of producing "unscientific 
bourgeois" history. In most instances, the offender has been 
given a chance to confess his errors and agree to rewrite his 
work in accordance with current party historical directives. 
Severe penalties have been imposed on the historian who has 
refused to admit his "shortcomings." The subsequent punishment 
has been exile, permanent banishment from the profession accom­
panied by severe social and economic hardships, or, in extreme
4
cases, execution, especially during the Stalinist period.
and East European Review, XIII (January, 1935), pp. 294-319;
Georg von Rauch, "Grundlinien der Sowjetischen Geschichts- 
forschung im Zeichen des Stalinismus," Europa Archiv, V 
(October, 1950), pp. 3383-88; Bertram D. Wolfe, "Operation 
Rewrite; The Agony of Soviet Historians," Foreign Affairs,
XXI (October, 1952), pp. 39-57. This theme can also be 
inferred from editorials in Pravda, Izvestia, and Soviet 
historical journals.
3
Herbert E. Bowman, "Literary and Historical Scholar­
ship," The Transformation of Russian Society: Aspects of Social
Change, ed. Cyril E. BlackTCambridge: Harvard University Press,
1960), p. 381; Fritz Epstein, "Die Marxistische Geschichts- 
wissenschaft in der Sovetunion Seit 1927," Jahrbucher fur Kultur 
und Geschichte der Slaven, VI (1930), pp. 79-80.
4See footnote two. Also Vladimir Chernavin, "The Treat­
ment of Scholars in the Soviet Union," Slavonic and East European 
Review, XI (April, 1933), pp. 710-14. The most comprehensive study 
of this problem in English is Konstantin F. Shteppa, Russian 
Historians and the Soviet State (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univer-
sity Press, 1962). In Russian see G. Zaidel and M. Tsvibak, 
Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom Fronte: Tarle _i Platonov i_ ikh
4Some historians have managed to survive the reoccurring 
purges by dealing with obscure historical topics of a non­
political nature, such as pre-Kievan and early Byzantine history. 
Probably others have made it a practice to review carefully 
party publications which might tend to suggest forthcoming 
changes in the writing of history. The historian in this case
has been able to revise his work in time, avoiding the inevit-
5
able chastisement or public confession of guilt.
Since 1917, four distinct periods have emerged in the 
development of historical writing in the Soviet Union. Each 
period has been marked by acute domestic and foreign problems 
which had a direct bearing on the relationship of the historian
Shkoly (Moscow-Leningrad, 1931); "Burzhuaznye Istoriki Zapada 
v SSSR (Tarle, Petrushevski, Kareev, Buzeskul i Dr.)", Istorik 
Marksist, XXI (1931), pp. 44-86; S. Mokhov, "Intervent Tarld 
pod Zashchitoy Vostokova," Borba Klassov, II (1931), pp. 120-21; 
M.N. Pokrovsky, "0 Zadachakh Marksistkoy Istoricheskoy Nauki 
v Rekonstruktivnye Period," Istorik Marksist, XXI (1931), pp. 3-7.
~*It is evident that party officials have been acutely 
aware of this problem and in several editorials have taken 
the historian to task for avoiding contemporary history.
For example: "Zadacha i Zhurnala Voprosy Istorii," Voprosy
Istorii, I (1945), pp. 3-5; Current Digest of the Soviet 
Press (hereafter CDSP.) Vol. I, No. 10 (April 5, 1949), "pp. 54-55. 
"Why Are There No General History Textbooks," A. Davydov and 
M. Bizer, Literaturnaya Gazeta, (February 23, 1949), p. 2;
CDSP Vol. I, No. 26 ( July 26, 1949), pp. 16-23. "On the Tasks 
of Soviet Historians in the Struggles with Manifestations of 
Bourgeois Ideology," Voprosy Istorii, No. 2 (1949), pp. 3-13;
CDSP Vol. I,No. 35 (September 27, 1949), pp. 3-9. (Editorial) 
"Tasks of Soviet Historians in the Field of Modern and Recent 
History," Voprosy Istorii, No. 3 (March, 1949), pp. 3-13;
CDSP Vol. I,No. 50' (January 10, 1950), pp. 6-8. "Raise the 
Standard of Bolshevist Criticism and Self Criticism in Soviet
5to the government. Briefly, the decade between 1917-1928 was 
characterized by the relatively peaceful coexistence of the 
old "Bourgeois" historian with the new "Marxist" historian; 
1928-1934 was marked by an all out attack and purge of the 
"Bourgeois" school of history; 1934-1945 witnessed the sub­
jugation of ideology and the historian to the political aims 
of the regime; and from 1945 to the present, the writing of 
history has been conditioned by the Cold War with the histor­
ian serving as a propagandist for the regime despite the
£
"slight thaw" of the Khrushchev period.
Before the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia had already
developed a tradition of historical scholarship which was an
7
integral part of Western European historiography. The influence 
and work of Vasily Klyuchevsky, who had emphasized the impor­
tance of social and economic factors in the course of Russian 
history, was at its zenith. Most of the foremost historians
Historical Science," Voprosy Istorii, No. 7 (1949), pp. 3-8; 
CDSP Vol. IV, No. 34 (October 4, 1952), pp. 6-8; "Concerning 
the Magazine Voprosy Istorii," by L. Maximov. Bolshevik,
No. 13 (July, 1952), pp. 60-70.
6Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, 
Introduction, pages not numbered.
7
Cyril E. Black, "History and Politics in the Soviet 
Union," Rewriting Russian History, ed. Cyril E. Black (New 
York; Random Housed 1962), p. 7; Bowman, "Literary and Histor­
ical Scholarship," The Transformation of Russian Society, 
p. 376; Butenko, V. translated from Annaly 1922, pp. 128-167 
by Ren^T Martel, "La Science de l'histoire moderne en Russie," 
Revue Historique, No. 3 (1929), pp. 109-151; The most com­
prehensive treatment is N.L. Rubinshtein, Russkaya Istorio- 
grafiya (Moscow, 1941).
6of the next generation were his students, although they
differed from him in interpretation. For example, the liberal
historian Paul Milyukov asserted that the forces in history
were too complex to be presented as an organic unit; thus
0
his major works were monographic in nature. Other students 
of Klyuchevsky who disagreed with him were Alexander Pres­
nyakov who emphasized the political role of the state, and
Paul Vinogradov, the distinguished scholar in the area of
9Western feudalism and legal history. It was during this 
period that a school of Marxist historians emerged. Led by 
Michael Pokrovsky and Nikolai Razhkov, both of whom studied 
under Klyuchevsky and Milyukov, the Marxists attempted to 
challenge the accepted principles of Russian historical 
scholarship, but met with little success.^
Most historians devoted their time to the publishing 
and editing of source materials, the writing of short mono­
graphic studies, or broader historical syntheses. As long 
as historians were not involved in political intrigues, they 
were permitted to pursue independent studies free from
8Sherman B. Barnes and Alfred A. Skerpan, "Modern 
Russian Historiography," Historiography under the Impact 
of Rationalism and Revolution (Kent: Kent State University
Press', 1952 ), pp. 39-40.
9Black, "History and Politics in the Soviet Union," 
Rewriting Russian History, p. 4; Mazour, Modern Russian 
Historiography, p . 186.
10Black, Ibid., pp. 4-5; Mazour, Ibid., pp. 185-186.
7government control.^ Two notable exceptions were Paul Milyukov
and Michael Pokrovsky; both were excluded from the teaching
profession because of their political activities. One final
observation can be made about this period. The Czarist
government did not use the historian as a propaganda weapon
12m  support of its political policies.
The success of the Bolsheviks in 1917 did not produce
any immediate changes in the writing of history and in the
relationship of the historian to the new regime. The Soviet
government was confronted with problems much more important
and serious than subjugating the historian to its immediate
political needs. Most of the old historians also wrote within
an economic determinist frame of reference and were social 
13minded. However, the historian did not remain unscathed. The 
period of War Communism, accompanied by the allied intervention 
and civil war, created serious hardships for him. Libraries 
and archival repositories were burned and looted; it was prac­
tically impossible for the historian to undertake research in 
his field of study. On a few occasions the historian was
'L1Black, Ibid. , p. 5.
12_,.,Ibid.
13Sherman B. Barnes and Alfred A. Skerpan, "Modern 
Russian Historiography," Historiography under the Impact 
of Rationalism and Revolution, p . 41.
8persecuted for political reasons. In spite of the social,
economic, and political upheaval which accompanied the period
of War Communism, the historian was relatively free to pursue
his former work and to continue teaching in the traditional
14manner as long as he did not attack the regime. A few well
known historians such as Paul Milyukov, Otto Struve, George
Vernadsky, and M.I. Rostovtzeff, who were not in sympathy with
the new government, were permitted to leave the Soviet Union.
They spent the remainder of their careers in exile challenging
15and criticizing Soviet interpretations of history.
The Bolshevik Revolution also brought to the forefront
several Marxist historians. The most prominent of these was
Michael Pokrovsky who dominated the field of Soviet histor-
16iography for more than a decade and a half. Prior to the 
Revolution, Pokrovsky joined the Bolsheviks, became a close 
associate of Lenin, and helped to organize the revolt of the 
Moscow workers in 1905. Hunted by the secret police because
14A. Presniakov, "Historical Research m  Russia During 
the Revolutionary Crisis," American Historical Review, XXVIII 
(January, 1923), pp. 248-49; Kagan, "La Crise de la Science 
Historique Russe," p. 2.
15Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, pp. 234-242; 
Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," p. 294.
16Thomas R. Hall, "Mikhail Nikolayevich Pokrovsky (1868- 
1932)," Some Historians of Modern Europe, ed. Bernadotte E. 
Schmitt ’(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 349;
Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography," 
p. 57; Von Rauch "Grundlinien der Sowjetischen Geschichts- 
forschung im Zeichen des Stalinismus," p. 3383.
of his political activities, Pokrovsky fled Russia. He spent
most of his time in France where he was involved in both
17political polemics and historical research. After the 
Revolution, Pokrovsky was given the task of training a new 
generation of historians in order "to overthrow the philo­
sophy on which an older generation of historians had been
nurtured, replacing it with one more suitable to a young,
18dynamic, and revolutionary people."
As head of the Moscow Soviet, a ranking member of the
Communist Party, assistant commissioner of Education, and
chief of the historical section, Pokrovsky was in a commanding
position to implement the government's policy of producing
a new generation of Marxist historians. Under his direction,
the Institute of History was merged with the Academy of Science
of the USSR, a society of Marxist historians was organized in
the chief towns of the Soviet Union, and the Institute of Red
Professors was initiated. Pokrovsky became the editor of the
new historical journal Krasnyi Arkhiv which was dedicated to
19the publication of documentary materials. Most significant,
17Hall, Ibid., p. 351; Kagan, "La Crise de la Science 
Historique Russe," p. 5.
18Hall, Ibid., p. 352.
19Black, "History and Politics in the Soviet Union," 
Rewriting Russian History, pp. 6-7; Hall, Ibid., p. 351;
Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, p p . 18S-189•
10
he established the Society of Marxist Historians and was the
chief editor of its publication, Istorik Marksist. The goals
of the journal were: the maintenance of a united front of all
Marxists engaged in historical research, the study of Marxian
methodology, the combating of all anti-Marxist bourgeois
distoritons in historical writing, the establishment of a
critical Marxian literature, assistance to its members in
matters of research, and the popularization of the Marxian
historical view. The sheer physical accomplishments and
organizing capacities of Pokrovsky provided the new Soviet
20government with a solid foothold m  the field of history.
The historical views of Pokrovsky, at least during 
this period, were used by the government in support of its 
political goals. Official sanction was given to Pokrovsky's 
Brief History of Russia in a congratulatory note written by 
Lenin who advocated its adoption as a text.
I congratulate you very heartily on your success. I 
like your new book . . . immensely. The construction 
and the narrative are original. It reads with tremendous 
interest. It should in my opinion be translated into the 
European languages. I will permit myself one slight 
remark. To make it a textbook (and this it must become), 
it must be supplemented with a chronological index. This 
is roughly what I am suggesting: first column, chronology
second column, bourgeois view (briefly); third column,
20M.N. Pokrovsky, "Zadachi Obshchestvo Istorikov 
Marksistov,,T Istorik Marksist, I (1926), pp. 3-10. A German
and English translation of the tasks of Marxists historians 
appears respectively in Fritz Epstein, "Istorik Marxist," 
Jahrbucher fur Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven, IV (1928), 
~pl 2 17; Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, p. 189.
11
your view, Marxian, indicating the pages in your book.
The students must know your book and the index so that 
there should be no skimming, so that they should retain 
the facts, and so that they should compare the oldpscience 
and the new. What do you say to such an addition?
In light of later developments, especially after 1934, Lenin's
statement was to cause serious repercussions for the historian
who wrote within the Marxian framework espoused by Pokrovsky.
Initially, Pokrovsky's interpretation of history
supplied the Bolsheviks with a necessary and useful philosophy
which supported their objectives for more than a decade.
According to Pokrovsky, material needs were the basis of
human existence; as for history it was a revolutionary weapon
22which must be used to serve the needs of the state. In
other words, history was subordinated to politics, or as
Pokrovsky put it, "History is politics projected into the 
2 3past." The Russian Revolution was interpreted by Pokrovsky 
as the forerunner of an international workers revolution 
which would serve as an example for the inevitable uprising 
of all the working classes and subjugated colonial peoples 
of other countries. Historical phenomena such as nationalism
21 . . .Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet
Historiography," pp. 57-58.
22Hall, "Mikhael Nikolayevich Pokrovsky (1868-1932)," 
p. 353; Mazour and Bateman, Ibid., p. 58; Mazour, Modern 
Russian Historiography, p. 186.
23Mazour and Bateman, Ibid.; Sergius Yakobson, "Postwar 
Historical Research in the Soviet Union," Annals of the Ameri­
can Academy of Political Science, CCLXII (May, 1949), p. 123.
12
and patriotism or cultural and religious factors were com­
pletely rejected by Pokrovsky. The Russian past was not to 
be glorified; Tzarist Russia was depicted as a "prison of 
oppressed peoples." Nationalism and patriotism, in particular,
were interpreted by Pokrovsky as merely manifestations of
24traditional bourgeois historiography.
In general, historians of the Pokrovsky school explained 
historical events by means of socio-economic systems. They 
minimized the role played by individuals or any form of ideology 
which inspired leadership. The history of individual nations 
became unimportant since all events were explained simply as 
part of the overall class struggle. Thus the historian reduced 
the facts of history to general trends. Above all, it was the 
duty of every historian of the Pokrovsky school to wage a con­
stant war against the influence of bourgeois history and to be
continually on guard to avoid being deceived by bourgeois
25writers of the past.
The destruction caused by the civil war and the policy 
of War Communism forcibly introduced by the Bolsheviks led
24Paul H. Aron, "M.N. Pokrovsky and the Impact of 
the First Five Year Plan on Soviet Historiography," Essays 
in Russian and Soviet History, ed. John Shelton Curtiss 
TTlew York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 295-297;
Hall, "Mikhail Nikolayevich Pokrovsky (1868-1932)," p. 360.
O C /\
Hall, Ibid., pp. 349; Rafina Papouskava L'histoire 
en U.R.S.S.," Le Monde Slave, IV (October, 1936), p. 400.
13
to a wave of strikes and peasant uprisings which finally 
culminated in a rebellion at the Kronstadt Naval Base in 1921. 
These events prompted Lenin and his colleagues to modify their 
domestic programs for purely tactical reasons. In effect, the 
period of War Communism was a failure; it was replaced by the
so-called New Economic Policy which temporarily brought about
2 6a superficial normalization of conditions.
Within the ranks of the party, however, the New Economic
Policy touched off a wave of disillusionment. The difficulty
lay in the reconciliation of this policy with the original
revolutionary fervor and idealism of 1917. The doctrine of
"one step backward and two steps forward" which, according to
Lenin, meant that communism had merely retreated to make a new
start, did not allay the fears of several prominent Bolsheviks.
A few party members committed suicide, giving further evidence
to the dissatisfaction of this policy. The suicides were
accompanied by the appearance of elements in society which
were hostile to the Bolshevik regime; some even predicted a
27return to Czarist times.
In spite of the turmoil caused by the introduction of 
the New Economic Policy, Lenin held his ground; he continued 
to assert that this was the correct path to the new socialist
2 Kagan, "La Crise de la Science Historique Russe," p. 3; 
Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography," 
p . 58.
^Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought,"
p. 294.
14
2 8state. Lenin even made further concessions, especially with
regard to the intelligentsia. In his State and Revolution
Lenin had asserted that the intellectuals would voluntarily
join the ranks of the workers when revolution broke out in 
29Russia. Since this had not happened, Lenin tried to gain
the support of the educated, non-party members by reversing
his previous ideological stand. As for the historian, he was
granted more freedom to pursue independent research and, in
some instances, he was appointed to a position formerly
30reserved only for party members.
Lenin never realized his new approach to socialism.
His premature death in 1924 left the party leaderless and 
caused a power struggle between Trotsky and Stalin, the leaders 
of the opposition, who had already been quarreling about the 
direction of the revolution. Stalin contended that before 
world revolution could be realized, the resources of the Soviet 
Union ought to be concentrated in building socialism within its 
own borders. Trotsky argued that the Soviet Union must continue 
to intensify its efforts to bring about a world revolution.
? ftV. I. Lenin, ’’The New Economic Policy: Report Delivered
at the Seventh Moscow Gubernia Party Conference, October 29, 1921,” 
Vol. IX: V.I. Lenin: Selected Works, ed. J. Fineberg (12 Vols.; 
New York: International Publishers, 1937), pp. 276-294.
? Q
V. I. Lenin, ’’State and Revolution," Vol. VII: V. I.
Lenin: Selected Works, ed. J. Fineberg (12 Vols.; New York:
International Publishers, 1943) pp. 92-93.
on
Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," 
p. 295; Izvestia, May 12, 1927, p. 4.
15
In a series of shrewd tactical maneuvers, Stalin defeated the
Trotsky wing of the party and other opposing factions, finally
31emerging as leader of the party in 1928.
The power struggle within the ranks of the party afforded
the pre-1917 historian an opportunity to continue to write
history in the traditional frame of reference. In fact, during
the period of the New Economic Policy, two schools of historical
thought coexisted, both cooperating and tolerating each other
to a certain degree. Some non-Marxist historians were allowed
to join the Society of Marxist Historians, a policy which was
in keeping with Lenin's pronouncement concerning intellectuals.
Marxist, as well as Non-Marxist, historians participated in
historical congresses held in Berlin and Oslo. A few non-Marxist
historians were granted permission to leave the Soviet Union,
enabling them to continue their research in the archives of 
32foreign states.
Further evidence of the relatively peaceful coexistence
31Many articles touch on the party struggle. However, 
the most comprehensive treatment of this topic is Leonard 
Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: 
Random House, i960 j, pp." "267-3'S^; also see T. Szamuely, "The 
Elimination of Opposition Between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Congresses of the CPSU," Soviet Studies, XVII (January, 1966), 
pp. 318-338; Pravda, February 12” l’9"28"," p. 2; Pravda, September 
13, 1928, p. 4.
32Black, "History and Politics in the Soviet Union," 
Rewriting Russian History, pp. 5-7; Mazour and Bateman,
"Recent Conflicts m  Soviet Historiography," p. 58; Tompkins, 
"Trends in Communist Historical Thought," pp. 297-298.
16
between the official (Pokrovsky) school and the old historical
school can be seen in the number of new historical periodicals
initiated while the New Economic Policy was in effect. In
spite of the lack of funds, journals such as The Annals, The
Russian Past, Centuries, Russia and the West, Labors and Days,
and The Russian Historical Journal published articles dealing
with a variety of subjects of a non-Marxian nature. The history
of the Bolshevik Revolution and its antecedents was reversed
33exclusively for the Marxist historian.
Outwardly, it appeared that continued cooperation 
between the old and new historians was possible. However, a 
series of interrelated internal and external political events 
dispelled this illusion. The exile of Trotsky not only com­
pleted the victory of Stalin over the opposition, but it also 
weakened the party. At about the same time, the almost certain 
global wide depression fanned the hopes of world revolution 
among party theoreticians. But the most significant departure 
in party policy, which obliterated all objective history, was
33The most complete summaries of historical works 
written by Marxist and non-Marxist historians during this 
period can be found in the following articles: Fritz Epstein,
MDie Marxistische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sovetunion 
Seit 1927,” pp. 78-203; Antoine Florovsky, ”La Litterature 
Historique Sovietique-russe. Compte-rendu 1921-1931,”
Bulletin d * Information des Sciences Historique en Europe 
Orientale, VI (1934-193577 PP- 120-186, pp. 5-111; P. Vostokov, 
”Les Sciences Historiques en Russie,” Le Monde Slave, VII 
(September, 1930), pp. 438-68; (October, 1930)', pp. 79-98; 
(November, 1930), pp. 294-311; (December, 1930), pp. 437-460; 
VIII (February, 1931), pp. 265-294.
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the introduction of the First Five Year Plan by Stalin. It 
officially ended the era of compromise marked by the period 
of the New Economic Policy, and ushered in a policy of oppres­
sion. From this point on, compromise of any kind was not to 
be tolerated unless the conditions warranted it. A concerted 
effort was undertaken by the party to eliminate the opposition, 
including the bourgeois historians, so as to ensure the success 
of the First Five Year Plan. All resources were placed at the 
disposal of the state in support of the program of socialist 
reconstruction. Historians who had enjoyed some degree of 
freedom in the past were publicly castigated as enemies of 
the state. Some were accused of being saboteurs and others 
were labeled agents of foreign powers. Pokrovsky reached the 
zenith of his career as he became undisputed leader of all 
historians. His specific task was to organize a monolithic
historical front which would act as one voice in support of
. . 34
Stalin's policies.
For Pokrovsky, it was fortunate that he died in 1932.
Shortly thereafter, his interpretation of history became
34Ann K. Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a
Historian under the Soviet Regime," The American Slavic and 
East European Review, XIX (April, I960), p. 204; Kagan, "La 
Crise de la Science Historique Russe," p. 4; Mazour and Bateman, 
"Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography," p. 58; Mosely, 
"Freedom of Artistic Expression and Scientific Inquiry in Russia," 
p. 255; M.N. Pokrovsky, "Institut Istorii i Zadachi Istorikov 
Marksistov," Istorik Marksist, XIV (1929), pp. 3-12; Tompkins, 
"Trends in Communist Historical Thought," pp. 298-299.
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politically inconvenient for the regime and he, along with
several of his close associates, was posthumously purged from
the ranks of historians. He was accused of being anti-national
and anti-patriotic, of neglecting specific events, dates, facts,
chronology, and his entire conception of history was viewed as
35an empty generalized sociological scheme. In lieu of Pokrov­
sky’s anti-nationalistic approach to history, Stalin and his 
supporters initiated a rather narrow nationalistic interpreta­
tion. They were fully aware that a fresh climate of opinion 
had to be created to justify their domestic policies and a new 
direction had to be taken to strengthen the position of the 
Soviet Union in relation to the changes taking place on the 
international scene in the early thirties.
It became quite apparent to Stalin and his close ad­
visors that recent events on the foreign scene posed a direct 
threat to the existence of the Soviet Union. The triumph of 
Adolf Hitler, his purge of the German Communist Party, and his 
professed hatred of Bolshevism contributed heavily to change 
the attitude of Stalin and his clique. The rise of Fascist 
movements in Western Europe, the menace of an expansionist 
Japan, the failure of the working class to revolt during the
3 5Mazour and Bateman, Ibid., p. 59; Kark Radek, ”Ned-
ostatki istoricheskogo front i oshibki shkoly Pokrovskogo,”
Bolshevik, No. 5 (1936), pp. 53-66; B.H. Sumner, ’’Soviet
History,” Slavonic and East European Review. XVI (April,
1938), p. 603.
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world wide depression, and the economic recovery of the so-
called capitalist states also played a major role in the
36fundamental shift in Soviet thinking.
On the domestic scene, the initial implementation of 
the Five Year Plan, accompanied by forced collectivization, 
and the massive purge of the Kulak class, created severe 
economic and social problems. Government officials met with 
stubborn resistance throughout the Soviet Union when they 
tried to execute Stalin’s policies. In several regions of 
the Soviet Union separatist movements broke out among minority
nationalities, and, from the vantage point of the regime, it
37appeared that civil war was imminent. Confronted with these 
enormous domestic and foreign problems, a major effort was 
undertaken by the Soviet Government to gain the support of the 
masses and to promote the cooperation of the Western democracies.
Internally, as a means of distracting the masses' minds 
from the hardships caused by the Five Year Plan, to consolidate 
his power, and to eliminate the remaining opposition to his 
domestic policies, Stalin proclaimed that "class enemies" 
were entirely responsible. Trotskyite agents (among them
G.B. Carson, "Changing Perspectives in Soviet Histor­
iography," South Atlantic Quarterly, XLVII (April, 1948), pp. 
188-189; Mazour, "Party Line History," pp. 295-296; Klaus 
Mehnert, Stalin versus Marx (London: George Allen and Unwin
Limited, 1952), PP» 24-25.
37Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Histor­
iography," p. 59; Mehnert, Ibid., p. 25.
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several prominent historians) supported by Fascist states 
were blamed for sabotaging the government's efforts. Further­
more, they were accused of plotting to overthrow the Soviet 
regime and planning to replace it with a fascist government.
A wave of purges, culminating in the massive show trials of
38the middle and late thirties, followed Stalin's announcement.
While the "class enemies" were being rooted out, the 
Soviet Government launched a program to stimulate national 
sentiment among the masses and, at the same time, reversed 
its anti-Western attitude to gain the cooperation of demo­
cratic states by advocating a system of collective security
against the fascist threat. The fundamental aim of Soviet
39policy was to insure the safety of its own borders.
The signal for change began in 1934 when an editorial
appeared in Pravda praising the previously much maligned
40League of Nations. It was no longer considered a tool of 
the bourgeois-capitalist world, but rather an organ which 
stood for world peace. On September 18, 1934, the Soviet
V. Altman, "Chto chitat o Mirovoy Voyne," Borba Klassov, 
No. 5 (1931), pp. 120-21; Kagan, "La Crise de la Science Histor- 
ique Russe," p. 5; Mokhov, "Intervent Tarle Podzashchitoy Vosto­
kova," pp. 120-21; G. Zaidel and M. Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag 
na Istoricheskom Fronte, entire book.
3 Q
F. Barghoorn, "Stalinism and the Russian Cultural
Heritage," The Review of Politics, XIV (April, 1952), pp. 178-
182.
40Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet
Historiography," p. 59.
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Union entered the League of Nations.41 Soon after, a flood
of party directives appeared in newspapers and journals with
a decidedly pro-Western tone indicative of the new departure
in Soviet policy. The pro-Western attitude continued until
collective security failed with the dismemberment of Czecho- 
42Slovakia.
During this period, historians were given a key role 
in stimulating Soviet patriotism and in creating a pro-Western 
climate of opinion. As a result, two clearly marked tendencies 
appeared in Soviet historiography: an entirely new picture
of pre-1917 Russia and a revision of previous interpretations 
of Western European history. In fulfilling the former, the 
historian had to extol the heroic deeds of the masses by 
relating the significant role they played in defeating Russia's 
enemies. For example, the War of 1812 was now considered as 
a victory for the Russian people because of their efforts in 
the defeat of Napoleon. The "Time of Troubles” was viewed as 
a nationalistic movement on the part of the masses in driving 
foreign invaders from Russian soil. Minin and Pozharsky, two 
key figures of this period, were elevated to the ranks of folk 
heroes. Previously despised Tsars were rehabilitated by the
41Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
p. 482.
4? J. Stalin, V. Molotov, and A. Zhdanov, "Na Fronte 
Istoricheskoy Nauki," Bolshevik, No. 3 (1936), pp. 60-66.
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historian in line with the party's directives. Peter the Great 
was portrayed as a military genius whose reforms were considered 
progressive, and some historians even claimed that he was a 
forerunner of Bolshevism. Alexander Nevskii proved the invinci­
bility of Russians over Germans, and Ivan IV (not Ivan the 
Terrible) was a forward looking ruler and statesman. Military 
personalities, such as Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Bagration, were 
depicted as the initiators of a heroic military tradition.
Even Tsarist wars of aggression were interpreted as defensive 
43m  nature.
Prior to this period, Soviet historians had expressed 
a completely hostile attitude toward the historical develop­
ment of Western Civilization. To counteract this view, histor­
ians began to point out liberal trends in Western European 
history which helped to shape the culture and history of Russia. 
Democratic and socialist movements in Western Europe, according 
to historians now, had a positive impact upon the social devel­
opment and revolutionary tradition in Russia. In general, this
43
See the following articles in Cyril E. Black, ed. 
Rewriting Russian History, Leo Yaresh, "Ivan the Terrible and 
the Oprichnina,"pp^ 216-2 32; C.E. Black, "The Reforms of Peter 
the Great," pp. 233-259; Leo Yaresh, "The Campaign of 1812," 
pp. 261-289; Ernest Bock, "The Rewriting of Soviet History," 
History Today, IV (1954), p. 489; Mazour and Bateman, "Recent 
Conflicts m  Soviet Historiography," p. 59; A. Powell, "The 
Nationalist Trend in Soviet Historiography," Soviet Studies,
II (April, 1951), pp. 372-377; B.H. Sumner, "Soviet History," 
Slavonic and East European Review, XVII (July, 1938), pp. 157- 
160; Georg von Rauch, "Grundlinien der Sowjetischen Geschichts- 
forschung im Zeichen des Stalinismus," pp. 3386-3388, 3428-32.
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interpretation was similar in many respects to the thought of
the Western oriented intelligentsia of the nineteenth century.
As events proved, however, after World War II the historian was
to suffer the consequence for his pro-Western attitude and his
44explanation of Russia's indebtedness to the West.
By 1939 the international scene in Europe had changed
considerably. Austria had become part of Germany, the Spanish
Civil War had produced a Fascist regime, and the fate of
Czechoslovakia had been determined at the Munich Conference.
Infuriated by the events at Munich, Stalin interpreted the
settlement as a capitalist-imperialist plot concocted by
Great Britain and France for the purpose of giving Hitler the
opportunity to attack the Soviet Union. Fearing the danger of
a German attack, Stalin courted the Nazi Government and was
45able to conclude a Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939.
When the Germans attacked Poland, Stalin, in accordance with 
the secret provisions of the Non-Aggression Pact, delivered 
the final blow by ordering the Red Army to march on Poland. 
Shortly after, Soviet forces invaded Finland. For this act 
the Soviet Union was expelled from the now moribund League
44Carson, ’’Changing Perspectives in Soviet Historiogra­
phy,” p. 191; Mazour and Bateman, Ibid.
Ratifikatsii Sovetsko-germanskogo dogovora o 
nenapadenii-soobshchenie tov. Molotova na zasedanii verkhov— 
nogo Soveta Soyuz SSR 31 Avgusta 1939 Goda,” Istoricheskii 
Zhurnal, No. 9 (September, 1939), pp. 1-8.
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46of Nations.
The events of 1939, especially the conclusion of the 
Non-aggression Pact with Germany, set the stage for another 
drastic revision of history. Until the Germans attacked the 
Soviet Union in 1941, historians tried desperately to justify 
the regime's policies. Fascist states were no longer con­
sidered enemies, since it was argued that France and Great 
Britain had plotted to destroy the Soviet Union. Historians 
pointed out that Germany and Russia had a long tradition of 
friendly relations. Particular emphasis was placed on the
47nineteenth century in order to justify this point of view.
The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 ended 
this trend in historiography and signalled an immediate about 
face in the writing of history. During the early stages of 
the war, when German armies scored smashing victories, histor­
ical output was aimed particularly at bolstering the sagging 
morale of the population and the army. For the most part, 
therefore, historians dealt with patriotic themes and produced
46Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
p. 489.
4 7A. Tonapetyan, "Angliiskaya interventsia v Zakavkaze," 
and V. Virginskii, "Panamskii Kanal," Istoricheskii Zhurnal,
No. 2 (1940), pp. 47-53, 87-96; V. Golant, "Anglnskii imperial- 
izm v Yuzhnoy Afrike," and Ya. Goldberg, "Frantsuzskaya imper- 
ialisticheskoy voiny," Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 6 (1940), 
pp. 53-64, 65-74.
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48volumes of anti-German polemics. Another important feature 
of this period was the almost complete absence of ideological 
conformity. In fact, the historian was given great latitude 
in interpreting historical events. Foremost in the minds 
of Stalin and his advisors was the survival of the Soviet 
regime which necessitated the total support of all Russians 
and, in particular, the historian.
As for the United States and Great Britain, the allies 
of the Soviet Union, they were no longer denounced as hostile, 
capitalist states. Instead, they were placed almost on an 
equal level with the Soviet Union and constantly referred to 
as democratic, peace-loving, parliamentary states whose masses 
enjoyed a considerable amount of political freedom. The ration­
ale behind this shift in Soviet attitude toward the West was 
twofold. The United States and Great Britain were involved 
in a struggle against the common enemy, Germany, and the 
Soviet Union desperately needed all the aid it could get
48Needly, "Kannibalskaya rasistskaya teoria v fashistskoy 
istoriografii," and A. Predtechenskii, MOtechestvennaya Voyna 
1812," Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 8 (1941), pp. 61-74, 81-101;
S. Gopner, "Edinye front narodov protiv gitlerovskoy Germanii," 
and V. Picheta, "Vekovaya borba polskogo naroda s nemetskimi 
zakhvatchikami," Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 9 (1941), pp. 1-13, 
64-73; B.D. GrekoTJ and E.V. Tarle, "Soviet Historical Research," 
Science and Society, VII (Winter, 1943), pp. 229-232.
49from its allies.
Towards the end of World War II, it became increasingly 
apparent that cooperation between the Soviet Union and the 
West was merely an expedient measure.^ With the final capit­
ulation of Nazi Germany, the spirit of the so-called "Grand 
Alliance” officially came to an end. On the international 
scene, the Soviet Union emerged as a world power in control 
of Central Europe and most of the Balkans. As war time agree­
ments between the Soviet Union and its Western allies broke 
down, the United States began to take an active role in pre­
venting further Soviet expansion. On the domestic scene, the 
defeat of Germany marked the end of war time relaxation as the 
regime tightened its controls on all aspects of life. In light 
of the stand taken by the United States in blocking Soviet 
attempts at domination of Western Europe, a new cultural offen­
sive was initiated to eliminate all vestiges of Western European 
influences. A major role was assigned to the historian in 
creating this new milieu. As a result, Soviet historiography 
since 1945 has been conditioned by the Cold War atmosphere and 
distinguished by the following tendencies: its political
4^See the following editorials in Bolshevik: No. 17
(September, 1941), pp. 5-14; No. 10-11 (June, 1945"), pp. 63-67;
No. 9 (May, 1942), p. 37; No. 24 (December, 1942), p. 6.
50John L. Snell, Illusion and Necessity: The Diplomacy
of Global War 1939-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963),
entire book.
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propangandist nature, its ultra-nationalistic overtones sym-
bollically represented in the historical role of the Great
Russians during the "Great Fatherland War," its complete
negation of Western culture, and, until 1956, the intensi-
51fication of the Stalin "cult of the personality."
The first sign of impending change was the suspension 
of the publication of Istoricheskii Zhurnal which was replaced 
by a new journal entitled Voprosy Istorii. Its first editorial 
gave the reason for the demise of Istoricheskii Zhurnal: it
failed to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the party. The 
editorial also emphasized the objectives of Voprosy Istorii: to
deal with historical questions of a more theoretical nature, 
to serve as an organ of the government, to counteract the ex­
cessive nationalism of the war years, and to rewrite history
52
in an anti-Western frame of reference.
By the beginning of 1946, any form of hope of coopera­
tion between the Soviet Union and the West had all but disap­
peared. Under the direction of Andrei Zhdanov, who was charged 
with the task of cultural discipline by Stalin, an all out at­
tack was launched on the influence of Western culture in Soviet
51Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Soviet Union Between War 
and Cold War," The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, Vol. 263 (May~^ 1949) , P* 1«
52Editorial, "Zadachi Zhurnala Voprosy Istorii," pp. 3-5; 
(See footnote 5).
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intellectual life. In a speech delivered at a meeting of 
Soviet writers on August 21, 1946, Zhdanov officially in­
augurated the Cold War when he declared,
The position of socialism was strengthened as a result 
of World War II. The question of socialism has been enter­
ed into the agenda of many countries of Europe. This dis­
pleases the imperialists of all shades; they fear socialism, 
fear our socialist country which is an example for the whole 
of progressive mankind. The imperialists, their ideological 
henchmen, their writers, and journalists, their politicians 
and diplomats are trying to slander our country in every 
way they can, to represent it in a wrong light, to slander 
socialism. Under these conditions the task of Soviet 
literature is not only to return blow for blow against 
all this vile slander and these attacks upon our Soviet 
culture, upon socialism, but also boldly to attack bourgeois 
culture which is in a state of degeneration and decay.
In another speech in September, Zhdanov reiterated this theme:
It is no accident that in the literary journals of 
Leningrad people have been carried away with enthusiasm 
for the contemporary, low caliber bourgeois literature 
of the West. Some of our literary people have begun to 
regard themselves not as teachers but as pupils of bour- 
eois and petty bourgeois literati, have fallen into a tone 
of kowtowing and self prostration before petty bourgeois 
foreign literature. Is such kowtowing fitting for us,
Soviet patriots, for us who have built the Soviet order 
which is a hundred times loftier and better than any 
bourgeois order? Is kowtowing before the narrow minded 
petty bourgeois literature of the West fitting for our 
progressive Soviet literature; the most revolutionary 
literature in the world?
Zhdanov's speeches also set the tone for the future of 
Soviet historiography. A new Five Year Plan was introduced
James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera (ed.) Materials 
For the Study of the Soviet System (Ann Arbor: George Wahr
Publishing Company, 1953), p. 384.
S4 .Andrei Zhdanov, "Doklad o Zhurnalakh Zvezda i Lenin­
grad," Literaturnaya Gazeta, No. 39 (1946), pp. 2-3.
29
to eliminate all references to bourgeois culture in history
textbooks. In other words, history had to be rewritten to
conform to current trends in domestic and foreign policy.
Moreover, additional emphasis was placed on the role played
by the Great Russians during the Second World War and the
progressive influence they exerted on minority nationalities
within the Soviet Union. At the same time, the historian had
to walk a narrow path because he could not minimize the part
55played by minority groups m  defending the Soviet Union.
Dissatisfied with the progress of the new Five Year 
Plan in history, Deputy Premier Malenkov, in a speech deliv­
ered late in 1948, repeated Zhdanov’s views by announcing that
the historian must encourage Soviet patriotism by extermina-
5 6ting all traces of bourgeois culture. He argued that it was
preying on Soviet citizens and worked as a tool of American
57and British imperialism.
Malenkov’s speech was followed by an editorial in 
Voprosy Filosofii entitled "Against the Bourgeois Ideology 
of Cosmopolitanism," marking the beginning of the use of anti-
55CPSP, Vol. I, No. 10 (April 5, 1949), pp. 54-55, "Why 
Are There No General Textbooks?" (See footnote five).
56CDSP, Vol. I, No. 35 (September 27, 1949), pp. 3-9; 
(Editorial! "Tasks of Soviet Historians in the Field of Modern 
and Recent History," Voprosy Istorii, No. 3 (March, 1949), 
pp. 3-13.
57Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet 
Historiography," p. 62.
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Western cliches so characteristic of the post World War II
period. The widely used term "cosmopolitanism" was applied
to Western European states which joined together under the
leadership of the United States to block Soviet designs in
Western Europe. According to the editorial,
cosmopolitanism is a reactionary ideology preaching re­
nunciation of national traditions, disdain for the dis­
tinguishing features in the national development of each 
people and renunciation of the feelings of national dig­
nity and national pride. Cosmopolitanism conceals either 
an imperialistic great power chauvanism toward other nations 
or a nihilistic attitude toward one's own nation, a betrayal 
of national interests. Reactionary American imperialism 
has made cosmopolitanism its ideological banner as a capit­
alistic scheme to enslave Europe and to annihilate indepen­
dent nations. American imperialism strives to place the 
whole world under its s w a y .  5*3
In opposition to cosmopolitanism was Soviet patriotism, pro­
fessing a love of one's country and a respect for internation- 
59alism.
Western historiography as a whole came under attack 
and was denounced as "bourgeois objectivism," Western histor­
ians were critized for failing to write history within the 
only "true scientific framework" that is, Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine. In the case of the United States, specifically, * 
the term socio-reformism was applied to periods in American
CDSP. Vol. I, No. 1 (February 1, 1949), pp. 5-12; 
(Editorial! "Against the Bourgeois Ideology of Cosmopolitanism," 
Voprosy Filosofii, No. 2 (1948), pp. 3-12.
59Pravda, April 7, 1949, editorial, p. 1.
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history referred to as the ’’New Deal,” ’’Fair Deal,” and the
’’New Freedom.” All these movements were instituted by the
60ruling class in order to deceive the proletariat.
Shortly after the editorial appeared in Voprosy 
Filosofii, several historians were attacked by the Party 
because of Western influences in their works. The brunt 
of the attack was directed at Nicholas Rubinstein who pub­
lished a book entitled Russkaya Istoriografia in 1941 with the 
blessings of the regime. Written in the spirit of war time 
cooperation, Rubinstein’s book viewed the development of 
Russian and Soviet historiography as an integral part of the 
Western European tradition. His failure to revise his work 
in accordance with Zhdanov's speeches about the autochthonous 
nature of Russian culture and the uniqueness of its historical 
tradition was the principle reason for his castigation. 
Reprimanded by his colleagues and forced to confess his 
errors, Rubinstein agreed with the criticism and suggested 
that an entirely new work on Soviet historical development 
be prepared by a group of historians under the guidance of 
the Party.
6°CPSP, Vol. I, No. 6 (March 8, 1949), pp. 11-17;
(editorial) ] ’’Against Objectivism in Historical Science,” 
Voprosy Istorii, No. 12, (December, 1948), pp. 3-12.
61Ibid., p. 12; CDSP Vol. I, No. 26 (July 26, 1949), 
pp. 1 6 - 2 3 ; ( Editorial) ”0n the Tasks of Soviet Historians 
in the Struggle with Manifestations of Bourgeois Ideology,” 
Voprosy Istorii, No. 2. (1949), pp. 3-13.
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While Rubinstein and other historians were being 
severely criticized, an editorial appeared in Voprosy 
Istorii indicating the party’s complete dissatisfaction 
with the work of historians in the area of modern history. 
Violently anti-American, the editorial outlined the tasks 
of the historian. He was to deal exclusively with the 
history of American imperialism, wage all out ideological 
warfare with "Anglo-American falsifiers of history," and 
portray the United States as the symbolic leader of the 
forces of reaction and cultural decadence. In sharp contrast 
to the United States, the historian was instructed to repre­
sent the Soviet Union as the champion in the world struggle 
for justice and progress. He was also ordered to stress the 
progressive nature of Russian culture showing how it historically 
benefited Slavic (non-Russian) and non-Slavic minorities now 
within the Soviet orbit. Used pragmatically by the regime 
to justify both Tsarist and Soviet expansion, this view 
served as the basis for the development and eventual accept­
ance of the "lesser evil" formula. Accordingly, the Great 
Russians served as elder brothers and guides in the economic and 
cultural development of disparate ethnic groups. It was far more 
advantageous for them to come under Russian tutelage rather than
62CDSP. Vol. I, No, 35 (September 27, 1949), pp. 3-9;
"Tasks of Soviet Historians in the Field of Modern and Recent 
History," Voprosy Istorii, No. 3 (March, 1949), pp. 3-7.
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Turkish, Persian, or Chinese. The acceptance of this thesis 
was confirmed when the government ordered it to be taught in 
secondary schools.^
Another mandatory task of the historian during this 
period was to build up the image of Stalin. This was by 
no means a new assignment. Beginning in the mid-thirties, 
Stalin's role in the development of all areas of Soviet 
life had received a considerable amount of attention. The 
victory over Nazi-Germany added more fuel to the already 
legendary deeds and qualities of Stalin. Portrayed as the 
savior of the Soviet Union because of his brilliant military 
tactics during the "Great Fatherland War," Stalin was viewed 
as the foremost commander and strategist in Russian history. 
His "peaceful" foreign policy, compared with the war-like 
actions of Western statesmen, earned him the title "champion 
in the fight for peace." Furthermore, Stalin was solely 
responsible for the liberation of Europe from the Fascist 
yoke. Finally, he played a major role in freeing the Chinese
See the following articles in CDSP: Vol. 3, No. 31
(August, 1951), pp. 4-5; M. Nechkina, "On the Question of the 
Lesser Evil Formula," Voprosy Istorii, IV (April, 1951) pp. 44- 
48; Vol. 3, No. 50 (January 26, 1952), pp. 11-15; M. Mustafayev, 
"The Lesser Evil Formula," Voprosy Istorii, No. 9 (September, 
1951), pp. 97-101; Vol. 3, No. ”'5(5 (January 26, 1952 ), pp. 15-16; 
K. Nayakshin, "On the Question of Russia's Annexation of the 
Middle Volqa Region," Voprosy Istorii, No. 9 (September, 1951), 
pp. 108-111; Vol. 4, No. 2 (February, 1952), pp. 8-9; A. Yakunin, 
"On the Use of the Lesser Evil Formula in Assessing Annexation 
of Non-Russian Nationalities to Russia," Voprosy Istorii, No. 11 
(November, 1951), pp. 83-86.
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64-from the despotism of Chiang Kai-Shek.
The death of Stalin in 1953 did not produce any im­
mediate changes in the writing of history. In general, 
historical output between 1953 and 1956 followed the tend­
encies generated by the post World War II scene. The prin­
cipal reason for the apparent lack of historical directives 
was the fact that the leading members of the party were 
engaged in a struggle for power. Even with the triumph of 
Khrushchev in 1956 as the party leader, the duties of the 
historian were yet uncertain.
Since this dissertation deals with the career of 
E.V. Tarle who died in 1955, suffice it to say that despite 
the "thaw” and the policy of de-Stalinization during the 
Khrushchev period, the historian to the present day is a 
servant of the state. He is told what to write by the 
party and any deviation leads to severe censure.
64-The following articles are by no means a comprehen­
sive list of the building of the "cult of the personality,"
CDSP, Vol. I, No. 2 (February 8, 1949), pp. 37-38. "The Party 
of Lenin-Stalin is the Directing Force in the Struggle for 
Building Communism," S. Abalin, Pravda (January 12, 1951), 
p. 2; CDSP, Vol. Ill, No. 45 (December 22, 1951), pp. 8-11;
N. Talensky, "Great Lesson of History," Bolshevik, No. 11 
(June, 1951), pp. 24-36; CDSP, Vol. Ill, No. 45 (December 22, 
1951), pp. 11-12; "Toward the Tenth Anniversary of J.V.
Stalin’s Report on the Twenty-Fourth Anniversary of the Great 
October Socialist Revolution," Pravda (November 6, 1951), p. 2; 
CDSP, Vol. II, No. 20 (July 1, 1950), pp. 10-13; Suvorov Ses- 
quicentennial." In these articles Stalin is compared with 
Suvorov and placed above him in the Russian military tradition. 
CDSP, Vol. II, No. 31 (September 16, 1950), pp. 3-7; (Editorial) 
"On the Tasks of Studying the History of the Stalinist Foreign 
Policy of the Soviet Union," Voprosy Istorii, No. 4 (April 1950), 
pp. 3-11.
CHAPTER II
E.V. TARLE'S CAREER BEFORE THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION
In 1962, seven years after the death of E.V. Tarle,
The Soviet Academy of Science completed the publication of 
twelve volumes of his works.'1' The chief editor, A.S. Erusa- 
limskii, who wrote the biographical sketch of Tarle, was 
aided by other members of the historical section of the 
Academy in producing this multi-volume collection. Excel­
lent chronological bibliographical data, as well as repre­
sentative works of Tarle including articles, book reviews, and 
monographic studies are furnished by the editors. In general, 
adequate materials have been supplied for the study of Tarle's 
career under the Tsarist and Soviet regimes.
There are, however, some shortcomings. The collection 
is not a complete compilation of Tarle's writings and far too
great an emphasis is placed on his professional activities
2
during the Stalin era. Thus the use of Western sources is 
extremely important as they supply the additional data
1A.S. Erusalimskii (glavny redaktor). Akademik Evqenii 
Viktorovich Tarle Sochineniya v Dvenadtsati Tomakh (Moskva: 
Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 195 7-1962). Hereafter cited 
as Sochineniya and Volume Number.
2 . . .A complete bibliography of Tarle's works is given m
Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 486-521.
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necessary for a more complete picture of Tarle's long 
productive career, the evolution of his historical views, 
and especially his checkered relations with the Soviet 
government. Non-Russian sources fill in vital chunks of 
information conveniently left out by the Soviet editors.
For example, Erusalimskii1s biographical sketch makes no 
mention of the following difficulties encountered by Tarle 
beginning in 1928: the violent attack and subsequent
denunciation of Tarle by the Pokrovsky historical school; 
the trumped up charge of his involvement in a plot to over­
throw the Soviet government, his imprisonment for one year 
in Leningrad; his banishment to Central Asia; and, the 
recurring attacks on his professional competence throughout 
his career for failing to rewrite his works in accordance
3
with the changing party line.
One final observation should be made concerning the 
biographical sketch before evaluating the life and works 
of E.V. Tarle. Striking similarities are obvious when 
Tarle’s career is compared to the respective fictional
^Sochineniya, Vol. I, pp. XXIII-XXIV. Although the 
editors of the collected works make no mention of Tarle's 
difficulties beginning in 1928, several articles appeared in 
Istorik Marksist written by Pokrovsky and members of this 
historical school which attacked Tarle for his interpretation 
of the causes of World War I. Later, (in the journal Bolshevik), 
Tarle was criticized for his views concerning the role of Marshal 
Kutuzov in the Fatherland War of 1812.
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heroes of Mikhail Sholokhov’s novel Quiet Flows the Don and
Leonid Leonov's The Thief. Tarle appears to experience the
same transformation as his fictional counterparts Gregor
Melikhov and Mitka Vekshin who in the beginning reject the
ideals of the Bolshevik Revolution, but in the end go through
a metamorphosis and accept the new Soviet way of life. As
a former "bourgeois" historian who at first is an opponent
of Communist ideology, Tarle over a period of time sees the
unequivocal truth in Marxist-Leninist historical science and
the achievements of the Revolution. It is precisely because
of these factors that Tarle became one of the most outspoken
proponents of Soviet historical scholarship and the new way
of life. Finally, and even more important, is the fact that
Tarle's pen unquestionably served the propaganda needs of the
4
Soviet government on the domestic and foreign scene.
Apparently from a middle class background, E.V. Tarle 
was born in either Kiev or Nikolaev in the Ukraine on November 
8, 1875. The exact place of birth remains a mystery as Soviet 
biographical sketches mention both cities as Tarle's birth­
place.5 At an early age Tarle moved, together with his family,
4"Der Treitschke des Stalinismus," Ost-Probleme, No. 43 
(October, 1950), pp. 1350-1351.
5Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. VII; A.S. Manfred, "Evgenii 
Viktorovich Tarle," Iz_ Istorii Obshchestvennykh Dvizhenii i_ 
Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii
Nauk SSSR, 1957), p. 5; Ann K. Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The
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to the town of Kherson where he was enrolled in the local
gymnasium. According to Erusalimskii, "Tarle astonished his
teachers because of his exceptional memory and his profound
knowledge in the fields of history and Russian literature."
He also displayed a considerable amount of interest in the
7
work of the English historian Thomas Carlyle. It appears
that this early interest in Carlyle may have influenced Tarle
throughout his career as many of his monographs are devoted
to the study of the role of the individual in history.
After completing his education at the gymnasium in
0
1892, Tarle enrolled at the University of Odessa. In the 
same year, for some unknown reason, he transferred to the 
University of Kiev where he began to study the history and 
philosophy of the Middle Ages under the direction of I.V. 
Luchitskii. A leading historian of the "Russian historical 
school" who specialized in the social and economic history
Career of a Historian Under the Soviet Regime," p. 202, 
footnotes one and two; Edgar Hosch, Evgenii Viktorovic Tarle 
( 1875-1955 ) und Seine Stellung in Per Sowjetischen Geschichts- 
wissenschaft (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1964) p. 15,
footnote twenty.
8Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. VII.
^Ibid.
8Ibid; Franco Venturi, "Evgenii V. Tarle," Rivista Storica 
Italiana, LXVIII (1956), p. 192; Wiktor Weintraub, "Blaski i 
Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," in Polskie Towarzystwo 
Historycze w Wielkiej Brytani: Teki Historyczne, I (1946),
p. 81.
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of Western Europe, Luchitskii had established his reputation 
by publishing important studies on the agrarian situation in 
France under the Ancien Regime and the condition of the pea-
Q
sants just prior to the outbreak of the French Revolution.
These works were based on newly uncovered documentary materials 
which Luchitskii had gathered from the provincial archives of 
France on several trips to that country.^
The "Russian historical school" stems from the Western 
educated intelligentsia of the nineteenth century, men imbued 
with the spirit of the enlightenment and dedicated to its 
ideas of political and social justice. Frustrated by Czars, 
secret police, and censors, unable to implement their programs 
of reforms, the intelligentsia began to turn toward progressive 
movements in Western European history. Even before this time, 
Russian historians in general had been obsessed with the harsh 
economic and social conditions which existed under autocracy. 
Thus it was a simple matter for the historian to regard the 
liberalizing tendencies of the French Revolution and its long
9Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "I.V. Luchitskii: k pyatides-
yatiletiyu ego nauchno-literaturnoy deyatelnosti," pp. 378- 
394; V. Butenko, translated from Annaly. 1922 Rene Martel,
"La Science de l ’histoire moderne en Russie," Revue Historique, 
III (1929), p. 110; P. Vostokov, "Les Sciences historiques 
en Russie," Le Monde Slave, VII (1930), pp. 438—439; N.J. 
Kareev, "La Revolution Francaise dans la Science Historique 
Russe," La Revolution Francaise, No. 42 (1902), pp. 321-345.
^Sochineniya, Vol. I, pp. VII-VIII.
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range effects as the most forward looking trend in history*
Had it not created a new social and economic order based on
the rational humanitarian principles of the eighteenth
11century philosophies?
The death of Nicholas I and the accession to the 
throne of Alexander II— to be followed soon after by the 
Emancipation Edict— fanned the hopes of reform among intel­
lectual circles. The relaxation of censorship, the removal 
of teaching restrictions, the updating of the curriculum at 
the university level especially in the field of history, the 
opening of archival repositories, and the permission granted 
by the government to permit historians to travel and do 
research in Western European libraries in the 1870*s contri­
buted heavily to the rapid rise and popularity of the "Russian 
historical school." Even the repressive measures instituted 
during the reign of Alexander III could not counter these 
tendencies in Russian intellectual life. As a result, by the 
1890’s historians of this school had made valuable scholarly 
contributions to the economic and social history of the French 
Revolution with work based primarily on previously unpublished
■^Herbert E. Bowman, "Literary and Historical Scholar­
ship," The Transformation of Russian Society: Aspects of Social
Change, ed. Cyril E. BlackTCambridge: Harvard University Press,
19&0), pp. 371-376; Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," pp. 186-190.
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12archival materials.
The influence of Luchitskii, the studies produced by
historians of the "Russian School," the climate of opinion
among intellectual circles, and the social and economic
conditions of Russia had a profound influence on Tarle.
These forces helped to shape and color his views of history
as well as his ideas concerning social and economic reform.
His best known pre-Soviet works were studies of the social
and economic conditions in France during the era of the
French Revolution and Napoleonic period. Like the works of
his mentor Luchitskii and the historians of the "Russian
School," Tarle's publications were based on documentary
materials which he collected on his numerous trips to France
13and other Western European states.
In 1896, upon completion of his candidacy paper, 
"Pietro Pomponazzi and Skeptical Movements in Italy at the 
Beginning of the Sixteenth Century," Tarle was graduated 
from the University of Kiev.14 Two years later, he left
i p
Martel., "La Science de l'histoire moderne en Russie," 
pp. 109-113; P. Vostokov, "Les Science historique en Russie," 
pages 439 and 455; Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," pp. 188-190; 
Edgar Hosch, "Der Historiographische Umbruch in Russland:
Tarle als Beispiel," Saeculum, XI (1960), pp. 202-206.
13Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XVII; A.S. Manfred, "Evgenii 
Viktorovich Tarle," pp. 5—6; Alfred Meusel, "Zum Andenken an 
E.V. Tarle," Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswissenschafjt, III 
(1955), p. 149.
14 ^Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. 8.
Russia to undertake intensive research in Western European
archives, where he was able to collect enough materials for
his early publications and to acquaint himself thoroughly
with Thomas More and English history of the sixteenth century.
The work on More was in preparation for his Master's degree.
His trip to France resulted in the publication of two articles
in 1898, one dealing with the thought of Gracchus Babeuf and
the other with French political activities in the eighteenth 
15century.
Between 1898 and 1901 Tarle wrote several articles,
monographs, and reviews on a wide variety of subjects, such
as Charles Parnell, German humanism, the history of Athens
in the Middle Ages, Italy during the Middle Ages, and social
16movements in Europe during the nineteenth century. For the 
most part, Tarle produced nothing original in these early 
works. In fact, during these formative years, Tarle merely 
rehashed what had already been written by historians in
^ Sochineniya, Vol. XII, p. 486; "Delo Babefa: Ocherk
iz istorii Frantsii" Mir Bozhii, No. 4 (1898), pp. 73-99;
No. 5 (1898), pp. 1-24; "Politicheskii deyatel1 staroy Frantsii, 
Mir Bozhii, No. 8 (1898), pp. 1-33; No. 9 (1898), pp. 1-32.
16Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 486-487; "Charles Parnell," 
Mir Bozhii, No. 1 (1899) , pp. 1-26; No. 2, pp. 58-89; No. 3, 
pp. '§2-110; Review of L. Geiger's, "Istoriya Italii v Srednie 
Veka," (1901); "Kharakteristika obshchestvennykh dvizhenii v 
Evrope XIX Veka," Vestnik Evropy, No. 2 (1901), pp. 702-730;
No. 3, pp. 167-198.
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these areas. Perhaps, of all these works, his treatment 
of Charles Parnell appeared to be the most representative 
of his early historical conceptions. Absorbed in the history 
of recent times, especially with social problems and revolu­
tionary movements, Tarle shed additional light on the struggle 
for Irish independence and, more broadly, the relations be­
tween Britain and Ireland. In this essay, he also dealt with
the theme of the role of the individual as a creative agent in 
18history. This work was foreshadowed in content by Tarle's
short study of "The Peasants in Hungary During the Reforms 
19of Joseph II."
In 1901, after successfully defending his thesis, "The 
Social Attitudes of Thomas More in Connection with the Eco­
nomic Conditions of England of His Time," Tarle was awarded 
his Master's degree. Later, in the same year, the publica­
tion of his thesis caused heated discussion among academic 
circles at the University of Kiev. The work was criticized 
primarily for the superficial manner in which he utilized
17Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," p. 194; Sochineniya,
Vol. I, p. IX.
Sochineniya, Vol. I, "Charles Parnell: Stranitsa
iz istorii Anglii i Irlandii," pp. 39-118; A.S. Manfred, 
"Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," p. 7.
19 Sochineniya, Vol. I, "Krestyane v Vengrii do 
Reformy Iosifa II," pp. 3-118.
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his sources. It showed, however, that Tarle was keenly 
aware of acute domestic problems, the evolution of the 
Utopian socialist tradition, and the reasons for the devel­
opment of socialist thought. Tarle was not a socialist 
himself, and, in fact, criticized Marxism. He contended 
that, "Marx did not have the scholarly right to present 
prognoses, for his prediction of revolution did not come 
true."21
Tarle's activities were not strictly confined to
academic matters. On evidence given by his sister, he
attended illegal lectures conducted by members of the Social
Democratic Party. According to an article in Izvestiia, he
was arrested for being present at one such lecture in 1901,
22but was released by the authorities for lack of evidence.
Tarle was never pardoned for his guilt by association. He
23was judged unreliable by the secret police. Based on 
this one incident, the Soviet editors attempted to play up 
Tarle's Marxist sympathies, but, according to Weintraub,
20 Sochineniya, Vol. XII, p. XIV; Sochineniya, Vol. I, 
"Obshchestvennye vozzreniya Tomasa Mora v svyazi s ekonom- 
icheskim sostoyaniem Anglii ego vremeni," pp. 121-164.
2Sochineniya, Vol. XI, p. 4; Weintraub, "Blaski i 
Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 84.
2 2Izvestiia, "Perevybory prezidenta Akademii Nauk 
SSSR," May 12, 1927, p. 1.
22Sochineniya, Vol. XII, p. XIII.
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"it is a risky thing to draw from this one detached episode
    O A
any far reaching conclusions /that Tarle was a Marxist/."
In his early years, Tarle’s sentiments were close to those 
of the Social Democrats, but by 1905 a change in his political 
ideology began to occur. As a "leftist” member of the Con­
stitutional Democratic Party, he participated with students 
from the University of St. Petersburg in the street demon­
strations against Tsarist autocracy. On October 18, in one 
such demonstration, Tarle was severely wounded when Tsarist
troops opened fire. Recovering from his wound, he was per-
25mitted to return to his teaching position. When World 
War I began, Tarle actively supported Russia’s entry, its 
territorial ambitions, its so-called obligations to its
2 6Slavic brothers, and, especially, its alliance with France.
Under constant surveillance by the authorities be­
cause of his liberal political activities and ideas, Tarle 
was nevertheless promoted to Assistant Professor of History 
at the University of St. Petersburg. Almost immediately, he
24 . .Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dzeijow Zycia Prof.
Tarlego," p. 85.
2 5 . . .Sochineniya, Vol. XII, p. XV; Hosch, Evgeni] Vik-
torovic Tarle (1875-1955) und Seine Stellung in Per Sowjet- 
ischen Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 17; Venturi, "Evgeni V. 
Tarle," p. 197; M.N. Pokrovsky, "Burzhuaznie istoriki zapada 
v SSSR (Tarle, Petrushevskii, Kareev, Buzeskul i dr.),"
Istorik Marksist, Vol. XXI (1931), pp. 56-57.
? fiSochineniya, Vol. XI, p. 5; Weintraub, "Blaski i 
Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 85.
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became a very popular lecturer and teacher who possessed
the oratorical qualities and professional knowledge to
attract students from other fields to elect his courses.
Tarle's teaching career was focussed on courses dealing with
the general history of Europe in the eighteenth century. He
also offered special seminars on the French Revolution and
27the Napoleonic period. Why Tarle was not removed from his 
teaching position has not been explained. Perhaps the author­
ities felt that his dismissal might cause serious repercussions 
among the student body and faculty because of his popularity. 
And, after all, Tarle's misdemeanor was rather minor when 
compared with the extensive illegal underground political 
activity which was taking place in Russia at that time.
After 1905, Tarle's experiences with the government 
were reflected in several of his publications. Although 
well-documented and presented in a scholarly manner, his 
writings became propagandistic in tone and intent. To avoid 
the wrath of the secret police and the censors, Tarle wrote 
a number of articles pertaining to French history in the 
eighteenth century which had obvious implications for auto­
cracy in Russia and for those liberals who had compromised 
with it when they accepted the reforms promised by Nicholas II
^^Sochineniya, Vol. XII, p. XV.
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during the Revolution of 1905. Tarle's disdain for these
liberals was illustrated quite clearly in an article written
in 1908 entitled, "The Unfortunate Compromise." The analogy
drawn by Tarle between the French bourgeoisie who supported
the Bourbon restoration after the demise of Napoleon I with
the "Octobrists" who broke away from the Constitutional
Democratic Party after the issuance of the October Manifesto
2 8by Nicholas II, was remarkably striking. In another 
article published in 1913, Tarle vigorously defended the 
ideas of French bourgeois liberalism against the dual con­
servatism of the Bourbons and Jesuits. He also argued that 
the French bourgeoisie was the only class which actively
struggled against the preservation of the vestiges of feu- 
29dalism. Other essays written by Tarle during this period 
in a similar vein, such as "The Decline of Absolutism in 
Western Europe," "The Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizens," "Separation of Church and State in France," and 
"The Role of Students in the Revolutionary Movements in 
Europe in 1848," were all indicative of his uncompromising 
stand with regard to Tsarism. Finally, it appears that
? Q
Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Neudavshiisya Kompromiss," 
pp. 286-341; p. 2.
29Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Paul-Louis Kure (1772-1825)," 
pp. 342-361; p. 3.
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Tarle wrote these same essays with another purpose in mind. 
Holding up Western European institutions and principles as 
either prescriptions, models, or scientific axioms, Tarle, 
by example, tried to show how the backward economic, social, 
and political conditions which existed in Russia at the 
beginning of the twentieth century might be corrected. Even 
though limited constitutional monarchy was initiated during 
this period, Tarle was far too optimistic about the future 
for he overlooked the peculiar Russian situation and its 
realities.^
Although Tarle wrote numerous politically motivated
essays between 1907 and 1913, the same period witnessed the
publication of his most original and creative works based
on several years of thorough investigation in the French
archives. The first results of his fruitful research was
the publication of a short monograph in 1907, Workers of
National Manufacturing in France during the Revolutionary
31Period (1789-1799). A more detailed study of the same 
subject appeared in 1909, The Working Class in France During 
the Period of the Revolution (1789-1791). In 1911 a second
30 Sochineniya, Vol. XII, "Otdelenie tserkvi ot gosudar- 
stva vo Frantsii," "Padenie absolyutizma v Zapadnoi Evrope," 
"Rol’ studenchestva v revolyutsionnom dvizhenii v Evrope v 
1848,” pp. 490-491.
31 Sochineniya, Vol. I, ,?Rabochie natsionalnykh manu- 
faktur vo Frantsii v epokhu revolyutsii (1789-1799)," pp. 605— 
695.
volume was published concluding Tarle's study of this topic.
After submitting his two volume work as his doctoral disser­
tation and defending his conclusions successfully, Tarle was
3 3awarded his degree in the same year. Prior to the appearance
of Tarle's works on this subject, French historians, such as
LeVasseur and Jaures, had written about the working class in
34France but in a less thorough and systematic manner. In 
contrast, Tarle was the first historian to write a comprehen­
sive history of this topic based on such a vast amount of
35archival material. He also displayed a remarkable talent 
for synthesizing evidence, and the ability to reconstruct this 
period of history in a methodical manner while neither sacri­
ficing readability for details nor content for meaning. Later 
in his career Tarle acknowledged the debt that he owed his
mentor, Luchitskii, and recognized the influence of the "Russian
3 6historical school" in writing this study. Despite these ties 
with the past, he made an original contribution to the historical
32Sochineniya, Vol. II, Rabochii Klass vo Frantsii v 
epokhu revolyutsii, entire volume.
33Sochirieniya, Vol. I, p. XVI.
3^Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XVII; Weintraub, "Blaski i 
Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 82.
^Kareev, "La Revolution Francaise dans la Science 
Historique Russe," p. 386.
36Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "I.V. Luchitskii kak univ- 
ersitetskii prepodavatel," pp. 407-410.
literature of the French Revolution and pioneered a fertile
area of study for historians to expand upon in the future.
His work was praised in several reviews which added to his
already growing scholarly reputation among Western European
37historical circles.
In the first part of his study, Tarle painstakingly 
reviewed the reports of the Inspectors of Manufacturing and 
of Administrative Correspondence. From this evidence, he 
was able to trace and to verify the plight of the workers 
during the eighteenth century and especially at the beginning 
of the Revolution. He also assessed French industrial devel­
opment and organization in rural areas and discovered that it 
varied from village to village. In certain parts of France, 
rural industry rivalled that of the cities and, in some in­
stances, it was superior. Tarle concluded this section by 
arguing that, in general, France was far behind Britain in 
technology and that, during the course of the Revolution, 
industrial growth declined mainly because of an acute short­
age of raw materials.
In the second part of the work, Tarle asserted that 
as industrial growth declined between 1789 and 1791, unem­
ployment became more widespread. Consequently, in 1791, a
37Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XVII; B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch, 
»La Litterature Russe Contemporaine sur la Revolution Francaise, 
La Revolution Francaise, No. 78 (1925), p. 72.
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strike occurred, leading to the enactment of the Le Chapelier 
Lav; which was directed against workers* organizations. This 
act on the part of the government only aggravated the situa­
tion. Despite the passage of the Law of Maximum in 1792 
which fixed prices in an effort to limit speculation, condi­
tions grew worse. In evaluating the impact of the Law of 
Maximum, Tarle seemed to express a laissez faire attitude 
when he stated that it was an illegal intervention by the 
state in the economic life of France. Instead of improving 
the situation, from the outset, the Law of Maximum was 
violated, and therefore failed to alleviate the conditions 
of the working class, placing an unbearable burden on them.
When it was finally suspended, the working class did not 
demonstrate in favor of its re-enactment.
In the same section, Tarle spent a considerable amount 
of time assessing the relationship of the working class with 
various political parties. He maintained that, of all political 
parties, the Jacobins had the most humanitarian policy with 
regard to the working class. However, Tarle stressed that 
the Jacobins' attempt to regulate the economy was economically 
unsound. And, to make matters worse, it led directly to dic­
tatorship and terrorism, characteristics of the Republic of 
Virtue under the direction of Robespierre. Tarle continued 
that throughout the entire period, the workers were not in­
52
volved in the political intrigues. Instead, they consistently 
struggled for higher living standards. They did not man the 
barricades when Robespierre was executed, they were not in­
volved in Babeuf's conspiracy of the Equals, and they passively 
accepted the coup d 1etat of the eighteenth of Brumaire. Tarle 
concluded his study by stating,
For the entire period under discussion the workers 
in general did not display a hostile attitude to either 
the basic economic structure or to any political organ­
izations beginning with the Constituent Assembly and 
ending with the Consulate . ^ 8
Furthermore, he contended,
The awareness of class differences or feeling of 
solidarity among comrades, rarely, if the innumerable 
exceptions are not considered, appears in the workers’ 
environment in the period under discussion. Political 
interests, even as something directly resulting from 
the needs and aspirations of an economic nature, were^g 
for them still a distant and complicated abstraction.
In short, Tarle presented a sympathetic picture of a class
lacking in political awareness, unity of action, and completely
unaware of its potential during the entire course of the revo-
-,4-* 40lution.
A final remark must be made in light of the interpre­
tation made by'Erusalimskii in the biographical sketch. He
O O
Sochineniya, Vol. II, Rabochii Klass vo Frantsii v 
Epokhu Revolyutsii, p. 570.
4 0 Ibid. This is the thesis of the work.
claimed that Tarle was influenced by Marxism and was testing
41
its methodology. True, the element of class struggle was 
apparent in the study, but to say that Tarle was influenced 
by Marxism or was testing its methodology misses the point.
The work, indeed, was not inspired by the Marxist conception 
of history. Trained by members of the "Russian historical 
school" and steeped in its traditions of social and economic 
history, Tarle was decidedly influenced by this school. Des­
pite the fact that he placed more emphasis on economic factors, 
he neither overlooked the political and social conditions, nor 
failed to stress how they interacted and influenced the economic 
conditions of France.
Between 1911 and 1913, Tarle undertook further research 
on the French working class and the Continental Blockade at 
the Archives of the Lyon Trade Palace, the London Records 
Office and British Museum, the Hague Archives and Royal Library,
the Hamburg State and Commerical Libraries, the Library of
42Paris, and the Royal Library of Berlin. The initial results 
of this research appeared in 1913 when Tarle published a mono­
graph entitled The Continental Blockade: Research on the
History and Foreign Trade Policy of France During the Period
41 Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XVII.
4 2 Ibid., p. XVIII; Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle,"
p . 12.
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Napoleon 1 , In part, the study was a continuation of
his most recent monograph concerning the history of the
French working class. As a departure point for the study
of the Continental Blockade, Tarle set forth the following
objectives in the introduction which were:
(1) A history of the working class in France during 
the period of the Consulate and Empire; and (2) the 
history of the influence of the Continental Blockade 
on other European states and how it substantially 
affected the then existing economic relations between 
them and France.^4
According to Weintraub and Venturi, prior to Tarle’s
study very little had been written about the origins and
45functions of the Continental Blockade. The first part of 
the work was devoted to a discussion of Napoleon’s domestic 
policy during the first few years of his reign. He described 
its influence on the industrial situation in France and con­
cluded this section by evaluating its effects on the working 
class. Tarle went on to show that a conflict of interest 
existed between the merchant classes which favored a policy 
of free trade, and the manufacturing classes which preferred 
a policy of high protective tariffs. Another problem which
4 ^Sochineniya, Vol. Ill, Kontinentalnaya Blokada: 
Issledovaniya po istorii promyshlennosti i_ vneshnei torqovli 
Frantsii v epokhu Napoleona _I, pp. 11-507.
44 , . \Ibid., predislovie (introduction).
4 5 Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," p. 202; Weintraub, "Blaski 
i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego,” p. 85.
confronted Napoleon was the fact that the antiquated French 
industrial system was not able to compete on the European 
market with the modern British system. He hoped that by 
simultaneously forcing British goods off the European 
market, and building up French industry and commerce, the 
British economic system would crumble. As a result, Napo­
leon expected the British to sue for peace on French terms.
Thus, according to Tarle, for these reasons, Napoleon ini-
46tiated the Continental Blockade.
In the last part of the work, Tarle outlined the 
commercial relationship of France with other states during 
the period of the Continental Blockade, and then concluded 
his study by pointing out the reasons for its failure. He 
argued that from the outset, the Continental Blockade was 
doomed. In spite of the ruthless economic exploitation of 
client and conquered states by the French, these areas were 
still able to compete successfully with nascent French 
industry. Moreover, the leaders of these states resented 
French economic as well as political domination. As for 
the British, they easily circumvented the blockade and, 
in fact, increased their exports since they controlled the 
seas. A further outcome of the introduction of the Blockade
V. Butenko, nNauka novoy istorii v Rosii," Annaly, 
Vol. II, (1922), p. 163.
was the development of a lively smuggling trade which 
flourished throughout the entire period. The repercussions 
of the Continental Blockade were disastrous for French 
industry. A noticeable decline occurred as industry was 
unable to procure the necessary raw materials it depended 
on from foreign markets. As a result, many workers lost 
their jobs, particularly in the silk and cotton industries 
which were hit hard by Napoleon's policy. He tried des­
perately to correct the situation, but, according to Tarle, 
it was impossible to gauge the long term effects of these 
reforms, because after 1811 military disasters ensued,
officially putting on end to the Continental Blockade and
47the career of Napoleon.
Once again, Tarle's contemporaries were impressed
with this study. One of the most prominent English economic
historians, Maurice Ashley, praised him and Paul Vinogradov,
a former Russian history professor who was then teaching at
Oxford University, proposed that Tarle's Continental Blockade
48be translated and published in English. In 1913, Tarle 
received and accepted an invitation to attend the first
^ Sochineniya, Vol. Ill, pp. 495-506.
A Q
F. Uspenskii, F. Buzeskul, V. Bogoslovskii, and S. 
Platonov, "Zapiska ob uchenykh trudakh Prof. E.V. Tarle," 
Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR, XVIII (1927), p. 1558; Weintraub, 
"Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 8 6 .
international conference of historians which was held in 
London, where he presented a paper entitled, "The Economic 
Consequences of the Continental Blockade. " 4 9 After returning 
to Russia, Tarle published a short article about the con­
ference in which he gave a most favorable report of the 
results of the work of his colleagues in the field of modern 
European h i s t o r y . "
When the First World War broke out, Tarle set aside 
his differences with the Tsarist government and rallied to 
its defense. Throughout the war years, he was a dedicated 
supporter of the Franco-Russian alliance and a confirmed 
Ententophile. "  Consequently, most of his publication be­
tween 1914 and 1917 were marked by an anti-German bias on 
the one hand, and a pro-French attitude on the other. Tarle 
wrote primarily about the relations of the European powers 
before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 and the historical- 
political consequences of the First World War. For example, 
at the outset of the war Tarle wrote an article entitled,
49 Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. SVIII; Sochineniya, Vol. Ill, 
p. 6 ; Uspenskii, Buzeskul, Bogoslovskii, and Platonov, "Zapiska 
ob uchenykh trudakh Prof. E.V. Tarle," p. 1558; Venturi, "Evgen 
V. Tarle," p. 203; Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a
Historian under the Soviet Regime," p. 203.
" sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Mezhdunarodnyi istoricheskii 
-Kongress v Londone (3-9 aprelya, 1913)," pp. 395-398.
51 Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," p. 203; Weintraub,
"Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 8 6 .
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’’From the History of Russian-German Relations in Recent
Times," which was followed by its sequel in 1915, "What
Do the Germans Demand of Russia?" Both essays clearly
52illustrated his anti-German stand. According to Tarle,
There have been two facts which have always charac­
terized the recent history of Russian-Prussian relations: 
(1) the economic exploitation of Russia was the chief, 
basic goal, the achievement of which was desired by the 
ruling circles of Berlin; (2) they never lost the final 
hope of attaining this basic aim without the risk of war. 
However, they almost exclusively made use of their in­
timate connections with Russia.53
In contrast, Tarle's pro-French views came through
clearly in the two most representative articles of this
period: "The Alsace-Lorraine Question on the Eve of the
Great European War," written in 1915, and "The Franco-
Russian alliance: Russia and its Allies in the Struggle
54for Civilization," published in 1916. In the former,
Tarle argued that the seeds of the war were sowed when 
Germany annexed Alsace-Lorraine after the Franco-Prussian 
War. He placed the blame for the War squarely on the
5 2E.V. Tarle, "K istorii russko-germanskikh o t n o s h e n n  
v noveyshee vremya," Russkaya Mys i , No. 11, (1914), pp. 83-93;
E.V. Tarle, "Chego nemtsy dolzhny trebovat ot Russkikh?"
Golos Minusheqo, II (1915), pp. 263-269.
5 3Tarle, "Chego nemtsy dolzhny trebovat ot Russkikh?"
p. 263.
54 Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Elzas-Lotaringskn vopros 
nakanune velikoy Evropeiskoy voiny," p. 431-443; "Franko- 
Russkii soyuz," Rossiya i ee soyuzniki v borbe za tsivili- 
zatsiyu (Moskva, ID 16 )', pp. 73-105 .
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shoulders of Germany. Its policy created a spirit of revenge
among all segments of society within France. Furthermore,
he said that Alsace-Lorraine was an integral part of France
and the act of annexation permanently mutilated her natural
boundaries. In the latter, Tarle presented an unconvincing
Manichean interpretation of the war aims of Russia and her
allies in which the Entente Powers were depicted as the
forces of cultural progress struggling against the reac-
55tionary Triple Alliance led by decadent Germany.
Throughout World War I, Tarle remained at his teaching
post lecturing and writing in support of Russia's war effort.
For this stand, in the characteristic Soviet manner, Tarle
was censured by his biographer, Erusalimskii. He asserted
that Tarle failed to understand the nature of the First
World War in Leninist terms: "It was imperialist on both
sides, the Austro-German Alliance as well as the Anglo-
French-Russian Entente." Furthermore, "Tarle shared the
mood of the bourgeois liberal intelligentsia who, in error,
buttressed their position on the principle of self-defence."
Finally, Erusalimskii contended,
he dijd not understand that this great event _/World 
War 1/ tore Russia out of the most horrible blood
^^Ibid.; Sochineniya, Vol. XI, p. 443: "Franko-
russkii soyuz," theme of article.
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letting war which freed her from the chains of 
imperialism, opening a new era in the world for 
the history of m a n k i n d . 56
Tarle's activities during the war years did not
prevent him from writing another significant monograph T
dealing with the Napoleonic period. In 1916 there appeared
The Economic Life of the Kingdom of Italy During the Reign 
5 7
of Napoleon 1 . However, during the course of the Bolshevik
Revolution almost the entire edition of the book was burned.
Later, it was published in French at Paris in 1928 under the
title, Le Blocus Continental et Le Royaume d 'Italie: la
5 8Situation Economique de 1'Italie sous Napoleon ler.
The work was reviewed most favorably by well known
scholars. One of the leading historians of the French
Revolution and the Napoleonic era, Albert Mathiez, declared,
It is not enough to say that he has repeated this 
history. He has created something from entirely new 
fragments. I am overwhelmed with the enormity of the 
research. His research shows that he understands the 
forces of this period. He interprets and reinterprets 
the subject in all its aspects, diplomatic, political,
and economic.59
^^Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XX.
5 7Sochineniya, Vol. IV, Ekonomicheskaya zhizn 
korolevstva Italii v tsarstvovame Napoleona jE, pp. 11-312.
5 8 E.V. Tarle, Le Blocus Continental et le royaume 
d 'Italie: La situation economique de L 'Italie sous Napoleon
ler. d ’apres des documents inedits (Paris: Felix Alcan,
1928), entire book.
99Quoted in Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia 
Prof. Tarlego," p. 8 6 .
Another French scholar, Albert Pignaud concluded, "It is a
new work, solid, clear, well documented, well organized,
and in its entirety appears definitive , " 6 0 The famous
Italian historian Benedetto Croce, who had been highly
critical of Tarle's early work on Italy, stated that
"it was a monograph of particular significance based on
61extensive documentation,"
Although Tarle used some of the materials and re­
inforced a few of his conclusions from his previous study 
of the Continental Blockade, the bulk of this new work was 
written from unpublished documents collected at the French
National Archives, the Archives of the State of Milan, and
6 2the Archives of the Kingdom of Italy. Moreover, the scope 
and thesis was original as Tarle dealt primarily with the 
one-sided economic and political relations existing between 
France and its satellite Italian Kingdom.
Tarle began his study with a description of the economic 
life of the Italian Republics. Although some commerce con­
tinued, by the beginning of the nineteenth century it had 
declined noticeably and, as a result, Italy, for the most
6°Albert Pignaud, Review of Lie Blocus Continental, 
by E. V. Tarle, Revue Historique, No. 15 7 ( April , 1928) , p. 388.
*]
Quoted in Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia 
Prof. Tarlego," p. 8 6 .
r o
V. Butenko, "Nauka novoy istorii v Rosii," p. 364.
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part, became agrarian. A unique feature of Italy, pointed 
out by Tarle, was' the emergence of an industrial revolution 
in several northern cities. When Napoleon transformed the 
area into the Kingdom of Italy in 1805, he expected it to 
become the reservoir of raw materials for French industry, 
the trading center for French goods, and the chief supplier 
of grains for France. He also hoped to eliminate English 
goods from the Italian market. Napoleon's policy was 
initially carried out by the introduction of tariffs and 
customs duties reserved exclusively for the French, thus 
making Italy economically dependent on France. At the out­
set, these measures enabled the French to acquire cheap grains 
and permitted them to sell their manufactured goods without 
any competition. To protect his interests, Napoleon stationed 
large numbers of troops whose upkeep was maintained by Italy 
through the arbitrary imposition of extraordinary taxes.
Despite these measures, a well organized illicit trade, 
centered at Malta, was carried on between the Italian Kingdom 
and Britain. British industry required raw silk from Italy 
and Italy depended on British manufactured goods. Napoleon 
responded to this situation by initiating the Berlin and 
Milan Decrees which prohibited the Italian Kingdom, as well 
as the French Empire, from trading with Britain. In another 
attempt to eliminate British competition, an Italian-French
63
treaty of commerce was signed which gave exclusive rights 
to French products in Italy.
Tarle concluded his study by evaluating the positive 
and negative aspects of Napoleon's policies toward Italy.
He argued that, in a sense, they attained their objectives. 
French products replaced British products and Italian in­
dustry. Italian prosperity was enhanced by the abolition 
of guilds, the introduction of French codes, and by a high­
way building program. However, on the other hand, the long 
term effects on Italy were disastrous. The Continental 
system all but wiped out the Italian textile, chemical, and 
metal industries; the price of manufactured goods rose; and
seaports, such as Venice, Genoa, and Trieste, declined, which
6 3resulted in the loss of trade with the Far East.
In 1917 Tarle was among the ranks of the intelligentsia 
who rejoiced over the abdication of Nicholas II and actively 
supported the newly established Provisional Government. His 
many articles in the newspaper D e n ' attacked the idea of 
concluding a separate peace with Germany and defended the 
efforts of the Provisional Government to continue the war.
Tarle argued that Russia was waging a defensive war for its
Sochineniya, Vol. IV, pp. 11-312; see the following 
reviews of this work: F.E. Melvin, American Historical Review,
XXXIV (April, 1929), pp. 587-588; F.C. Montagu, History, XIV 
(January, 1930), pp. 368-369; Albert Pignaud, Revue Historique, 
No. 157 (April, 1928), p. 387-388.
survival and that "Nicholas II fell, as the history of all 
wars and the latest events show, not because he was carrying
/r 4
on the war, but because he was hindering the defense." In
these same articles, Tarle tried to stimulate among the
masses the same type of patriotism which was unleashed during
the course of the French Revolution. Playing upon examples
and drawing analogies from the French Revolution, he wrote
that "people who oppose the further continuation of the
war are threatened with the possibility of the revolutionary 
6 5guillotine." Tarle was also firmly convinced that Russia's 
Western allies would not let her down and that they would 
continue to send help. He constantly hammered away at this 
idea in another effort to bolster the then sagging war 
effort.
Tarle became directly involved in politics, serving 
as an agent of the Provisional Government when it was led by 
Alexander Kerensky. As a special envoy, he was sent to 
Helsinki to counteract the detachment of Finland from Russia.
He also journeyed to Stockholm to confer with Swedish author­
ities. When the Bolsheviks withdrew from the war and con­
cluded a separate peace with Germany, the disillusioned
6 4 Den ' , No. 4 (March 9, 1919), p. 1; also quoted in 
Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 87.
65
Tarle characterized the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as the
"death of R u s s i a . " ^
Zaidel i Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom 
Fronte: Tarle jL Platonov i_ ikh Shkoly, pp. 45, 48, and 49.
CHAPTER III
TARLE’S ACTIVITIES DURING THE FIRST TEN YEARS 
OF SOVIET RULE (1917-192 7)
On the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, E.V. Tarle 
was a well-established historian, highly regarded by his 
contemporaries as both a scholar and teacher. He had earned 
the respect of, and had been praised by, such distinguished 
French historians as Albert Mathiez for his numerous articles 
and books pertaining to the French working class during the 
Revolution and Napoleonic era, and for his work on the origins 
and effects of the Continental System.^
When the Bolshevik Revolution broke out in 1917, Tarle 
was not among the ranks of those intellectuals who championed 
or actively supported it. He differed from many of his asso­
ciates, however, who left Russia for reasons of safety after 
the November Revolution because they were either ideologically 
opposed to Bolshevism, or had participated in the affairs of 
the Provisional Government. Unlike them, Tarle decided to
1Albert Mathiez, "Choses de Russie Sovietique," Annales 
Historiques de la Revolution Francaise, VIII (1931), pp. 149- 
T5&T; B. Mirkine-Geutzevitch, "La Litterature Russe Contemporaine 
sur la Revolution Francaise," La Revolution Francaise, No. 77 
(1924), p. 273.
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2remain m  spite of the apparent danger.
As for his own personal safety and the future of his 
career, it was fortunate for Tarle that the period between 
1918 and 1921 was marked by severe economic and social chaos. 
The introduction of the disastrous policy of War Communism 
by the Bolsheviks during the initial stages of the Revolu­
tion, compounded by chronic civil war, required the full 
energies of the new regime to preserve the new order. Thus, 
the acute domestic problems became the primary concern of 
the Bolsheviks, diverting their attention, at least for 
the time being, away from those historians like Tarle who 
were decidedly anti-Soviet. Moreover, it was precisely for 
these reasons, and for his later cooperation, that Tarle’s
position in the academic community was not seriously threat-
3ened until the emergence of Stalin.
In 1918, Tarle was promoted to professor of history
at the University of Petrograd where he was allowed to teach
1 4
and write in the traditional pre-Soviet manner. In the
Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXI; A.S. Erusalimskii, "Der 
Sowjetische Gehlehrte E.V. Tarle als Historiker und Publizist," 
Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswissenschaft, No. 6 (1958), p. 270.
^See Chapter I, pp. 7-8.
^Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," p. 14; Uspenskii, 
Buzeskul, Bogoslovskii, and Platonov, "Zapiska ob uchenykh 
trudakh Prof. E.V. Tarle," pp. 1558-1559; Venturi, "Evgeni V. 
Tarle," p. 204; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Prof. 
Tarlego," p. 87.
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same year, he was appointed to a commission which was given 
the task of reorganizing and restoring the state archives
c:
in Petrograd damaged and looted during the Revolution.
Why an admitted opponent of Bolshevism was given a promo­
tion, appointed to an important commission, and permitted 
to carry on with his activities was not explained by his 
biographer, Erusalimskii.
The Bolsheviks made these concessions for purely 
pragmatic reasons. They recognized the general decline of 
academic standards, the scarcity of historians of Tarle's 
caliber and reputation, and the need to train a cadre of 
Marxist historians to fill the many vacancies caused by the 
exodus of scholars during the Revolution.^
The toleration accorded to Tarle and other historians 
was also in line with one of Lenin's tactical ideological 
pronouncements of this period. Since many intellectuals had 
not voluntarily come over to the side of the Revolution,
Lenin argued for cooperation, hoping that in time they would 
accept the ideological and political programs introduced in 
c;
Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Arkhivokhranilishche Narodnogo 
Khozyaistva, Prava, Kultury i Byta Leningradskogo Tsentralnogo 
Istoricheskogo Arkhiva," pp. 585-596; Hosch, Evgenij Victor- 
ovic Tarle ( 1875-1955) und Seine Stellung in der Sowjetischen 
Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 91; Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," 
p. 204.
6See Chapter I, pp. 12-13.
69
7
Russia by the party.
According to Erusalimskii, between 1917 and 1921,
Tarle was in a state of confusion since he was neither 
on the side of revolutionary Marxism nor was he ac­
quainted with Leninism. Consequently, his creativity 
completely declined as he wrote nothing original during 
these years.°
It is true that Tarle published little during this period, 
but to say that his creativity ceased because he was un­
familiar with the Marxist-Leninist scheme of history is 
sheer propaganda. Due to the conditions of the times, 
scholarly production, for the most part, was at a stand­
still. Archival repositories and libraries were either 
closed or short of printing supplies, travel was extremely 
dangerous, and scholars were not allowed to travel abroad
9to conduct independent research and then return to Russia.
In spite of the privations, Tarle managed to publish 
a book in 1918 entitled, The West and Russia, which was 
comprised of articles that he had written for various 
journals before the Bolshevik Revolution. The theme of the 
work focussed on the political and economic relations of 
Russia with Western Europe from the eighteenth to the
7
See Chapter I, p. 14.
O
Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXI.
g
See Chapter I, pages seven and eight, especially 
the articles by Kagan and Presniakov.
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twentieth century.1^ In general, the collection of essays 
was apolitical in tone. However, in certain sections of 
the book, Tarle injected political overtones. The work was 
dedicated to the memory of two martyrs, A.I. Shingarev and
F.F. Kokoshkin, both active members of the Constitutional 
Democratic Party. Shingarev, an outstanding parliamentarian, 
and one of the leaders of the Cadets, held the position of 
Minister of Agriculture and later of Finance in the Pro­
visional Government. He was arrested by the Bolsheviks in 
November, became ill in prison, and, in January of 1918, he 
was transferred to the hospital. On the following night, 
he and Kokoshkin, who was also in the hospital, were murdered 
by a group of revolutionary sailors.1 1 According to Weintraub, 
’’Later, the Bolsheviks, who were implicated in this political
murder, announced that it had been committed by anarchist 
12sailors.” Analogies between the policies of the Bolsheviks 
and those of Nicholas I were subtly drawn by Tarle in one of
1 ^Sochineniya, Vol. XII, p. 496. Zapad i_ Rossiya 
Stati i Dokumenty po Istorii XVIII-XX VV. Byloe, (1918),
'219 pages; G. Gautier, "Histoire de Russie: Publications
des Annees 1917-1927,” Revue Historique, CLVII (January,
1928), p. Ill; B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch, ”La Litterature Russe 
Contemporaine sur la Revolution Francaise," p. 274.
1 1 Hosch, Evgeni j Viktorovic Tarle (1875-1955) und 
seine Stellunq in der Sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft, 
p. 90; Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle,” p. 204.
12Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. 
Tarlego," p. 87.
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1 5the essays, "Emperor Nicholas I and French Public Opinion."
In another article, "The English Ambassador and Catherine 
in 1756-1757," Tarle again alluded to the present. During 
the twilight of the reign of Elizabeth, Russia was at war 
with Prussia, England’s ally. The British envoy to St. 
Petersburg, Charles Williams, was assigned the task of 
trying to get Russia out of the war, or, at the least, to 
create enough confusion, so as to make Russian participation 
ineffective. By taking advantage of a power struggle between 
anti-Prussian and pro-Prussian factions, Williams began to 
play both groups off against each other to accomplish his 
mission. He courted the pro-German Catherine, the wife of 
the heir to the throne and future Tsarina, and simultaneously 
bribed the anti-Prussian foreign minister Bestiuzhev-Riumin. 
Tarle concluded his study, knowing that he took a swipe at 
Lenin's slogan of open diplomacy:
The secret diplomacy of the eighteenth century sacri­
ficed the interests of the state in the same manner as the 
open diplomacy of our times. We are only now acquainting 
ourselves with the details of eighteenth century secret 
diplomacy and, in the future, information concerning soc­
ialist diplomacy will be revealed. Baron Bestiuzhev un­
doubtedly believed that his financial operation would 
remain outside the range of interested eyes.14
1 ^ "Imperator Nikolai I i Frantsuzskoe Obshchestvennoe 
Mnenie," in Zapad i Rossiya, pp. 28-78.
1 4 Sochineniya, Vol. IV, "Angliiskii posol i Ekaterina 
v 1756-1757," p. 480; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia 
Prof. Tarlego," p. 8 8 .
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Included in the same collection were two scholarly
essays marked by the absence of political overtones, "From
the History of 1904-1905," and, "Was Catherine's Russia an
15Economically Backward State?" In the former, Tarle was
the first historian who utilized the then unpublished
exchange of telegrams between Nicholas II and William II
16in 1904 and 1905. In the latter, he attempted to revise 
the prevailing historical interpretation that during the 
reign of Catherine the Great, Russia was economically back­
ward when compared with Western European states of that 
period. By thoroughly examining the views and opinions of 
contemporary Western Europeans who visited Russia, Tarle 
discovered that a consensus existed, especially among French, 
British, and German travelers that Russian industry was only 
slightly less developed than in their own states. In an un­
published note sent by Calonne in 1786 to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Vergennes, he also disclosed that the
French were anxious to conclude a treaty of commerce with
• 1 7  Russia.
1 5 Sochineniya, Vol. IV, "Byla li Ekaterininskaya 
Rossiya Ekonomicheski Otstaloyu Stranoyu?" pp. 443-468;
"K Istorii 1904-1905," pp. 547-565.
1 £
Mirkine-Guetzevitch, "La Litterature Russe Con- 
temporaine sur la Revolution Francaise," p. 2 74.
1 7 Sochineniya, Vol. IV, "Byla li Ekaterininskaya 
Rossiya Ekonomicheski Otstaloyu Stranoyu?" pp. 447-450.
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The termination of the civil war brought peace to 
an economically prostrate Russia. In spite of his ideolo­
gical justifications for the New Economic Policy, Lenin 
scrapped the program of War Communism for purely practical 
reasons because he recognized that it had been one of the
major causes for the widespread internal disorder during 
18the war years. As for non-Marxist intellectuals, the 
initiation of the New Economic Policy paved the way for a 
short period of relatively peaceful coexistence with the 
handful of dedicated Marxist intellectuals. The older 
generation of historians, in particular, was granted a 
certain amount of freedom by the government, and especially 
by the Marxist historians of the Pokrovsky school. They 
were permitted to pursue independent scholarly research 
and allowed to publish the results as long as the subject 
was non-political in n a t u r e . ^
By the end of 1921, the Bolsheviks began to court 
well-known historians of the pre-Soviet era who were con­
sidered to be politically reliable and fully acquainted 
with the principles of Marxism. They would be used to 
disseminate and popularize Marxist ideology. Tarle was 
among those historians who decided to work actively for
■^See Chapter I, pp. 12-13.
^ S e e  Chapter I, pp. 15-16.
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the government. He became a member of two Party sponsored
societies, The Petrograd House of Scholars, and The House
of Literary Men, helping to organize a series of lectures
to Red Army groups, workers clubs, and other organizations.
A popular speaker, but not a Marxist himself, ironically
enough Tarle was enlisted to teach Marxism to members of the
Party. In undertaking his assignments, "Tarle, like Platonov,
was ubiquitous and displayed an indefatigable activity that
20might have served as an example for any Soviet activist.”
Still opposed to any deterministic interpretation of 
history, and, more specifically, to Marxism, one can only 
speculate on why Tarle began to cooperate openly with the 
regime at this time. Perhaps, like others, Tarle rejected 
the Bolshevik Revolution for both humanitarian and ideologi­
cal reasons, yet, possibly his sense of loyalty and duty to 
Russia meant more to him than the sacrifice of his own per­
sonal convictions. After being actively involved in the 
mainstream of Russian intellectual and sometimes political 
life before the Revolution, and finally given the opportunity 
to play an active role again, Tarle accepted, compromised 
his views slightly, and as a result, was able to relieve his 
sense of frustration and alienation by plunging headlong into
20 Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State,
p. 28.
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his new work. If his motive was to gain more freedom of
movement and greater access to source materials in the Soviet
Union and later abroad, then he achieved his purpose, at
least for the time being. Whatever the reasons may be, it
is apparent that for his untiring activities, Tarle was
rewarded by the Government in 1921 by being elected as a
corresponding member of the Academy of Science of the 
21
U.S.S.R.
Between 1922 and 1924, often referred to as the 
period of the ’’Scholarly N E P , ” government censorship light­
ened quite considerably. Many historians in the city of 
Petrograd now began to publish independent historical 
journals devoted to general history in the Western European
tradition, relatively free from governmental control. One
22
such journal, Annals, was co-edited by Tarle. Prior to
the Revolution, St. Petersburg had been the center for
Russian scholars who were Western oriented. The journal
Annals clearly fits into this category as
it was an organ of those scholars concentrated around 
the Academy of Science who were not communists, fought 
to preserve the independence of scholarship, and who
21 Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXI; Manfred, ’’E v g e n n  
Viktorovich Tarle,” p. 14; Uspenskii, Buzeskul, Bogoslovskii, 
Platonov, ’’Zapiska ob uchenykh trudakh Prof. E.V. Tarle,” 
p. 1559.
7 7 •Annaly, Zhurnal Vseobshche I s t o r n  Izdavaimyi
Rossiiskoyu Akademieyu Nauk pod Redaktsiei Akademika F.I.
Uspenskogo i Chlena-Korresp. Akademii Nauk E.V. Tarle.
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2 5wanted to keep cultural contacts with the West.
Above all, the articles published in this journal ostensibly 
demonstrated that many historians desperately tried to main­
tain the pre-1917 level of Russian scholarship despite the 
severe handicap of working within a totalitarian system 
whose leaders’ avowed purpose was, after all, intellectual 
conformity.
Tarle was not only co-editor of Annals, but also 
one of its most productive contributors. He wrote the in­
troductory article to the first volume in which he spelled
24out the immediate tasks of the historian. In it he con­
tended that it was useless for the historian to adapt pre­
war historical formulas or, for that matter, any determin-
25istic theory in explaining the contemporary scene. The 
events that transpired since 1914 had been so destructive 
that it now became necessary to revise previously accepted 
historical concepts so that the historical process might be 
viewed in a new light. He then contemplated on the dangers 
which might sidetrack the historian by arguing that in such
25Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Prof. Tarlego,"
p . 89.
24 E.V. Tarle, "Ocheredneya Zadacha,” Annaly, No. 1 
(1922), pp. 5-20.
2 5 •No doubt that in this instance Tarle took a swipe
at the official Pokrovsky school of history.
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cataclysmic periods it was extremely difficult to achieve 
total scholarly objectivity. In such times the historian 
was most likely to be caught up in the events. As a conse­
quence, his work was liable to become either apologetic or
propagandistic in tone, thus reducing him to the position of
2 6a mere ’’pseudo-historian. M
Toward the end of the article, Tarle argued that 
another hazard threatened the historian’s objectivity. It 
was possible for him to sink to the same level as the "cam­
eralists,” the theorists and philosophers of absolute bureau­
cracy in Central Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, who approached historical material with preconceived 
ideas. Like them, "there are historians presently who, in
historical data, look not for truth, but for illustrations
2 7for their own schemes and theories." Tarle concluded the
2 8
article by criticizing the views of Hegel.
Other publications by Tarle in Annals warrant comment 
as they represent sound scholarship indicative of the breath 
of fresh air generated by the relaxation of controls by the 
government during the period of the "Scholarly NEP." In an 
article written in memory of the late James Bryce, the author
p fi
Tarle, "Ocherednaya Zadacha," pp. 13-14.
^^ibid., p . 19.
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of a classic work on American democracy and the Holy Roman
Empire, he captured the spirit and character of the renowned
English historian. Writing sympathetically, Tarle stressed
that the moral values found in Bryce’s works were a mirror
29of his private life.
The political problems of Europe arising from the 
changes that occurred on the international scene after the 
First World War prompted many historians to investigate the 
present situation and, subsequently, to challenge the vali­
dity of the post-war settlement. Like many historians of 
this period, Tarle began to question the Versailles Treaty, 
arguing that it had created more problems for Europe than 
it had solved. Probably influenced by the French occupation 
of the Ruhr, Tarle expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
Versailles Settlement in an article written in Annals in
1922, entitled, ’’Three Catastrophies: The Peace of Westphalia,
30
the Peace of Tilsit, the Versailles Treaty.” He argued,
It is apparent that the Versailles Treaty gives peace 
neither to Germany nor to Europe. There is no doubt that 
it has only prolonged the war by other means. As a result, 
the future of Europe, as well as the whole world, will be 
fraught with exceptional dangers and unhealthy conditions.
29E.V. Tarle, "Lord Dzhems Brais," Annaly, No. 1 
(1922), pp. 5-20; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Prof. 
Tarlego,” p. 90.
m  .
E.V. Tarle, "Tri Katastrofy: Vestfalskii Mir, Til-
zitskii Mir, Versalskii Mir,” Annaly, No. 2 (1922), pp. 59- 
94; Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," p. 13.
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Clemenceau, who was instrumental in writing the Treaty, 
and Poincare, President of the Republic at that time, 
sanctioned each of the 440 statutes and initiated the 
Council of Four. Now in the role of Prime Minister, 
Poincare does everything within his power to enforce 
the treaty, thus bringing the victors into a special dis­
agreement with the vanquished who are in a situation 
of hopeless despair.31
Tarle, however, saw some hope for the future of Europe.
He wrote,
On the question of the immediate future, different 
answers are given. Some believe in an early, and others 
believe in a late approach of social cataclysm in Germany, 
France, and other capitalist powers which will sweep away 
the Versailles Treaty;32 to others it seems that the vic­
torious states will finally declare themselves against 
French claims, and, in this way, they will weaken the 
Versailles grip of France; a third group is convinced 
that in spite of the nearness of the recent war, diver­
gent interests will develop among the victorious states 
and, as a result, the Versailles Settlement will auto­
matically cease to exist; finally the pacifists, many of 
them French, nurture the hope that the government of the 
"National Bloc" will gradually realize that its policies 
have been harmful to French economic and political life ^3 
and they will voluntarily agree to a substantial retreat.
In another article, "The Hegemony of France on the 
Continent," published in Annals in 1923, Tarle pinpointed 
this theme by evaluating the growing differences in policy
■^Tarle, "Tri Katastrofy," p. 59.
3 7 •Tarle again was referring indirectly to the inevita­
bility of revolution in capitalist states characteristic of 
the Bolshevik estimation of the Western powers at this time.
3 3 Tarle, "Tri Katastrofy: Vestfalskii Mir, Tilzitskii
Mir, Versalskii Mir," p. 59.
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of Britain and France toward G e r m a n y . ^  The occupation of
the Ruhr was denounced by the British press as a move on the
part of France to dominate continental affairs at the expense
of Britain. A lively debate was touched off when the French
press responded by defending the policies of its government
35and attacking, at the same time, its British counterpart. 
After carefully analyzing editorials, as well as statements 
made by Lloyd George and other leading political personal­
ities, Tarle discovered that, in general, the British were 
weighing the possibility of a rapprochement with Germany, 
and, as a first step in this direction, they were considering 
the feasibility of the reduction of reparation payments. 
Although Tarle wrote favorably about the likelihood of the 
reduction of tensions by such a concession on the part of 
the British, he nevertheless viewed the German question as 
a European problem whose final solution depended on the 
cooperation of all states. In his opinion, Germany would 
never become an integral part of the European state system,
let alone a viable state, until the Ruhr and the Rhineland
3 6were handed back to her. From the Soviet point of view,
34 . •Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Gegemoniya F r a n t s n  na
Kontinente,” pp. 523-584.
"^*Ibid. , pp. 524-525.
~^Ibid. , pp. 583-584.
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Tarle's interpretation of the German problem contained 
serious shortcomings:
He did not take into account the increasing inter­
national role of the Soviet Union which had already con­
templated the aim of the ruling class of France and other 
powers to make use of the aggressive forces of German 
reaction for the struggle against the Soviet Union, the ^7 
international worker, and democratic movements in Europe.
The third volume of Annals, which appeared in 1923,
3 8contained another interesting article written by Tarle.
In it he reviewed the reasons for the development of the 
diplomatic struggle between Russia and Britain in the nine­
teenth century over the Ottoman Empire. Tarle argued that 
up to the First World War, British policy was dedicated to 
the maintainance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire, which meant, in fact, the containment of the histor­
ical designs of an expansionist Russia in this direction.
The British stand was based on geographic and political 
factors, for they feared a Russian penetration into this 
area, or a possible take-over of the Ottoman Empire, would 
challenge their supremacy in the Mediterranean and endanger 
their position, in the Far East. Despite the changes that 
had occurred as a result of the post-war settlement, and 
contrary to the slogans made by the Bolsheviks, Tarle
3 7Sochineniya, Vol. XI, p. 6 .
op
E.V. Tarle, "Angliya i Turtsiya: Istoricheskie
Korni i Razvitie Konflikta," Annaly, No. 3 (1923), pp. 21-
71.
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concluded that the fundamental geographic-political condi­
tions remained the same, and therefore Europe ought to
anticipate the same Russian-English antagonism over Turkey 
39m  the future.
Even though the government permitted the publication 
of Annals, Marxist historians criticized it in their monthly 
publication, Pechat 1 j. Revolyutsia, for errors in both 
methodology and interpretation. M.N. Lukin, a close asso­
ciate of Pokrovsky, also complained that the journal was 
closed to Communists. Realizing the possible danger of 
such an accusation, Tarle invited one of the Petrograd 
Marxist historians to work with him in editing the journal. 
This move probably saved the publication from being suspended 
by the government.4^
During the Annals interlude, Tarle continued to teach, 
edit source materials, and publish articles in other journals. 
At the University of Petrograd, he lectured about the French 
Revolution. Before two thousand students, he spoke about 
the life and works of Aulard, a leading historian and ardent
39 z-'
Ibid. , pp. 70-71; Rene Martel, "Quelques etudes
d ’histoire Russe," Le Monde Slave, No. 5 (May, 1926), p. 318;
Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Prof.'Tarlego," p. 91.
40Weintraub, Ibid.
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defender of the French Revolution.4 1 One particular work,
"The Press in France Under Napoleon I,M was reviewed as
Ma valuable contribution to the history of the reign of 
42
Napoleon I." Originally published by Tarle in 1913, it
43appeared m  a revised form in 1922. Based primarily on 
the correspondence of Napoleon and source materials from 
the French National Archives, Tarle ably presented an almost 
complete picture of the state of the French press during 
the period of the Empire. By tracing Napoleon's relations 
with the press in particular, he clearly illustrated its 
servile character. For its excessive zeal in carrying 
out its assigned tasks, the press sometimes provoked the 
police to enact a series of measures, more repressive than 
previous laws, designed to muzzle it temporarily. He also 
showed that many Frenchmen privately expressed their indig­
nation, and even a few dared to object publicly, to the 
constant harrassment of the press. In addition, Tarle 
compared the subservience of the press in France with Russia
4 1 Mirkine-Guetsevitch, "La Litterature Russe Con- 
temporaine sur la Revolution Francaise," pp. 275-276.
42 B. Mirkine-Guetsevitch, "La Litterature Russe 
Contemporaine sur la Revolution Francaise," La Revolution 
Francaise, No. 77 (1924), p. 136.'
42 . .
Sochineniya, Vol. IV, "Pechat' vo Frantsii p n
Napoleone I," pp. 4§3-543.
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at that time and concluded that the situation was similar
44
m  many respects. Perhaps in this instance he was allud­
ing to the censorship policies of the Soviet government.
According to the Bulletin of the Academy of Science 
in 1921, Tarle was thinking about revising two studies:
The History of Italy and The Decline of Absolutism in 
45Western Europe. He was also planning to publish a short 
monograph on the subject of Russian finances during the 
period of the Napoleonic Wars, and was contemplating the 
possibility of writing another book in the Continental 
Blockade series dealing exclusively with Spain. The bul­
letin stated, however, that it would not be possible to
publish this last work unless Spanish archival materials
46were made available. This last projected study never 
materialized.
The suspension of the publication of traditional 
scholarly journals, including Annals, in 1924 marked the 
end of the period of the "Scholarly NEP" as well as the 
beginning of a concerted effort by the regime to control
4 4 Ibid.; Mirkine Guetzevitch, "La Litterature Russe 
Contemporaine sur la Revolution Francaise," p. 137.
45Istoriya Italii v Srednie Veka (1906), 197 pages; 
Padenie Absolyutizma _v Zapadnoy Evrope (1906), 207 pages.
4^"Izvestia Akademii Nauk CCCP," 1921, p. 72; Wein- 
traub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 92.
intellectual life by wiping out all suspected instances 
of non-conformity. And even though a certain amount of 
toleration was still accorded to non-Marxist intellectuals 
who either cooperated with the regime or compromised their 
views, it was evident that a showdown was rapidly approaching. 
Only when Stalin finally defeated his political rivals, and 
emerged as the undisputed leader of the party in 1928, was 
the policy, which had been initiated in 1924, ruthlessly 
enforced.
As for Tarle, until 1924 he had cooperated with the 
government by teaching Marxism to the masses, by helping in 
the reorganization of libraries and archival repositories, 
and by serving on officially sanctioned societies, such as 
The Research Institute for Modern and Contemporary History, 
in Petrograd, and The Commission for the Study of the Teaching 
of the History of Labor in Russia. For his cooperation Tarle 
was allowed to retain his membership in the following Western 
scholarly organizations: The Academy of Political Science
of Columbia University, The Historical Society of the Great 
War, The Committee of Historical Research of the International 
Institute For the Cooperation of Intellectuals, The Society 
of the History of the French Revolution, and The Society of
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4 7
Modern History. Even more significant was the fact that 
he was permitted to publish a new journal, to write articles 
for it, and to contribute to historical literature in 
general, within the confines of governmental censorship 
of course, but conspicuously marked by the absence of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology. Due to his obviously dual role 
in the Soviet scene, historians have speculated on the ques­
tion of whether or not Tarle was indeed a Marxist. Some 
have argued that the transformation occurred before the 
liquidation of Annals, and others have contended that the 
suspension of Annals made him compromise his views and 
accept Marxist principles. According to Venturi, Tarle 
showed "strong Marxist tendencies; he accepted Marxist 
schemes without the theory, he was less categorical and
more eclectic, but, unlike Soviet historians, he did not
48make a dogma out of it." Shteppa wrote that "Tarle was
a ’pseudo-Marxist,' an economic materialist, and a liberal
49who was almost a Marxist." Hosch agreed with Shteppa by
concluding that during the period of the twenties, Tarle
4 7"Perevybory prezidenta Akademii Nauk SSSR," I z v e s t n a , 
May 12, 1927, p. 1; Hosch, Evgenij Viktorovic Tarle (1875- 
195 5 ) Seine Stellung in der Sowjetischen Geschichtswissen- 
schaft, p. 1 0 0 .
AO
Venturi, "Evgenij V. Tarle," p. 211.
4 ^Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, 
pages 13 and 27.
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50
was a "pseudo-Marxist." In mentioning Tarle, Tompkins
asserted that, "He was a Marxist, but not a Communist. " 51
Weintraub contended that "until 1924 Tarle's position was
uncompromising as he was hostile to the regime and its
ideology. But after seven years of struggling he decided
52
to compromise." The official Soviet version printed in 
Borba Klassov in 1931, stated: "After our victory in the 
Civil War, Tarle ostensibly attempted to adapt himself to
5 3the Soviet regime and even proclaimed himself a Marxist."
All these interpretations have some validity, except 
for the Soviet version, which must be dismissed in light of 
Tarle's arrest at that time for his supposedly anti-Marxian 
and counter-revolutionary activities. It is also an over­
simplification to label Tarle as an economic materialist, a
"pseudo-Marxist," or a historian who showed strong Marxist
tendencies. It is true that before 1917 he emphasized the 
economic side of history, but it should also be remembered
5 <1Hosch, Evgeni j Viktorovic Tarle (1875-1955 ) Seine 
Stellung in der Sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft, pp7 §9- 
1007
51 Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought,"
p. 306.
52Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof.
Tarlego," p . 93.
5 3S. Mokhov, "Intervent Tarle pod Zashchitoy Vostokova,"
pp. 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 .
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that Tarle never neglected to point out the importance of 
political and social factors and how they interacted with 
economic phenomena. Tarle's cooperation with the govern­
ment after 1917 does not conclusively prove that he was a 
Marxist. Until 1924 his publications'were free of both 
Marxist terminology and theory and Soviet revolutionary 
jargon. For the most part, his work was reviewed favor­
ably by Western historians who were critical of Marxism, 
especially the Soviet version. As Weintraub suggested, it 
was not until after 1924 that Tarle compromised his position 
and began to write articles and books within a Marxian frame­
work. It should be kept in mind, though, that Tarle did not 
capitulate completely. He did not accept the theories of 
the official Pokrovsky school which considered history as 
merely a weapon to serve the needs of the state, or, as
Pokrovsky himself succinctly put it, "History is merely
54politics projected into the past." If anything, only 
after 1924 might Tarle be called a "pseudo-Marxist" as he 
developed his own brand of Marxism which was strikingly 
different from that of the Pokrovsky school. By sprinkling 
his work with revolutionary slogans, and by quoting the 
masters, Marx, Engels, and Lenin, he satisfied government
54Chapter I, page eleven, especially footnotes 22
and 23.
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censorship for the time being, thus gaining a certain 
amount of freedom to express his unorthodox Marxism, as 
well as his traditional historical views. Moreover, for 
compromising he was allowed to leave the Soviet Union to 
lecture in France, to undertake several research projects 
while visiting that country, and to publish his results in 
French and Soviet journals. Finally, from the standpoint 
of the government, foreign policy considerations might have 
played a part in the toleration extended to Tarle. Prior 
to 1924, Soviet relations with the Weimar Republic were 
friendly. Consequently, Marxist historians responded to 
the political realities by carrying on normal and cordial 
relations with German scholars. However, at the same time, 
the Pokrovsky school was engaged in bitter polemics with 
historians of the former Entente powers which reflected the 
strained relations with France and Great Britain. When 
trade agreements were concluded with Britain and France, and 
when diplomatic channels were opened with the two Western 
states, Tarle was used by the government to serve its imme­
diate needs, for no one was more acceptable than he to patch
55
up the animosity between Soviet and French historians.
In 1924, Tarle was extended an invitation by the 
College des Science Sociales to lecture on the economic
5 5Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Prof. Tarlego,"
p. 93.
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history of the French Revolution. Permission was granted 
by the authorities, and for the next few years Tarle fre—
C /C
quentlv commuted between the Soviet Union and France.
While in France he was able to establish a somewhat tenuous 
understanding between historians of the respective states. 
Most of his time, however, was spent in renewing old ac­
quaintances, serving as a guest lecturer, undertaking re­
search projects in the French archives, and occasionally 
writing articles for the French press. Two of his works, 
Naooleon I and the Economic Interests of France and The
Continental Blockade and the Kingdom of Italy, well received
57
by French scholars, were translated and published m  France.
As for his research, it was primarily centered on two topics:
the history of the French working class during the Bourbon
5 8
Restoration, and the causes of the First World War.
Tarle’s frequent appearances in France never side-
56 Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XX±I; S o c h m e n i y a , Vol. XI, 
"Arkhivnoe Delo na Zapade," p. 613; Mathiez, "Choses de 
Russie Sovietique," pp. 149-158; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze 
Dziejow Prof. Tarlego," p. 93; Uspenskii, Buzeskul, Bogoslovskii, 
and Platonov, "Zapiska ob uchenykh trudakh Prof. E.V. Tarle," 
p. 1559.
5 7E.V. Tarle, "Napoleon Ier et les Interets Economi- 
ques de la France," Napoleon. (March-April, 1926), pp. 117-
137; E.V. Tarle, Le Blocus Continental et le Royaume d 'Italie.
La Situation Economique de L {Italie sous Napoleon Ier. D 1apres 
des documents inedits. "("Paris: Felix Alcan, 1928*7^ entire
b o o k .
^Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXII.
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tracked him from his responsibilities at home. He continued 
to teach at the University of Leningrad (formerly Petrograd) 
where he conducted a popular seminar in research techniques. 
He also helped to establish the Leningrad Historical Insti­
tute. In 1926 he was invited to join the Society of Marx­
ist Historians, and in the following year, he was elected
59as a full member of the Academy of Science.
The tightening of censorship by the authorities in 
1925 had forced all independent publishing houses and 
journals to close down. From this time on, Tarle's articles 
and books, outside of those published in France, appeared 
in the government controlled press. He also began to edit 
documentary materials for Red Archives, the only government 
organ for such publications. In 1927, he wrote his first 
article for Istorik Marksist, "The Flight of William 1 1 . " ^  
Despite his work for the government and the compro­
mise he made with Marxism, Tarle still maintained some
59
Sochineniya, Vol. I, XXIII; Izvestia, May 12, 1927, 
p. 1; Alfred Meusel, "Zum Andenken E.V. Tarle," Zeitschrift 
Fur Geschichtswissenschaft,'III (1955), p. 149; Manfred, 
"Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," p. 14.
f i 0
E.V. Tarle, "S. Yu. Vitte, Frantsuzskaya Pressa i 
Russkie Zaimy," Krasny Arkhiv, III (1925), pp. 36-37; 
"Aleksandr III i General Bulanzhe," Krasny Arkhiv, I (1926), 
p. 260-261; "Doneseniya iz Berlina S.S. Tatishcheva V.K. 
Pleve v 1904," Krasny Arkhiv, IV (1926), pp. 186-187;
"Pismo V.K. Pleve k A.A. Kireevu," Krasny Arkhiv, Vol. V 
(1926), p. 201; "Begstvo Vilgelma II," Istorik Marksist,
IV (1927), pp. 62-72.
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freedom of opinion. In 192 7 a bomb exploded in the Leningrad 
Discussion Club, wounding several people. In connection 
with this event, a meeting was held at the Institute of 
History, where a government sponsored resolution was intro­
duced condemning this act. Serving as chairman of the 
committee, Tarle rejected it and substituted his own motion 
which expressed sympathy for the injured. According to a 
later Soviet account of this event, Tarle acted in this 
manner "because he felt the Institute of History was an 
academic institution and not a political o n e . " ^
In 1929, when Tarle was under attack for his histori­
cal and political views by Pokrovsky, he refused to take part 
in the proceedings directed against the famous Russian ar­
chaeologist V. Zhebelev, who had sent his work to an emigree 
journal, published in Prague. The government tried to ram 
through a resolution at Leningrad University denouncing 
Zhebelev for his actions, but Tarle refused to sign it, and 
moreover, spoke out against i t . ^
61 Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vraq na Istoricheskom 
Fronte: Tarle i_ Platonov _i ikh Shkoly, p. ITS"; Weintraub,
"Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 94.
6 9
Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag ha Istoricheskom 
Fronte: Tarle i_ Platonov _i ikh Shkoly, pp. 166—170; Weintraub,
"Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 94.
CHAPTER IV
TARLE AND THE SUBJUGATION OF HISTORICAL
SCHOLARSHIP TO THE PARTY LINE
The emergence of Stalin as practically undisputed 
leader of the party after a long struggle with his poli­
tical rivals during the twenties completely shattered the 
existing, but eroding, relationship between the non-party 
and party historian . 1 Beginning with the introduction of 
the First Five Year Plan in 1928,
The party demanded that the historian must not 
only accept Marxist theory, but also unite that 
theory and proletarian practice, investigating only 
those subjects necessary for immediate practical 
tasks and reaching only those conclusions demanded 
by the political l i n e . 2
The onslaught by the regime on the historical front 
was organized and carried out by the ubiquitous M.N. Po­
krovsky who launched a two pronged offensive to eliminate 
all traces of. historical non-conformity. He initiated
1See Chapter I, pp. 16-17.
p
Aron, MM.N. Pokrovsky and the Impact of the First 
Five Year Plan on Soviet Historiography,” Essays in 
Russian and Soviet History, p. 301; Hall, "Mikhail Niko­
layevich Pokrovsky (1868—1932)," Some Historians of Modern 
Europe, pp. 349-366.
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systematic purges of existing scholarly institutions and
simultaneously inaugurated an all out ideological attack
upon the views and works of several prominent "bourgeois”
3
historians. The initial step taken by Pokrovsky to subju­
gate scholarship to current politics in order to create a 
monolithic historical front began in 1928 when he convened 
the first in a series of conferences of Marxist historians
4
to discuss ways to implement the party’s policy. These 
conferences were used as a springboard to mount a steady 
campaign against the non-party historians who were accused 
of ideological and political crimes. The so-called offenses 
committed by these historians were well publicized in a sen­
sational manner in the party controlled press to convince 
the Soviet public of an impending plot to topple the govern­
ment.^ By the end of 1931, Pokrovsky had accomplished his
Aron, Ibid., pp. 283-302; Hall, Ibid.; M. Pokrovsky, 
"Novye Techeniya v Russkoy Istoricheskoy Literature," Istorik 
Marksist, VII (1928), pp. 3-17; Pokrovsky, "Institut Istorii
i Zadachi Istorikov Marksistov," pp. 3-12; Shteppa, Russian 
Historians and the Soviet State, p. 47; Szamuely, "The Elim-
ination of the Opposition Between the Sixteenth and Seven­
teenth Congresses of the CPSU," pp. 318-338.
^"Trudy Pervoy Vsesoyuznoy Konferentsii Istorikov 
Marksistov," Vol. II, (Moskva, 1930), pp. 25-45.
5
"Burzhuaznye Istoriki Zapada v SSSR (Tarle, Petrush- 
evskii, Kareev, Buzeskul i dr.)," pp. 44-86; Mokhov, "Inter­
vent Tarle pod Zashchitoy Vostokova," pp. 120-121; Zaidel i 
Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom Fronte: Tarle _i
Platonov i ikh Shkoly, entire book.
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goals. Independent historical scholarship had been virtually 
obliterated by means of wholesale arrests, followed by show 
trials which resulted in exile for some historians, and for
g
others, execution.
Although Tarle had cooperated with the regime, and 
had compromised his views somewhat, he became the object of 
an unrelenting attack by Pokrovsky and his associates during 
this period. In 1930 he was arrested along with the rest of 
the leading pre-revolutionary historians, and spent about a 
year and half in a Leningrad jail. At his trial in the spring 
of 1931, he was accused of being a Russian bourgeois historian, 
a chauvinist of World War I, an irreconcilable enemy of Bol­
shevism, a protector of the warmongers of the First World 
War, an anti-Marxist, and an ideological torch bearer of 
the general imperialist front directed against the Soviet
7
Union. Convicted of this long list of charges, Tarle was 
exiled in the summer of 1931 to the remote town of Alma-Ata
Chernavin, "The Treatment of Scholars in the USSR," 
pp. 710-714.
7Kagan,' "La Crise de la Science H i s t o n q u e  Russe," 
p. 4; Mehnert, Stalin Versus Mar x , p. 13; Mokhov, "Inter­
vent Tarle pod Zashchitoy Vostokova," pp. 120-121; George 
von Rauch, "Grundlinien der Sowjetischen Geschichtsforschung 
im Zeichen des Stalinismus," p. 3424; Yakobson, "Postwar 
Historical Research in the Soviet Union," p. 124; Zaidel i 
Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom Fronte: Tarle i_ 
Platonov i ikh Shkoly, pp. 1T^  45, and 176.
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O
(Kazakhstan) in Central Asia.
The drive to eliminate Tarle from the historical
scene began in 1928 when Pokrovsky published an article in
Istorik Marksist entitled "New Trends in Russian Historical 
9
Scholarship." From the tone of the article alone, it was 
obvious that Pokrovsky purposefully intended to discredit 
Tarle. Pokrovsky attacked Tarle personally and castigated 
him specifically for his historical views in his latest work, 
Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism first published in 1927."^ 
Although the interpretations in this study concerning the 
causes of the First World War led to his subsequent down­
fall, ironically enough, as some historians have suggested, 
it was the first work Tarle wrote which was within a consis­
tent Marxist frame of re f e r e n c e . ^  Despite his Marxist 
analysis, Tarle produced a volume which can be viewed in
Q
Chernavin, "The Treatment of Scholars in the USSR,"
p. 712.
g
Pokrovsky, "Novye Techeniya v Russkoy Istoricheskoy 
Literature," pp. 3-17.
1 0 E.V. Tarle, Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma: 1871-1919
(Moskva-Leningrad, 19"2 7")V They're vised edition of the work 
appears in Sochineniya, Vol. V, pp. 24-509.
1 1 Epstein, "Die Marxistische Geschichtswissenschaft 
in der Sovetunion Seit 1927," p. 79; Tompkins, "Trends in 
Communist Historical Thought," p. 307; Venturi, "Evgeni V. 
Tarle," p. 211; von Rauch, "Grundlinien der Sowjetischen 
Geschichtsforschung im Zeicheri des Stalinismus, " p. 3424; 
Vostokov, "Les Sciences Historiques en Russie," p. 459; 
Weintraub, "Blaski i nedze dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," 
p. 94.
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many respects as "revisionist'1 historical literature. Like 
many Western historians of that time, he questioned the 
validity and justice of the "War Guilt" clause of the Ver­
sailles Treaty which blamed Germany and her allies for the 
outbreak of hostilities in 1914. Thus Tarle1s purpose in 
writing Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism was to explain 
the reasons for World War I from a Marxist point of view
and to determine which power or alliance bloc ought to be
12held responsible for starting the conflict.
The bulk of the research for this book came from
recently edited historical literature from the Soviet Archives
and from the Vincennes Library in France, where Tarle spent
a few years pouring over the excellent collection of unpublished
source materials concerning European international relations
before and during the war and the period after 1919 while he
13was a guest in that country. In the first thirteen chapters 
of the work, he analyzed the attitude and the conditions of 
the working classes and evaluated the relationship between 
the domestic and foreign scene prior to the outbreak of the 
w a r . 1 4 In chapters fourteen through twenty, he assessed the
1 3 Sochineniya, Vol. V, pp. 24-39.
1 3 Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXII; Sochineniya, Vol. V, 
pp. 498-507 and 569-580; Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle, 
p . 13.
1 4 Sochineniya, Vol. V, pp. 27-317.
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foreign policy of the war years and gauged the impact of 
the Treaty of Brest—Litovsk on the Entente p o w e r s . ^  In 
the concluding two chapters he apprised the Versailles 
Settlement and surveyed the conditions of capitalism after 
1919.16
Tarle attributed the major cause of World War I to
the economic competition among imperialist states, especially
the protracted struggle between Germany and Great Britain.
He argued that after 1870, industrial capital began to
expand rapidly, and as it developed, it attempted to secure
new markets. Tarle referred to the political side of this
phenomenon as imperialism of the industrial powers. The
struggle for new markets was marked by the creation of new
colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence which made
war inevitable. According to Tarle, the most accute conflict
developed between German and British imperialism as the
ruling circles of both states, that is those who controlled
industrial capital, were preparing for an eventual showdown
as early as 1900. Thus he concluded that the political
events between 1870 and 1914 were conditioned primarily by
17
the economic forces of this period.
1 5 Ibid., pp. 318-448.
1 ^Ibid., pp. 449-497.
^ 7 Ibid., pp. 27-39.
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From the point of view of the party line at that 
time, Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism was both ideologi­
cally and politically unacceptable. In the work Tarle de­
clared that he was a Marxist but
he saw in Marxism a method for the understanding of 
reality and did not think that facts necessarily had to 
be fitted into previously established formulas or sub­
ordinated to political goals.18
It must be remembered that, up to this time, Tarle was con­
sidered as merely a "bourgeois” historian who sympathized 
with the regime. Now this unorthodox Marxist interpretation 
of a crucial period in recent history by Tarle, "the pagan 
turned heretic," was regarded by Pokrovsky as an attempt to 
destroy the official version of Marxism which he had mono­
polized since the Bolshevik Revolution and had also equated
19with the immediate political needs of the regime.
Three specific conclusions of Tarle came under heavy 
criticism by Pokrovsky and his associates. By denying that 
the class struggle became more intense before 1914, he 
completely contradicted the views expounded by Lenin in his
1 ftShteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State,
p. 58.
1 9See Chapter I, pages eight through twelve and page 
seventeen; Hall, "Mikhail Nikolayevich Pokrovsky (1868-1932)," 
pp. 349-366.
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p f)
pamphlet Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.
Whereas Lenin had argued that the class struggle would in­
tensify in this period, causing class contradictions to 
become more aggravated as capitalism began to falter, and 
Pokrovsky had reaffirmed this doctrine when he declared 
that ’’Marxism-Leninism carries with it not only the fact of
the class struggle, but also its inevitable result— the
21socialist revolution,” Tarle insisted on defending his 
thesis while subjected to Pokrovsky’s attack. He declared,
Indeed I am wholly convinced that one of the serious, 
real, deep down causes of the catastrophe of 1914 was the 
very fact that in the working masses the disposition to 
check the strivings of the imperialistic plunderers by 
every means was not sufficiently developed. . . . The
political heterogeneity of the working class must be 
admitted as a fact. . . .  I wished to point out the 
relative infrequency of revolutionary manifestations 
of the workers’ struggle in the 1872-1914 period.22
In essence, Tarle's interpretation meant that
the workers' class of the Western European countries 
did not prevent war, either because it could not, or did 
not want to do so, signifying that either there was a 
relaxation of the class struggle during the period of 
imperialism— a complete impossibility in the light of
p n
V.I. Lenin, ’’Imperialism, the Highest Stage of 
Capitalism,” Vol. V; V.I. Lenin: Selected Works, ed. J.
Fineberg (12 Vols.; New York: International Publishers,
N .D .), p p . 3-119.
p i
Pokrovsky, ’’Novye Techeniya v Russkoy Istoricheskoy 
Literature,” p. 11.
2 2 E.V. Tarle, "K Voprosu o Nachale Voiny: (Otvet M.N.
Pokrovskomu),’’ Istorik Marksist, IX (1928), pp. 101, 102, and 
105; Also quoted in Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet 
State, p. 59.
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the Leninist Theory of Imperialism; or the Western 
proletariat was hopeless as an ally in the future war 
for "world revolution." Such a conclusion could play 
a tremendous role in the ever-sharpening dispute, which 
then disturbed the Party, on the matter of permanent 
revolution.23
In addition to this unforgivable ideological blunder,
Tarle made matters worse for himself by committing another 
serious error. In the first place, he blamed Germany, not 
the Entente powers, for plunging Europe into war in 1914. 
Moreover, he argued that ever since the Franco-Prussian War, 
German economic and political development had been geared for 
future military aggression, thus making war practically in­
evitable. Tarle also reiterated his view that the direct 
responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities must be attri­
buted to Germany because of the unconditional support she 
gave to her ally, Austria-Hungary. Without the "blankcheck," 
Austria-Hungary would never have sent such an unacceptable
ultimatum to Serbia following the assassination of Archduke
25Ferdinand at Sarajevo.
Tarle was sharply rebuked by Pokrovsky for placing 
the blame of the war squarely on the shoulders of Germany. 
Pokrovsky emphatically stated that the problem of guilt must
2 3 Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, p. 62.
2 ^Sochineniya, Vol. V, pp. 27-40, 56-68, and 140-168.
2 ^Ibid., pp. 274-317.
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never be approached in this manner, but rather on the basis 
of class analysis. It was the capitalist classes of Europe 
who were responsible for the war, not just the German rep-
? fl
resentatives of this class. In arguing that Germany was 
the guilty party, and not England, France, or Tsarist Russia 
for that matter, Tarle merely compounded his ideological sins, 
for he plainly invited Pokrovsky to attack his political views.
If Tarle points to the Germans as the aggressor, this 
is only evidence of his former sympathy for the allies, 
having faith in that political system which he professed 
before the war. What we have in the book is_one of the 
attempts of polemics carried on by Entente /representa­
tive^/ against the Germans.^7
The editors of Istorik Marksist also criticized Tarle for
his "Entente-philism” and explained precisely why the
Entente powers, especially Great Britain, must be blamed
for the war.
It is important to clear up the matter of England 
in 1914 down to its deepest roots because it explains 
to us the position of England in 1928. The fact that 
there are some people who share nothing in common with 
our world outlook of Marxism and take up the study of 
recent history, the history of events closely connected 
with our present day political realities, is a fact of 
profound sadness shameful for our Marxist historians.28
The reasons for the indictment of Tarle by Pokrovsky and
the editors of Istorik Marksist seemed obvious at the time.
0
Pokrovsky, "Novye Techeniya v Russkoy Istoricheskoy
Literature," p. 12.
27* Ibid.
28"Ot Redaktsii," Istorik Marksist, IX (1928), p. 108.
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First, if it was Germany, and not the Entente, who 
began the w a r , or at least bore the responsibility for 
it (though only primarily), that in itself removes the 
responsibility, or, at least, a considerable share of 
it, from the tsarist government as well as from the 
Western nations, France, and more especially England, 
who in 1928 was considered the chief enemy and the great­
est danger for the Soviet Union. Not without reason did 
the answer to Tarle state clearly that the position of 
England in 1928 could only be explained by her position 
in 1914. Why? One explanation might be that, although 
this violated not only the historical facts but also 
the laws of dialectic, it nevertheless harmonized well 
with the tasks of current p o l i c y . 2 9
Finally, Tarle was denounced for his interpretation of 
the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Versailles because he con­
tended that
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, or, more exactly, the behavior 
of Germany in the east following this treaty served as 
a stimulus to the further consolidation of the Entente, 
and consequently, as a cause for the decisive military 
defeat of Germany and the Versailles Treaty which fol­
lowed . 30
Pokrovsky replied, and unequivocally declared, that the 
Treaty of Versailles had been prepared as early as 1914. 
Furthermore, he asserted that Tarle was completely wrong in 
placing the blame on the "stupid Bolsheviks," especially 
Lenin, for contributing both to the defeat of Germany and to 
the victory of’ the Entente.31 In essence, Tarle had committed
2 9Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State,
p. 61.
30Ibid., p. 59; Sochineniya, Vol. V, "Brest-Litovskii 
Mir i ego Znachenie v Istorii mirovoy voiny," pp. 387-393.
31Pokrovsky, "Novye Techeniya v Russkoy Istoricheskoy 
Literature," pp. 15-17.
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two more serious ideological errors. First, he failed to
take into account the party struggle, specifically the role
of Lenin, prior to the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk. Second, unaware of the fact that "participants in
this struggle had not left the stage, Tarle poured water on
the mill wheel of the Party opposition, whose liquidation
32was bound to come."
In an article entitled, "Concerning the Question of
the Outbreak of the War," published in Istorik Marksist
soon after Pokrovsky's attack, Tarle answered the charges
of his protagonist and defended the views he expounded in
33his book, Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism. He complained 
first about the polemical nature of Pokrovsky's article and 
asked the readers of his book to decide whether or not the 
aggressive tone was justified. In concilliatory prose he 
wrote that "Pokrovsky ascribes to me views, tendencies, and 
conceptions with which I have nothing in common, and there­
fore it is possible /to assume/ that there has been some
34misunderstanding." He also rebutted the accusations of 
Pokrovsky, namely'that he was pro-Entente and that the
32 Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State,
p. 61.
3 3
Tarle, "K Voprosy o Nachale Voiny: (Otvet M.N.
Pokrovskomu)," pp. 101-107.
34 Ibid., p . 101.
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Bolsheviks, in negotiating the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in­
directly contributed to the defeat of Germany and the Ver­
sailles Settlement. Tarle stated,
M.N. Pokrovsky accuses me of Entente-philism although 
many times I have repeated that the Entente and Germany 
were equally matched and deserved each other and that 
the clumsy publicists of these states have tried zealous­
ly to blame one another for the guilt which is a common 
crime.35
In answering the second charge, Tarle agreed with Pokrovsky 
that the Versailles Treaty was formulated three years before 
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but he also contended,
It was two diplomatic errors on the part of the Germans 
that caused this program to be put into effect: their
ruthless submarine warfare . . .  and the Ludendorff finale, 
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, both its plunderous nature and 
the way in which it was carried out.36
Although Tarle promised to clarify his views in a 
second edition of his book which was being printed at the 
time of his reply to Pokrovsky, he nevertheless failed to 
satisfy the editors of Istorik Marksist who, obviously, had 
already convicted him on two counts: his entire methodolog­
ical approach and his use of facts in explaining the causes 
of World War I. They wrote:
^^Ibid., p. 102.
o /r
Ibid.; Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet 
State, p. 60.
37Tarle, "K Voprosu o Nachale Voiny: (Otvet M.N.
Pokrovskomu)," p. 101; ”0t Redaktsii," pp. 107-108.
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And if in his answer, Tarle is still a greater and 
even a more flagrant fatalist than in his book, then 
it means that fatalism comprises the essence of his 
convictions, he frankly imagines that Marxism is a 
fatalism, and that it makes no difference to Marxism by 
whom, how, or when one thing or another has been accom-^o 
plished, granted that it was sociologically inevitable.
In short, Tarle’s unorthodox Marxism conflicted with the
party’s version which was geared to justify and support the
political policies of the regime. The editors concluded
their article by issuing Tarle a stern warning:
For E.V. Tarle there will be no future in Marxism 
for it is beyond his capabilities of course to understand 
in general our opinions in discussing subjects with him. 
He complains about the tone of the remarks in Istorik 
Marksist. Excuse us for this tone, but we always con­
verse in this manner with our class enemies, so spoke 
Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, and Lenin. Whoever is not 
pleased with this tone, let him not interfere in the 
class struggle, let him not defend the point of view of 
those or other imperialists against Marxist analysis.39
The mounting criticism directed against Tarle was 
not exclusively confined to the pages of Istorik Marksist.
At the first All Union Conference of Marxist Historians held 
in Moscow at the end of December, 1928, and January of 1929, 
Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism became the subject of a 
lively discussion among the members of the committee for 
Western European history, who unanimously agreed to condemn
^^”0t Redaktsii,” p. 108. 
^^Ibid., pp. 108-109.
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the work. Following the lead of Pokrovsky, who previously
stated that the book was well—written, the committee explained
that its "beautiful style" was precisely its greatest danger,
for it was widely read in general, but in particular by
Soviet youth, who were being corrupted and persuaded by
Tarle that Germany was responsible for the outbreak of the
40First World War.
A second, but shorter, edition of Europe in the Epoch
of Imperialism, which Tarle had promised the editors of
41Istorik Marksist, appeared at the end of 1928. Through a 
play on words, Tarle naively attempted to convince Pokrovsky 
and his associates that he had accepted their critical sug­
gestions and had incorporated them into the revised edition 
of his work. But it was obvious that he maintained his 
former views and merely tried to save face. For example, 
in the first edition, Tarle wrote about the role of the 
working class prior to 1914:
A fourth characteristic feature of the period 1871- 
1914 was the considerable weakening of the menacing force 
of the socialist parties in the area of foreign policy. 
Perhaps one should give a much more broader formula:
4<^ "Trudy Pervoy Vsesoyuznoy Konferentsii Istorikov 
Marksistov," pp. 25-45.
41Sochineniya, Vol. V, Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma: 
1871-1919*1 TizdarTle vtoroe dopotnennoe Moskva-Leningrad: 
Gosudarstvenoe Izdatelstvo, 1928), pp. 24-509.
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the working class as such in this period, especially in 
the last fifteen or twenty years, continuously and to a 
lesser and lesser degree opposed the adherents of the 
idea of a show of force in the administration of their 
policy.42
Concerning the same subject in the second edition, 
Tarle stated,
Regarding the working class during this period—  
obviously it broadened and strengthened its class 
consciousness as the social democrats were able to or­
ganize the masses and communicate with them also through 
the proletarian press; but, as the situation became more 
complicated to the working class, especially in the area 
of international problems and colonial policy, the less 
threatening they became, or at least the less threatening 
they became in the eyes of the ruling circles who pre­
viously feared that the working class with its entire 
mass would reply to mobilization with revolutionary 
outbursts.43
As for the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany, 
which prompted England to declare war, Tarle related in the 
first edition,
For England, German domination of Belgium by peaceful 
means or by war, was such a terrible economic and poli­
tical wrong, that England could in no way reconcile 
itself to it.
In the second edition he wrote:
A '? Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma: 1871-1919, (izdanie 
Pervoy— first edition), p. 14.
43Sochineniya, Vol. V, Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma 
1871-1919, p. 19.
44Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma: 1871-1919, (izdanie 
Pervoy— first edition")', p. 287.
Obviously, it had already been known for a few years 
in England that the Germans would violate the neutrality 
of Belgium. Now, however, the English pretended that this 
was something completely unexpected; the agitation for 
war began immediately and at once a pretext was found to 
declare war. The English considered the domination of 
Belgium by Germany, whether it be by peaceful means or 
by means of war, a terrible political and economic wrong, 
to which they could never in any way reconcile themselves.
When writing about the working class in England in the 
first edition, Tarle asserted, "In 1911, the danger of the 
revolutionary movements of the working class was already sub­
stantially less in England than when the liberal government
46came into power." In the second edition, he posed a ques­
tion: "In 1914 was the danger of the revolutionary movements
of the working class already smaller in England than when the
47liberal government took power?"
Shortly after the publication of the revised edition 
of Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism, a critical review 
written by N. Rubinshtein appeared in Istorik Marksist eval­
uating the new work in light of the corrections demanded by
48Pokrovsky and the editors. Rubinshtein carefully analyzed
45Sochineniya, Vol. V, Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma: 
1871-1919, pp. 308-309.
4^Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma: 1871-1919, (izdanie
pervoe— first edition), p. 51.
/ 7 .
Sochineniya, Vol. V, Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma: 
1871-1919, p. 55.
4®N. Rubinshtein, "Kriticheskie Stati-Otstuplenie v 
Boevom Besporyadke," Istorik Marksist, XI (1929), pp. 157- 
162.
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the second edition, especially those sections which were 
considered objectionable for ideological and political rea­
sons. He recognized that Tarle had made some changes and
4 9had second thoughts about his former conclusions:
These reservations show that E.V. Tarle had been aware 
of the steps to take in view of the observations and 
opinions of Pokrovsky. It was especially intolerable 
for him to consider the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk 
peace as a factor in strengthening the Entente.50
Rubinshtein concluded the review by summarizing the correc­
tions that Tarle had made in the second edition:
Once again they show that at best his means of de­
fending the Marxist position continues to remain noth­
ing but a decisive attack on it. Under the pressure of 
Marxist criticism, E.V. Tarle has been forced to retreat 
in confusion along the entire front. The repudiation 
of his errors in the first edition is both incomplete 
and inconsistent. In his attempts at reservations,
Tarle changes the stress, trying to integrate his err­
oneous formulas, but in doing this, he acknowledges his 
errors by his transition to another historical scheme, 
refusing to acknowledge his obvious sin of fatalism by 
failing to understand the historical process. The 
second edition . . . once and for all decides the ques­
tion about "misunderstanding,M "inaccuracies," and "care­
less reading" alluded to by E.V. Tarle. Europe in the^  
Epoch of Imperialism was understood as it was written.
The changes that have occurred on both the internation­
al and domestic scene since 1928 have forced Soviet histor­
ians to revise Pokrovsky's views of Europe in the Epoch of
^ Ibid. , p. 157.
SO
Ibid., p . 161. 
^ Ibid., pp. 161-162.
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T mperialism and place it in a contemporary political frame 
52
of reference. In volume five of the collected works of 
Tarle, which includes the second edition of Europe in the 
Epoch of Imperialism, the editor, V.M. Khvostov, stated,
The reader without difficulty will see that E.V. Tarle 
does not hold to the position of the Leninist theory of 
imperialism, but, nevertheless, there is a definite, and 
besides, a great influence of this theory on him.53
Erusalimskii, the chief editor of the collected works of
Tarle said,
Even though he was not completely successful in re­
lating the profound economic and class antagonisms re­
sulting from the first imperialist war, he succeeded in 
exposing many aspects of imperialist diplomacy, showing 
those methods by which it speedily adapted itself in 
preparing and unleashing the war, and how, during the 
course of the war, they /.the imperialist powers/ planned 
the redivision of the w o r l d . 54
In his concluding remarks about the book, Khvostov
contended, "The book was weak and one-sided because of the
author’s prejudiced attitude in placing the major share of
55
the blame for the outbreak of the war on Germany." How­
ever, he also declared that
although Tarle struck with an acute pen and with a 
special passion, namely at German imperialism, he also 
stressed the guilt of the Entente powers. The book,
52,S o c h m e n i y a , 
Vol. V, pp. 5-6.
Vol. I, PP . XXII
53, , .S o c h m e n i y a , Vol. V, p. 6 .
54 S o c h m e n i y a , Vol. I, p. XXIII.
55,S o c h m e n i y a , Vol. V, P- 6 .
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moreover, maintains its political presence and it will 
maintain this presence in the future as it concerns it­
self with the extreme measures of that time, while human­
ity did not care to save itself from the terror of German 
imperialism and militarism and from the danger of renewed 
German aggression.
It is interesting to note that neither Erusalimskii nor
Khvostov attacked Tarle for his interpretation of the Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk.
In 1928 Tarle wrote an important monograph entitled,
The Working Class in France in the First Period of Machine
Industry: From the Fall of the Empire to the Workers Uprising
57
m  Lyons. A sequel to his two previous studies on this
subject, it was the first work of this type published by the
Institute of Marx and Engels in the series Research on the
5 8History of the Proletariat and its Class Struggle. The
book was primarily based on unpublished materials gathered
from the French National Archives, reports of the Prefecture
and the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the correspondence
59of the Minister of Justice. In the study Tarle traced the
5 7 -
Sochineniya, Vol. VI, Rabochii Klass vo Frantsii v 
Pervye Vremena Mashinnogo Proizvodstva ot Kontsa Imperii do 
Vosstaniya Rabochikh v Lione, pp. 9-260.
5 ^Sochineniya, Vol. VI, p. 5; Manfred, "Evgenii Vik­
torovich Tarle,” p. 14; Kareev, "Les Etudes sur l'histoire 
de France en Russie depuis Vingt Ans," p. 386.
^^Sochineniya, Vol. VI, pp. 55 7-709.
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growth of industry during the period of the Bourbon Res- 
storation, he assessed the conditions of the working class 
and the development of their economic and political griev­
ances up to the July Monarchy, and concluded the work with
60an evaluation of the Lyons Uprising of 1831. The book was 
written within a Marxist framework and marked by the consis­
tent use of Marxist terminology to explain the actions of 
the working class. Tarle stated,
We will not forget that the French working class 
played a tremendous role in all revolutionary movements 
of the nineteenth century; universal history will not 
forget the significant part played by the workers in the 
revolutionary uprising in Lyons in 1831. If one does not 
know the details of the history of the working class in 
France, it is impossible to understand the Lyons uprising, 
the history of socialism as it developed in France, and 
to understand correctly all of French history in so far 
as the working class always appeared as the vanguard of 
the revolution. 61-
In spite of the Marxian overtones and terminology, the study
was panned by the Pokrovsky school, which considered it a
non-Marxist work. A review in Istorik Marksist cautioned
the reader to exercise great care so as not to be misled by
the Marxist phraseology used in it. The review likewise
pointed out the fact that several problems were treated in a
methodologically incorrect manner. It was admitted begrudgingly,
however, that the book was well—written and especially valu—
k^Ibid., pp. 9-260. 
^ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXIV.
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able because the author used new materials. 62
Another Tarle work, published in 1929, was Essays 
in the (Most) Recent History of Europe, 1812-1919. Primari­
ly an introductory textbook for nineteenth century history, 
it was violently attacked in Istorik Marksist for its factual 
and methodological errors, and especially for the author’s 
complete ignorance of the writings of Marx and Engels.
S. Monosov, who reviewed the book, concluded,
We believe that what has been said about the book 
has clearly unmasked it, and also made clear to us the 
character and quality of the book. We have before us 
a book written hastily, extremely slipshod, and from 
every page and from every line of the book there emerges 
the face of a liberal bourgeois historian who clumsily 
and awkwardly screens the book with a thin mask of 
Marxist terminology . . . .  Moreover, all the achieve­
ments and conclusions of Marxist historical science greet 
with monstrous scorn the author’s ignorance of the prin­
ciples of Marxism . . .  we categorically recommend /that 
everyone"/ refrain from using this book. Otherwise, un­
trained readers will receive lies, false impressions, and 
a distorted presentation of the leading themes of history 
from the Congress of Vienna to the Treaty of Versailles.
Despite the persistence and the visciousness of the 
attacks on Tarle, for the time being at least, they did not
/ r o
Akademik E. Tarle. Rabochii Klass vo Frantsii v 
Pervye Vremena Mashinnogo Proizvodstva ot Kontsa Imperii do 
Vosstaniya Rabochikh v Lione, Istorik Marksist, XI (1929),
pp. 189-193.
63 S. Monosov, Review of Ocherk Novyeshye Istorii 
Evropy (1814-1919)? by Akademik E.V. Tarle, Istorik Marksist, 
XII (1929), pp. 235-238.
6^Ibid., p. 238.
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cause him any undue hardships or practical consequences.
He was still able to maintain his contacts with the West
and was invited to participate in the International Congress
of Historians at Oslo in the summer of 1928 as a member of
6 5the Soviet delegation. In a letter sent from Paris, Tarle
expressed his regrets that he was unable to attend the meet-
6 6ing due to illness. Even though he was not present, an 
announcement was made at the Congress concerning Tarle’s 
forthcoming study of ’’The Working Class in France on the 
Eve of the Revolution of 1848.”^
At this point in his career, Tarle's position was 
indeed paradoxical; he was ruthlessly condemned for his 
historical opinions at home, but abroad, particularly in 
France, he was viewed as a distinguished representative of 
Soviet historiography and a recognized authority on the dom­
estic events of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic
• ^ 6 8  period.
Pokrovsky was the only Soviet historian to attend 
this conference.
6 6 Tompkins, ’’Trends in Communist Historical Thought,”
p . 307.
f i 7”VII Congres International des Sciences Historiques. 
Resumes des Communications” (Oslo, 1928), p. 291.
^Mathiez, "Choses de Russe Sovietique,” pp. 149-158; 
Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," p. 307; 
Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dzeijow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," 
p. 103.
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Tarle spent the year before his arrest in France, 
where he lectured at the Sorbonne, wrote articles for his­
torical journals, and collected source materials for future 
69
publications. On November 30, 1929 he gave a public lect­
ure at the Sorbonne entitled, "The Economic Unity of the 
European Continent under Napoleon," possibly unaware of the 
political implications connected with such a topic. In the 
course of his address, Tarle contended that Napoleon’s long 
range objective had not been to dominate Europe, but instead,
to create a community of economic interests on the European
70continent with France sharing only as an equal partner.
The Rector of the Sorbonne, M. Charlety, who followed Tarle 
to the rostrum, added to the political character of his speech 
when he stated that the League of Nations was merely a con­
tinuation of Napoleon’s idea. Just a few weeks before, the 
French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, had spoken before 
the Chamber of Deputies and proposed his own project for a
fig
Sochineniya, Vol. VI, p. 5; Mathiez, "Choses de 
Russe Sovietique," p. 157; E.V. Tarle, " L 'Insurrection 
Ouvriere de Lyon," Revue Marxiste, No. 2 (1929), pp. 132- 
153, and 265-294; E.V. Tarle, "L’Insurrection Ouvriere de 
Lyon," Revue Marxis t e , No. 4 (1929), pp>. 412-428; E.V. Tarle, 
" L ’Union ficonomique du Continent Europeen sous Napoleon,"
(Idee et Realisations) Revue Historique, CLXVI (January- 
April, 1931), pp. 239-255.
70"Burzhuaznye Istoriki Zapada v SSSR (Tarle, Pet- 
rushevskii, Kareev, Buzeskul i dr.)," p. 60; Tompkins, "Trends 
in Communist Historical Thought," p. 307.
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United States of Europe. It must be remembered that the 
Soviet Union at that time violently opposed the League of 
Nations, considering it to be a tool of Western imperialism, 
especially of France, whose purpose from its inception was 
the destruction of Bolshevism. In light of what the Rector 
of the Sorbonne and the French Foreign Minister had said, 
Tarle’s address was interpreted by Soviet authorities "as a 
tacit approval of the scheme for a Pan-Europe under French 
hegemony. "7^
The introduction of the policy of forced collectivi­
zation and "dekulakization" coincided with the Party's final 
showdown with the "bourgeois historians." In September, 1929, 
S.V. Rozhdestvensky was the first well-known scholar to be 
arrested. A mass purge of all the renowned pre-revolutionary 
historians followed, including the arrest of Tarle on Decem­
ber 18, 1930; and by the end of 1931, they were completely
72eliminated from the academic scene.
While Tarle languished in prison awaiting trial for 
his ideological and political transgressions, his troubles 
were compounded by the fact that his name was linked with
71"Burzhuaznye Istoriki Zapada v SSSR (Tarle, Petrush-
evskii, Kareev, Buzeskul i dr.)" p. 60; Mathiez, "Choses de
Russe Sovietique," p. 15 7; Tompkins, "Trends in Communist
Historical Thought," p. 308.
7^"Burzhuaznye Istoriki Zapada v SSSR (Tarle, Petrush— 
evskii, Kareev, Buzeskul i dr.)" p. 59; Chernavin, "The Treat­
ment of Scholars in the USSR," pp. 710-714.
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the "Workers Peasant Party" and the Prompartia.7  ^ According 
to Party officials, the members of both organizations had 
conspired with the ruling circles of Great Britain and 
France to overthrow the Soviet government and to replace it 
with a bourgeois-capitalist regime. The chief defendent in 
the Prompartia trial, N. Ramzin, an engineer in charge of the 
electrification program, admitted that while travelling in 
England and France in 1927 and 1928 on official business, he 
had reached such a clandestine agreement. Ramzin also dis­
closed that a slate had been prepared which comprised the 
members of the new government. Tarle's name appeared on it 
as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Another list released in 
1930 revealed that Tarle. and Paul Milyukov were both being 
considered as prime candidates for the post of Foreign Min­
ister. 74
During the course of the Prompartia trial, a number
of articles were written by Party historians, whose task and
purpose it was to justify the wholesale arrests of the pre­
revolutionary "bourgeois" historians. One publication in
7 3Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vraq na Istoricheskom 
Fronte: Tarle i_ Platonov i_ ikh Shkoly, p. 8 .
7 4 Mathiez, "Choses de Russie Sovietique," pp. 154- 
155; Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," 
p. 308; Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vraq na Istoricheskom
Fronte: Tarle jL Platonov i_ ikh Shkoly, p. 8 .
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particular, based on several meetings of the Institute of
History and the Leningrad branch of the Society of Marxist
Historians in January and February of 1931, was devoted
exclusively to the careers of the two most prominent jailed
75historians, Tarle and S. Platonov. Of the two, however,
Tarle received much more attention, indicating that he was
the primary target of the Party. The section of the book
which concerned Tarle was written by G. Zaidel, a historian
who had worked together with him at the Marx-Engels Institute
in 1927 and 1928 on publications about the history of the
7 6working classes in Western Europe. Even though Zaidel 
knew that Tarle was the object of the bitter attack by Pok­
rovsky for alleged anti-Marxist tendencies, he nevertheless 
boldly defended Tarle's work at the Institute at the first
77
All-Union Conference of Marxist Historians in Moscow in 1928.
7 5"Burzhuazye Istoriki Zapada v SSSR (Tarle, Petrush- 
evskii, Kareev, Buzeskul i dr.)" pp. 44-86; V. Altman, "Chto 
Chitat o Mirovoy Voine," Borba Klassov, No. 2 (1931), pp. 120— 
123; Mokhov, "Intervent Tarle pod Zashchitoy Vostokova," pp. 
120-121; S. Piontokovsky, "Velikoderzhavniye Tendentsii v 
Istoriografii Rossii," Istorik Marksist, XVII (1930), pp. 21- 
26; S. Piontokovsky, "Velikorusskaya Burzhuaznaya Istoriogra- 
fiya Poslednego Desyatelitiya," Istorik Marksist, XVIII-XIX
(1930), pp. 157-176; Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag n_a 
Istoricheskom Fronte: Tarle _i Platonov _i ikh Shkoly, p. 3.
7 6 Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 498-499; Manfred, "Evgenii 
Viktorovich Tarle," pp. 13-14.
77Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dzeijow Zycia Prof. Tarlego,"
p. 101.
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Because of his close association with Tarle and the defense 
of his work, it would seem likely that Zaidel agreed to co­
author this polemical book as an act of penance in order to 
convince the Party that he was a loyal historian actively 
engaged in the class struggle against enemies of the state, 
such as Tarle, one of the leading representatives of bourgeois 
historiography.
In general, Zaidel's objective in the book was to 
prove beyond a doubt that Tarle had committed serious method­
ological, political, and ideological errors throughout his 
career. To achieve this goal, Zaidel contended that Tarle 
consistently deviated from Marxism, especially Pokrovsky's 
version of it, that he had never been a Marxist in the first 
place, and that instead he had always been a spokesman for 
the class interests of the bourgeoisie. Thus, according to 
Zaidel, Tarle's major studies of the working class in France 
were not only anti-Marxist tracts, but also worthless falsi­
fications of history because they were written exclusively 
from a bourgeois point of view. Furthermore, Zaidel argued, 
Tarle had taken an uncompromising stand against Bolshevism 
since the Revolution. As evidence, Zaidel pointed to Tarle's 
active participation in the affairs of the Provisional govern­
ment and the pro-Entente outlook which was a feature of his
121
works during the "Scholarly NEP" period . 78
In the first chapter, Zaidel evaluated the early
works of Tarle, particularly those which were published
79
between 1906 and 1916. He stated that this was the 
period in which Tarle produced his most significant studies 
and formulated his methodological views. However, Zaidel 
declared that the works were the product of a reactionary 
historian because they were written during the most reaction­
ary decade in Russian history. In addition, for synthesizing 
the views of prominent bourgeois historians and for incorpor­
ating them into his publications, Tarle was accused of method-
80ological eclecticism. Zaidel concluded this section of the 
book stating,
Thus from the first days of his scholarly-literary 
activities, Tarle concealed his bourgeois essence and 
carried out the social ideas of the Russian bourgeoisie, 
that is, to take the proletariat in tow and to use it 
as a tool for strengthening the bourgeois state. The 
methodological eclecticism reveals that Tarle used these 
tools in order to achieve the political goals of the 
bourgeoisie.SI
In the second chapter of the book, Zaidel evaluated 
Tarle's interpretation of the role of the working class during
7 0
Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom 
Fronte: Tarle _i Platonov i. ikh Shkoly, theme of the book.
7 ^Ibid., "Metodologicheskie Vzglady Tarle," pp. 8-22.
8 8 Ibid., p . 2 2 .
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the French Revolution. Tarle had concluded his two volume 
work on this subject by stating,
For the entire period under discussion the workers 
in general did not display a hostile attitude to either 
the basic economic structure or to any political organ­
ization beginning with the Constituent Assembly and end­
ing with the Consulate. The awareness of class differen­
ces or feeling of solidarity among comrades, rarely, if 
the innumerable exceptions are not considered, appears 
in the workers' environment in the period under dis­
cussion. Political interests, even as something direct­
ly resulting from the needs and aspirations of an economic 
nature, were for them still a distant and complicated 
abstraction.83
Zaidel argued that this view contradicted the Marxist-Leninist
scheme of the French Revolution and was similar to traditional
reactionary historiography which considered the proletariat
as the submissive servants of the bourgeoisie in the histori- 
84cal process. According to Zaidel, Marx explained the French 
Revolution and the role of the working class in the following 
manner:
The revolutionary movements began in 1789 in the 
Social Clubs, during its course it had many spokesmen, 
but in time it finally sustained a defeat with the 
suppression of the conspiracy of Babeuf— this move­
ment gave rise to the birth_of the communist idea and 
also to the idea of a new /proletarian/ order.
p  p
Ibid., "Tarle, Kak Istorik Rabochego Klassa vo 
Frantsii," pp. 22-37.
88Chapter II, page 52.
84Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom 
Fronte: Tarle i Platonov i ikh Shkoly, p. 25.
8 8 Ibid., p . 30.
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Zaidel insisted that Tarle naturally was forced to falsify
history to prove his thesis since he relied exclusively on
bourgeois sources which ignored Marxist historical doctrines,
particularly the class struggle. As a result,
Tarle underestimated the development of industry in 
France, he overlooked a series of important events 
during this period, he absolutely glossed over the 
distinction between the Thermidorean counter-revolution 
and the revolutionary dictatorship, and finally, he dis­
torted the true role of Babeuf when he argued that Babeuf 
was the only radical in the Revolution, but not a com­
munist. 8 6
Zaidel closed this chapter by declaring, "From the past until
the present day, Tarle’s ideology has been clearly apologetic
to the bourgeoisie and it has been quite obviously the enemy
8 7of the working class."
Tarle was also accused by Zaidel of being the fore-
88most spokesman for Russian neo-imperialism. To support 
this contention, Zaidel analyzed a few articles which Tarle 
wrote during the First World War. He noted his pro-French 
attitude. After the February Revolution, Tarle became the 
spokesman for the Kerensky regime as his articles, which 
appeared in the newspaper D e n 1, supported the government's 
policies, especially its efforts to continue on with the war.
^ Ibid. , p . 37.
8 8 Ibid., "Tarle— Ideolog Russkogo Neoimperializma," 
pp. 37-49.
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His political activities on behalf of the Provisional Govern­
ment were indicative of his ideological stand, which Zaidel 
denounced as anti-Bolshevik and anti-revolutionary.
As we have seen, from the first days of the February 
Revolution, Tarle seriously took part in foreign policy, 
he even took it upon himself to volunteer for the post 
of Minister of Foreign Affairs, travelling to Helsinki 
and Stockholm. He apparently believed he would become 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Zaidel also spent considerable time reviewing Pokrovsky’s
criticism of Tarle's work, Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism
The articles that Tarle wrote for the journal Annals
91were systematically attacked by Zaidel. He stated that dur­
ing this period,
there can be no doubt that in the journal Annals,
Tarle tried to revive in all its crudeness the school 
of bourgeois historiography. He determined the polit­
ical program and was concerned with the foreigri rela^ 
tions of the Soviet Union; in particular its /future/ 
foreign policy. In short, his program can be described 
as a return to the restoration of c a p i t a l i s m .  2
In the final chapter, Zaidel summarized the reasons
93
why Tarle was guilty and why he should be punished. He
90
89
Ibid., p . 47.
90
Ibid., pp. 40-44.
9 1 Ibid., "Annaly. Shkola Tarle,” pp. 49-60.
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Ibid., p . 60.
^ Ibid. , "Zaklyuchenie. Nauchnaya tekhnika Istorich- 
eskikh Rabot Tarle,” pp. 60-66.
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concluded;
From the first days of his scholarly literary acti­
vity, Tarle was clearly a bourgeois historian who falsi­
fied history to satisfy the class interests of the capit­
alistic historical process. His methodological eclecti­
cism, a combining together of the ideas of Luchitskii,
Kant, Rodgers, Struve, and Bernstein, showed that from 
the beginning, Tarle adopted a few supposedly Marxist 
views. These circumstances, and in addition the themes 
and skills to use radical phraseology and being able to 
combine it with a beautiful style, promoted the idea 
that Tarle was a leading scholar and thus for a long 
time, he played the role of a first class progressive. 
Taking from the first days of the February Revolution a 
counter revolutionary position, Tarle concealed it master­
fully from the Soviet government by publishing nearly al­
ways Marxist works whose quality was supposedly friendly 
to the Soviet State, but in reality he formed an alliance 
with the double-dyed reactionary school of Platonov, and 
in his bourgeois work he slandered the working class and 
became an apologist for Entente imperialism and for Russian 
neo-imperialism. This ideology of sabotage combines with 
it a bad quality which in essence is the destruction of the 
relationship between the _/historia_n/ and the documents; he 
/Tarle/ gathers documents under a definite reactionary 
point of view, he neglects important printed sources, and 
he substitutes critical analysis for self-glorification 
with disdain for the views of the work of others.
The proletariat learns nothing from the studies of 
the type of historians such as Tarle. Not only do the 
sabotaging schemes of Tarle have to be discarded, but also 
the documentation of this historian which has been revised 
in a radical manner. Tarle does not have the right to be 
called a historian of the working class, the history of 
which he has falsified in order to satisfy the bourgeosie. 
Neither the workers of the Soviet Union, nor the prole­
tariat of other states have been able to recognize his 
sabotaging'conception. By firmly establishing proletariat 
historiography in the USSR, once and for all this will put 
an end to Tarle and his friends on the historical front.
94.
Ibid., pp. 65-66.
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The second part of the book contained a series of 
speeches by Marxist historians who gave additional support to 
the accusations directed against Tarle and Platonov by Zaidel 
and Tsvibak. P. Shchegolev, who had previously criticized 
Tarle in 1928 for his work on the Continental Blockade, set
the mood for the rest of the speeches when he denounced Tarle
• • 95again m  an extremely hostile manner.
Soviet historians of Marxism who work in the field 
of Western European history, because of a series of 
objective conditions, rarely have the opportunity to 
turn to such sources which would be unknown to the 
bourgeois historian. If we were to accept Tarle’s 
attitude and were to be guided by his directives, then 
we would have to enclose ourselves in the framework of 
historical diagnosis which in essence would mean the 
complete immobilization of the work of our historians 
of the West.
Another aspect of Tarle's method would mean the 
following: To concentrate exclusively on raw material
of archives means to believe in all the conclusions 
that Western historical science has made up to now.
This orientation, on the other hand, would mean that 
the existing Marxist literature would be taken out of 
circulation. This attitude would mean that Marxist 
historical literature would come to a complete stand­
still and that in a whole series of problems, Marxist 
historical science would have to lay down its a r m s . 96
In short, Shchegolev was saying that Tarle’s traditional use
of sources to document his works was contrary to the methods
Q  C
P. Shchegolev, Review of L_e Blocus Continental et le 
Royaume d 'Italie, by E.V. Tarle, Istorik Marksist, IX (192877 
pp. 281-283.
9 6Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom 
Fronte: Tarle _i Platonov i_ ikh Shkoly, p. 12T.
employed by the Pokrovsky school which unquestionably possessed 
the key to the secret of scholarly procedures for historical 
research. The works of historians of this school, especially 
Pokrovsky’s, were marked by the almost complete absence of 
references to sources.
A peculiarity of Shchegolev’s speech was his attack
on Tarle's monograph Germinal and Prairial, not published 
97until 1937. Just how Shchegolev obtained the unfinished 
manuscript was not explained. Nevertheless he declared,
If this work would have been completed then, we 
would not have obtained a history of Germinal and 
Prairial, but we would have gotten only a bourgeois 
falsification of these movements of the Parisian 
proletariat.98
From a moral point of view, the most infamous part 
of the book was the appendix. There, former students, as 
acts of humility and penance, cleansed themselves by con­
demning their imprisoned mentor, Tarle. N.N. Rosenthal, 
without mentioning Tarle's name wrote,
If I do not have the proper Bolshevik hatred toward 
our class enemies, it cannot be explained by my waver­
ing in basic matters, but rather by my__bourgeois intellec­
tual psychology ^/developed under T a r l e / . 99
9 7Sochineniya, Vol. VI, Zherminal' i Prerial' (Moskva, 
1937), pp. 321-562.
g  o
Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vraq na Istoricheskom 
Fronte: Tarle i_ Platonov i_ ikh Shkoly, pp. 135-136.
^ I b i d . , pp. 228-229.
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Ya. Zakher, who later became a professor at Leningrad Univ­
ersity and the author of several books dealing with the French 
Revolution and the Revolutions of 1848 in Germany, sent a 
letter from Leningrad in which he stated:
In my political viewpoints since 1928, I began to 
lean in the direction of right opportunism. The result 
of this was my under evaluation of the sharpening of 
class warfare in the Soviet Union and the necessity 
for sharpening the struggle with the class enemies 
on the ideological front. It was for this reason that 
I did not understand the need for unmasking the anti- 
Marxist viewpoint of Tarle when it was suggested that 
I take a stand against him. I acted in a two-faced 
manner, thus bringing down upon myself the justified 
punishment of my exclusion from the VKP (b) and the 
taking away of my work. I now feel that if I had sub­
jectively directed myself to make the final break with my 
former teacher, then considering the matter objectively,
I protected not only an anti-Marxist, but also a counter 
revolutionary, which, of course, I realized only later. ^ -00
Tarlefs arrest caused a tremendous reaction among 
French historical circles. Such prominent historians as 
C. Bloch, A. Mathiez, P. Renouvin, H. Hauser, H. See, Ch. 
Seignobos, and S. Levi sent a note to Soviet authorities 
protesting the imprisonment of Tarle. In it they pointed 
out the contributions that Tarle had made to the literature 
of the history-of the French working classes during the per­
iod of the Revolution and Restoration and to the causes and 
consequences of the Continental Blockade. They also reminded 
Soviet officials that he was instrumental in creating an
^ ^ Ibid. , pp. 226-227.
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atmosphere of good will and understanding between scholars 
of both countries. In conclusion, they stated,
We are not preoccupied with politics, but we consider 
it as our duty as scholars to raise our voices to attest 
to the honor, the worth, and the perfect loyalty of our 
colleague, and we wish that Y°u make this testimony known 
to all in the Soviet Union.1^1
Albert Mathiez, who extended the invitation to Tarle 
to lecture at the Sorbonne, published an article in which he 
likewise objected vehemently to the arbitrary arrest of Tarle. 
A renowned historian of the French Revolution, close to being 
a Marxist, and an admirer of Robespierre, Mathiez at one time 
was a staunch advocate of close Franco-Soviet scholarly col­
laboration. This relationship never developed fully because 
of the blind acceptance of Soviet historians of the Marxist- 
Leninist ideology set down by Pokrovsky through the Party. 
Tarle's arrest further disillusioned Mathiez as he realized 
that cooperation with Soviet historians was impossible, es­
pecially when they persecuted their own colleagues rather 
than defending them against attacks from the regime. To 
those historians loyal to the regime he wrote,
You have abdicated your independence. You are 
nothing more than tools in the hands of the government.
You embellish your capitulation in the name of Marxism, 
. . .  in the Russia of Stalin, there is no longer a place
1 0 1 Mathiez, "Choses de Russe Sovietique," p. 157.
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for independent scholarship, for free and impassionate 
scholarship, in short, for all science. History notably 
is nothing more than a branch of propaganda . . . .  Stalin 
is God and you are his prophets. 1 ^ 2
Soviet historians responded to Mathiez declaring that his
historical views had nothing in common with Marxism, and
103were therefore completely erroneous. In spite of the
protests by French scholars, Tarle was tried and exiled for 
his alleged crimes.
1 Q 2 Ibid. pp. 153-154 and p. 156.
1 0 3 C. Fridliand, "Kazus Matieza," Borba Klassov, No. 2
(1931), pp. 100-105; M.N. Lukin, "Noveishaya Evolyutsiya Alberta 
Matieza," Istorik Marksist, XXI (1931), pp. 38-43.
CHAPTER V
TARLE AS HISTORICAL SPOKESMAN FOR POLICIES 
OF THE REGIME (1934-1945)
The changes that occurred on the international scene
during the thirties, such as the triumph of Nazism in Germany,
the spread of fascism throughout Europe, and the menace from
Japan in the Far East, posed a threat to Soviet security. At
the same time, the Soviet Union was faced with severe domestic
problems. The introduction of forced collectivization and
rapid industrialization caused economic and social chaos. In
light of the events on the foreign and domestic scene, Stalin
and his clique initiated a drastic revision of the writing of
history. Now historians were ordered to stress nationalism
and patriotism, particularly the traditional heroism of the
Russian people and the progressive nature of the Western
European Democracies as a means of bolstering morale at home
and gaining friends abroad. As a result of the inauguration
of this policy, the once official anti-nationalistic and anti-
Western historical school of Pokrovsky became a political
liability for the regime. Within a few years after the death
of Pokrovsky, his historical views were condemned. Most of
his close associates were tried and convicted of crimes against
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the state in a manner similar to the purge of the "bourgeois 
historians" in 1931.^
As the posthumous denunciation of Pokrovsky and his 
school intensified and the revision of historical writing 
proceeded, Tarle returned unnoticed from exile sometime in 
1933 or 1934. He soon took up his former academic position 
at the University of Leningrad. Why Soviet authorities per­
mitted Tarle to return remains a matter of conjecture. Ac­
cording to Weintraub, while he was in Russia a story circu­
lated that when Edouard Herriot, the Chairman of the French 
Society of Friends of the Soviet Union, visited Moscow in
See Chapter I, pp. 18-23. The following articles, 
books, and decrees deal with the new trends in Soviet histor­
iography and the denunciation of the Pokrovsky school. V 
Stalin, S. Kirov, and A. Zhdanov, "Zamechaniya po Povodu 
Konspekta Uchebnika po Istorii SSSR," Pravda, August 8 and 9,
1934, p. 2; J. Stalin and V. Molotov, "Na Fronte Istoric'nes- 
koy Nauki," pp. 60-66; Karl Radek, "Nedostatki Istoriches- 
kogo Front i Oshibki Skholy Pokrovskogo," pp. 53-66; N. Rub­
instein, "Nedostatki v Prepodavanii Istorii VKP(b)," Bolshevik,
No. 8 (1936), pp. 4-22; A. Shchegalov, "Metodologicheskiye 
Istoki Oshibok M.N. Pokrovskogo," Pod Znamenem Marksizma,
No. 5 (1936), pp. 55-69; J. Stalin, "Ob Uchebnike Istorii 
VKP(b)," Bolshevik, No. 9 (1937), pp. 8-10; P. Drozdov, 
"Istoricheskaya Shkola Pokrovskogo," Izvestiia, March 21,
1937, pp. 2-3; Protiv Istoricheskoy Kontseptsii M . N . Pokrovs­
kogo (Moskva-Leningrad : A d a d e m n  Nauk SSSR, 1939-1940 ) .
2
Leo Yarish, "The Campaign of 1812," Rewriting Russian 
History, p. 269; Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a
Historian Under the Soviet Regime," p. 204; Hosch, Evgenij 
Viktorovic Tarle (1875-1955 ) und Seine Stellung in der Sowjet- 
Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 117; Mehnert, Stalin Versus Marx, 
p~I IT* Meuse 1, "Zum Andenken an E.V. Tarle," p. 149; Weintraub, 
"Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego,” p. 115. There is 
no agreement as to the date when Tarle returned from exile. Meusel 
says he taught at the University of Leningrad from 1932 until 
1948. Soviet sources make no mention of his arrest and exile.
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1934, he asked V. Molotov as a personal favor, to allow him
3
to meet with Tarle. Molotov supposedly consented, ordered 
a plane to fly to Alma-Ata to bring him back, and, within a 
short period of time, Tarle became the leading political- 
historical propagandist for the government.4 Weintraub also 
admitted that the accuracy of the story was difficult to de­
termine.^ In spite of its dubious nature, if the story were 
true, then it is likely that the decision to release Tarle 
was a gesture of friendship toward France which might have 
been a step, albeit a small one, in the direction of the 
normalization of relations between the two states. However, 
it appears more likely that the reinstatement of Tarle was 
inspired by "reason of state" which could be used by the 
regime for propaganda purposes in the West, especially in 
the French intellectual community, to promote the idea that 
a new liberal policy had been introduced in the Soviet Union. 
From the standpoint of the Soviet government, it was obviously 
in dire need of the services of historians of Tarle's caliber 
to help implement the new historical line. Even though he
3Weintraub, Ibid.
4 Sochinen.iya, Vol. I, pp. XXIV-XXXII; Hosch, Evgeni j 
Viktorovic Tarle (1875-1955) und Seine Stellung in der 
Sow j etischen Geschichtswi~ssenschaf t , p. 117.
^Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego,"
p . 115.
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had been purged by the Party in 1931, Tarle still enjoyed 
his scholarly reputation among historical circles abroad.^
His many contacts and friends, particularly those in the 
academic community and government circles of France, could 
also be used, as in the twenties, to further the major ob­
jective of Soviet diplomacy which was at that time aimed at 
containing Fascism. In 1934 the Soviet Union entered the 
League of Nations, and, in the same year at Geneva, Maxim 
Litvinov and Jean Louis Barthou conferred about the possibil­
ity of concluding a mutual assistance pact. In May 1935, a 
Franco-Soviet Pact was signed which provided for mutual
aid and assistance in case of an unprovoked attack by a third 
7
power. Finally, Tarle's historical views were no longer 
considered unorthodox. Tried and imprisoned in 1931 for 
alleged anti-German, anti-Marxist, pro-French, and generally 
pro-Western sentiments, which he expressed in numerous 
works written between 1914 and 1928, his historical concep­
tions were now considered correct. After all, they were the 
antithesis of the defunct Pokrovsky school and precisely those
^See Chapter IV, pp. 129-131.
7
George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin 
and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), p p . 304
305; Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p. 382 
Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia (Chicago: Rand
McNally and Company, 1964), ppY 317-318.
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encouraged by the regime in its gigantic effort to rewrite 
history to support its present policies.
In 1934 there appeared two publications by Tarle: 
he translated the personal papers of Talleyrand and wrote an 
introduction to a revised and more complete edition of his 
memoirs. Both these books provided him with the necessary 
primary source materials to write additional studies of
g
Talleyrand.
Tarle's first major work, a biography of Napoleon, was 
9published in 1936. In the opinion of Erusalimskii, "It sur­
mounted those dead, lifeless sociological schemes /of the 
Pokrovsky schoolT" which existed at one time in Soviet histor­
ical scholarship."^ M. Nechkina, who wrote the introduction 
to volume seven of the collected works which contains Napoleon 
and Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, contended that, unlike 
Tarle,
Pokrovsky was unsuccessful in creating a correct Marxist 
conception of the teaching of the /patriotic/ phenomena.
He justified the aggression of Napoleon. He failed to 
examine the nature of his expansionist policies and he
o
Taleiran: Memuary. Stary rezhim. Velikaya revolyutsiya.
Imperiya Restavratsiya (Moskva-Leningrad, 1934 ) ; Predislovie 
i perevoda: Taleiran Memuary (Moskva-Leningrad, 1934).
9
Napoleon (Moscow, 1936) in Sochineniya, Vol. VII, 
pp. 13-430; The work appeared in English in 1937 entitled 
Bonaparte, trans. John Cournos (New York: Knight Publication,
1937).
^ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVI; Sochineniya, Vol. VII, 
pp. 7-8.
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even dismissed calling the War of 1812 the "Fatherland 
War." He disclaimed the patriotism of the people and 
their role in the defense of the country. He concealed 
the activities of distinguished Russian generals, par­
ticularly N.M. Kutuzov. And he believed that the French 
army was responsible for burning the provisions which 
they desperately needed, rather than the heroic Russian 
people who made these sacrifices.
In the biography of Napoleon, even though Tarle
criticized the followers of Carlyle who had stressed the
role of the individual in history, he nevertheless recognized
the impact of Napoleon’s personality on this important period
of European history, as well as subsequent developments in the
12nineteenth century. In the introduction he wrote,
Only in romantic or idealistic conceptions of history, 
and especially in the species that is known as the "heroic 
school" was there ascribed to Napoleon the role of creator 
of his epoch, conferring upon it its ideas as well as its 
significance in the development of civilization. It does 
not mean, however, that we should underestimate the gigantic 
personality standing in the centre of this dual conflict 
and imposing upon it the impress of his tragic destiny.
The grandiose Napoleonic epic has had almost as strong 
a hold on political philosophers and theoreticians as on 
historians, publicists, and poets. Beginning with the 
Hegelians and ending with the revolutionary Marxist writers, 
there has been no single noticeable current of social and 
philosophic thought which, in one fashion or another, has 
not been influenced by N a p o l e o n . 13
Russian figures, such as Marshall Kutuzov and the leader of
the partisan forces, Efim Chetvertakov, were juxtaposed with
^ Sochineniya, Vol. VII, p. 7.
1 2 Ibid., p. 403.
13Bonaparte, pp. 10-11.
137
Napoleon and portrayed as additional, although minor, creative 
agents of history. At the time of the publication of the 
biography, Stalin had already introduced, as a major part of 
his policy, the "cult of the personality," and Tarle's por­
trait of Napoleon and leading Russian personalities fit in 
with this conception of h i s t o r y . ^  In addition, the biography 
of Napoleon was similar to Tarle’s numerous pre-revolutionary 
works in that he stressed the role of the individual in 
history.
Besides emphasizing the importance of the personality 
in history, Tarle interpreted the Napoleonic period within 
a Marxist framework. In the introduction he wrote,
For us the Napoleonic Empire is the birth of the 
stubborn conflict of new social and economic forces, a 
conflict which did not begin with Napoleon or end with 
him, and whose basic significance consisted in the 
victorious assault of the middle class against the feudal 
and semi-feudal order in France and Europe. The struggle 
was complicated by the simultaneous conflict between the 
French and the economically more powerful English commer­
cial and industrial groups for control of the more back­
ward countries. This, and the wars of national libera­
tion which followed, succeeded in placing Europe on the 
road to free capitalism.1^
Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian
under the Soviet Regime," p. 206; Leo Yaresh, "The Role of 
the Individual in History," Rewriting Russian History, pp. 
77-106; The major criticism of this work by Soviet histor­
ians today is precisely Tarle’s emphasis of the role of the 
individual in history; Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVII.
15Bonaparte, pp. 10-11.
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Furthermore, he argued,
In the realm of foreign policy, Napoleon’s imperialis­
tic tendencies, dictated by the interests of the bourgeoisie, 
brought him into conflict with the rotting, actively de­
composing semi-feudal world of Europe, which could not 
successfully cope with his initial onslaught. At the same 
time, the blows which the Emperor’s policy inflicted on 
English economic conditions were reflected in the intensi­
fied revolutionary mood of the English working cla s s e s . ^
In the conclusion, Tarle attacked those historians 
who had contended that Napoleon consolidated the victory of 
the French Revolution.
This is not the case. He borrowed from the Revolu­
tion those reforms designed to further the economic de­
velopment of the French bourgeoisie, but in so doing he 
also extinguished the revolutionary flame which had been 
burning so fiercely for ten years. He did not so much 
complete the Revolution as liquidate it. . . . That the
Revolution ended with the inauguration of Napoleon’s 
dictatorship signified above all the victory of the 
upper bourgeois masses, over the plebian storm which 
from 1789 to 1794 had directed the course of the Revolu­
tion. . . .  The Napoleon who repressed the workers and shot 
down the Jacobins, who made himself an autocratic monarch 
and transformed the surrounding republics into kingdoms 
which he parceled out among his relatives and marshals ^  
can hardly be called the ’’fulfiller of the Revolution."
In light of Stalin’s pronouncements and directives 
concerning the way history should be written, it was evident 
that Tarle had committed two serious errors in his biography 
of Napoleon. He rejected the idea that the peasants were
^ Ibid. , p. 407.
1 ^Ibid., pp. 406-407.
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instrumental in the defeat of Napoleon and denied that the 
character of the War of 1812 was a "People's" or "National 
War." According to Tarle, during this period in Russian 
history the position of the peasant closely resembled that 
of the Negro slave; and if Napoleon had issued a proclama­
tion to liberate the peasants, the Russian army would have 
disintegrated as a fighting force because it was comprised
mainly of serfs. As a result, a rebellion similar to the
18Pugachev uprising would have broken out. To support his 
view that the War of 1812 was not a "National" or "People's 
War," Tarle contended,
Never did Napoleon or his marshals, or their compan­
ions in arms speak of the War of 1812 as a "National War" 
in the same sense that they spoke of the Spanish guerilla 
war as a "National War." Nor could they compare the two 
phenomena. The war in Russia lasted six months, the first 
three saw Napoleon constantly victorious as he advanced 
along a direct line from Kovno to Vilna to Smolensk to 
Moscow, interrupted by battles and petty skirmishes with 
the regular Russian army. There was, however, not a single 
national mass revolt against the French— neither then nor 
after Napoleon's entry into M o s c o w . 19
He went so far as to suggest that the peasants welcomed the
French as liberators and even collaborated with them.
Indeed, there were occurrences of quite a contrary 
nature, as when the peasants of Smolensk complained to
1 8 Ibid., pp. 288-290. 
1 9Ibid., p . 302.
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the French authorities that their master, the landowner 
Engelhardt, had been guilty of betraying the French.20
As for what caused Napoleon's defeat, Tarle argued that it
was neither the Russian army nor the peasants, but rather
21the terrible winter.
During 1937, the biography of Napoleon was reviewed
three times. The first, which appeared in Istorik Marksist,
was generally favorable. N. Lukin, the reviewer, stated,
It is necessary to say that E.V. Tarle’s book 
is well written and its format belongs to the scholarly- 
popular type. The author is solely concerned with the 
Napoleonic period, and one can easily see that the work 
is based on the author’s study of the vast amount of 
primary sources and secondary literature. The book is 
a lively, popular, and simple account designed for the 
general reader so he can acquire a familiarity with the 
important facts of the history of the great bourgeois 
revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, the 
period of the Consulate, and the Empire. Needless to 
say, the book will be read with interest from the beginning
to the e n d . 2 2
Lukin’s major criticism of the book was Tarle’s "incorrect”
interpretation of the part played by the masses in the defeat 
23of Napoleon.
On June 10, an essay entitled, "History and the Present"
^ Ibid. , pp. 303-304.
7 2N. Lukin, "Kriticheskie Stat’i i Obzory," Review of 
Napoleon, by E. Tarle, Istorik Marksist, No. i (1937), p. 159.
^ I b i d . , p . 158.
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24
appeared m  Pravda. The author, A. Konstantinov, not 
only criticized the biography of Napoleon, but also subjected 
Tarle to a brutal personal attack. The reasons for Konstan­
tinov's denunciation of Tarle can be attributed to two factors. 
Although the Soviet government needed his services and pro­
tected him, Tarle was still not accepted in historical circles. 
In fact, Konstantinov's article was indicative of the general 
hostility toward Tarle as he reprimanded the handful of his­
torians who had befriended him in any way and reminded them 
of his past.
It has been known for some time that Tarle was a 
falsifier of the French Revolution, the classic bourgeois 
revolution. It has been the practice of this man not to 
oppose theoretical views; suffice it to remember that he 
figured prominently as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 
government of the saboteur Ramzin, who was judged guilty 
by a Soviet Tribunal in 1930.25
More important was the fact that Tarle's sponsor, Karl Radek,
the editor of the book, had been tried and convicted of
plotting to overthrow the Soviet regime. At approximately
the same time, N. Bukharin, who had praised the work, was being
accused by the Party of certain crimes against the state,
24A. Konstantinov, "Istoriya i Sovremennost," Review 
of Napoleon, by E. Tarle, Pravda, June 10, 1937, p. 4.
2 SIbid., p. 4; Kagan, "La Crise de la Science H i s t o n -  
que Russe," pp. 32-33; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow 
Prof. Tarlego," pp. 118-119.
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particularly his affiliation with the so-called Anti—Soviet 
Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites. Hence, Tarle's checkered 
past and the fact that the book had been lauded by Radek and 
Bukharin, now considered enemies of the people, prompted 
Konstantinov to write,
In the book Tarle has attempted to rehabilitate 
Bonapartism, which was contrary to the opinions of Lenin.
It is well known that Bonapartism has been used by Japan- 
ese-German-Trotskyite protagonists, spies, and infiltrators 
who were acting on Gestapo orders. Under the guise of 
Bonapartism the secret fascist policies, and the agents of 
it, Trotsky and Bukharin, have derived their inspiration. 
Trotsky tried to justify his criminal plan which called 
for the restoration of capitalism in Russia by means of 
historical analogies with the period of the Restoration.
This is the bandit-like concept that Tarle’s prattling 
tries to establish . ^6
The following day in Pravda, the editors apologized
for the harshness of Konstantinov’s review and presented the
regime’s opinion of the biography for the purpose of silencing
2 7any further criticism of it. They demanded that Tarle 
make certain corrections. However, they placed the blame 
for the errors squarely on the shoulders of the jailed Karl 
Radek. The editors also criticized the publishers of the 
book who, they claimed, had failed to help Tarle prepare the 
work. In spite of the shortcomings, the editors concluded,
"In any case, of all the non-Marxist books devoted to Napoleon,
^ K o n s t a n t i n o v , "Istoriya i Sovremennost' , ” p. 4.
27”Ot Redaktsii,” Pravda, June 11, 1937, p. 1.
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Tarle’s is the best, his approach is the most realistic, and 
it is the closest to the truth . " 2 8
In 1936 Tarle wrote a series of essays for Izvestiia
29
entitled, "Historical Parallels." He analyzed the origins
and the development of democratic institutions in the West
and then compared them with those introduced in Russia since
the Bolshevik Revolution. The final article in this series,
entitled "Concerning Bourgeois Democracy and the New Constitu-
30tion of the Soviet Union" was published in Istorik Marksist.
It was the most important of the group, especially with regard 
to Tarle’s position vis si vis the government. It would seem 
that the publication of this essay also marked the turning 
point in Tarle’s career. Not only was he admitted into the 
top echelon of Marxist historians, but from this time on 
Tarle also assumed the position of chief historical spokesman 
and apologist for the foreign and domestic policies of the 
Soviet regime.2 "^
2 8Ibid., p. 4; Kagan, "La Crise de la Science Historique 
Russe," p. 33; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Prof. Tarlego," 
p. 119.
2 9 "Istoricheskie Parallel!," (Organizatsiya vlasti v SSSR 
i na Zapade). (K proektu Konstitutsii SSSR). Izvestiia, June 23, 
August 12 and September 15, 1936.
30E. Tarle, "0 Burzhuaznoy D e m o k r a t n  l Novoy Konstitutsii 
SSSR," Istorik Marksist, No. I (1937), pp. 125-138.
31 Hosch, Evgenij Viktorovic Tarle (1875-1955) und Seine 
Stellung in der Sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 119;
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In the essay Tarle argued that,
On the one hand our Stalinist Constitution appears 
to be the completion and full realization of all the 
principles of democracy which were achieved in Europe and 
America only after a long bloody sjtruggle; on the other 
hand, it _/the Constitution of 1936/ introduces into con­
stitutional law a series of new aspects, principally 
those conditions for great social change, which have 
already occurred in our country. On both points the 
Stalinist Constitution is an act of exceptional historical 
significance .32
According to Tarle, in the constitutions of Western European 
states, the rights of individuals were based on merely post­
ulates and good intentions. For the first time in history, 
the rights of all citizens would be protected since they 
were now founded on the realities of social life. Although 
Tarle admitted that some provisions in Western constitutions, 
such as the secret ballot, outwardly appeared to be more demo 
cratic than the provisions of the Soviet Constitution, he 
claimed that
it is universally known that in industrial areas in the 
West, before elections, capitalists threaten the workers 
and make it known__to them that if they vote for the Social 
ist Party, they /the capitalists/ might limit production, 
or close their factories.33
Kagan, "La Crise de la Science Historique Russe," p. 32; 
Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," 
p. 119.
3 2Tarle, "Burzhuaznoy Demokratii i Novoy Konstitutsu 
SSSR," p. 126.
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Tarle also criticized the British policy of ministerial 
responsibility. During the First World War, Lloyd George 
governed England without the consent of Parliament. This 
trend led Tarle to conclude that parliamentarianism was de­
clining in the West. The rise of Fascist movements in France 
and in Great Britain accelerated this tendency, and eventually 
the movements of Charles Maurras and Oswald Mosely would
succeed in toppling the existing, but ever weakening, demo-
34cratic governments.
In 1937 Tarle’s final study devoted to the history of
the French working class during the period of the French
35Revolution was published. The work, Germinal and Prairial,
was based almost exclusively on unpublished source materials.
3 6It was reprinted in 1951 and translated into French in 1959. 
Tarle argued that the insurrections which occurred during the 
months of Germinal and Prairial "were the last mass uprisings 
of the masses (plebeians) of the suburbs during the period
3 ^Ibid., pp. 132-133.
3 3
E .V. Tarle, Zherminal * i_ Prerial ’ (Moskva: Gosu-
darstvennoe Sotsial’no-Ekonomicheskoe Izdatel’stvo, 1937); 
Sochineniya, Vol. VI, pp. 321-562; See Chapter IV, p. 128.
36Jean Dautry, Review of Germinal et Prairial, by 
Eugene Tarle, Annales Historiques de l^a Revolution, XXXII 
(January - March, 1960TJ pp^ 331-3"35".
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of the French Revolution, the greatest of the bourgeois
3 7revolutions of the European past." The masses revolted 
principally because of poor economic conditions. Thieves and 
speculators, according to Tarle, had become wealthy at the 
expense of the starving population of Paris. Prior to the 
uprisings, an unsuccessful attempt was made by a few political 
groups to organize the masses. The insurrections failed 
precisely because of the lack of political organization and 
the absence of dynamic leadership. Tarle wrote:
There was neither an acknowledged leader, nor a fully 
worked out political program adopted by the workers which 
would further their demands for the restoration of the 
Constitution of 1793 and measures to combat famine and 
high prices. There was not even any preparation for the 
coordination of activities and actions between the revolu­
tionary masses and the petty bourgeoisie, the last of the 
Montagnards, who paid with their lives for their personal 
activities on the First of Prairial, a sacrifice which 
seemed to be politically fruitless. The lack of a workers’ 
party, the absence of political organization, a class leader, 
and tactical plans cruelly tell the story of what happened 
on the first, second, third, and fourth days of P r a i r i a l . ^ 8
Even though the insurrections were destined to fail, Tarle
concluded,
In the history of the world proletariat, these days 
will have a tremendous meaning and will forever have a 
memorable place despite the fact that it was not purely
^ S o c h i n e n i y a , Vol. VI, p. 321.
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a proletarian uprising: it was an uprising of the
metropolitan plebeian masses in which the workers 
participated only as one of the components. . . .  In 
the history of the world struggle of the exploited 
against the exploiters, the gloomy heroes of Germinal 
and Prairial, as they were called by Herzen, will 
never be forgotten.39
When the Soviet Union honored the one hundred-fiftieth 
anniversary of the French Revolution, Tarle wrote several 
essays devoted to various phases of it, praising particularly 
the patriotism* and heroism of the French people.4^ Much of 
his emphasis was placed on the important part the masses played 
during the early stages of the Revolution, especially their 
efforts in helping to drive out Prussian and Austrian armies 
from France in 1792. In the same year, he collaborated with 
V.G. Volgin, a prominent modern European historian, in the prep­
aration of a collection of essays by Soviet historians concerning 
the historical problems of the French Revolution. The work was 
completed and published in 1941 under the title, The French
39
Ibid., pp. 321-324.
4 ^Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXV; For example, see the 
following: "Vzyatie Bastilii," Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal,
No. 1 (1939), pp. 55-63; "Zhan-Pol' Marat, drug naroda,"
Novy Mir, No. 7 (1939), pp. 183-201; MNeopublikovannye Doku- 
menty po Istorii Frantsuzskoy Revolyutsii," Pravda, January 9, 
1939; "Frantsuzskaya Revolyutsiya v Bor'be s Interventami," 
Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 10, 1939; "Bor'ba s Interventsiei"
(B epokhu Frantsuzskoy Burzhuaznoy Revolyutsii) Pravda, July 14, 
1939; "Osada i Vzatie Bastilii,” Izvestiia, July 14, 1939.
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Bourgeois Revolution 1784-1794.4^
Tarle's new study of Napoleon, replete with the
corrections suggested by the editors of Pravda, appeared in 
42
1938. The publication of the work reflected the changing 
trends of Soviet historiography in the 1930's.43 In it Tarle 
clearly took into account the new historical directives an­
nounced by the Party, which stressed patriotism, glorified 
the Russian peasant, and resurrected those important and
progressive personalities in Russian history who had previous-
44ly been maligned by members of the Pokrovsky school.
The importance of this work lay in the fact that it 
was written brilliantly by a recognized scholar and that 
the author expressed views directly contrary to those 
which he had defended two years earlier. The impression 
was created that the author, in taking a new position on 
the evaluation and the nature of the 1812 campaign, not 
only was declaring war on the views of earlier Soviet 
historiography, but was even refuting himself. In fact—  
and this is certainly not to Tarle’s credit— nowhere 
in his new book did he mention the change, nor did he 
explain it.45
V.G. Volgin and E.V. Tarle red. Frantsuzskaya 
Burzhuaznaya Revolyutsiya 1789-1794 (Moskva—Leningrad, 
1941); SochTneniya, Vol. I, p. XXV.
A ?Nashestvie Napoleona na Rossiyu (Moskva, 1938); 
Sochineniya, Vol. VII, pp. 435-738.
4 8 Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian
Under the Soviet Regime," p. 209.
44See Chapter I, pp. 21-22.
45Leo Yaresh, "The Campaign of 1812," Rewriting 
Russian History, pp. 261-289; Almost the same view was 
expressed by M. Nechkina in the introduction to volume
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One of the major differences between the biography 
Napoleon and Napoleon * s Invasion of Russia was the emphasis 
that Tarle now gave to patriotism, exhibited especially in 
the heroism of the Russian people. Contradicting his former 
view about the role of the peasants during the War of 1812, 
Tarle now wrote,
For Russia the consequences of the Fatherland War 
were indeed tremendous. It was neither the cold nor 
the vast expanse of Russia which defeated Napoleon; it 
was the resistance of the Russian people which defeated 
him.46
Furthermore, he explained,
The Russian people defended their right to an in­
dependent national existence and did this with an indom­
itable will to victory with such esteem, with such disdain 
in making a fuss out of every act of heroism, with such 
an awakening of the soul, that no other people in the 
world at the time could be compared with them, except 
possibly the Spanish.47
Tarle concluded with a stirring tribute to the heroic actions
of the Russian peasant.
The partisan movement which began immediately after 
the Battle of Borodino, as we shall see further, became 
successful only because of the most active voluntary aid
seven which contains this work. Napoleon1s Invasion of Russia 
appeared soon after the resolutions of the Party and the 
Government about the errors of the Pokrovsky school. For the 
most recent interpretation of the historiography on the War 
of 1 8 1 2 ,  see Barry Hollingsworth, "The Napoleonic Invasion 
of Russia and Recent Soviet Historical Writing," Journal of 
Modern History, XXXVIII (March, 1 9 6 6 ) ,  pp. 3 8 - 5 2 .
^ S o c h i n e n i y a ? V o l .  V I I ,  p. 7 3 6 .
^Ibid. , pp. 628-630.
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so sedulously rendered by the Russian peasantry. This 
insatiable hatred toward the usurpers, marauders, and 
oppressors, ignorant of whence they came, was expressed 
by the way in which the Russian peasants joined the 
army of 1812 and how they fought.
The national character of this war showed itself in 
the way the army was organized. . . . Further in describing 
the retreat of the French Army, I shall speak in detail 
about the guerilla warfare, about the peasant partici­
pation in it. According to the unanimous opinion of the 
French, absolutely nowhere, except in Spain, did the 
peasantry in the villages show such desperate resistance 
as in Russia. At our approach ’’each village was turned 
into a bonfire or a fortress," so wrote the French after­
wards. . . .  It was chiefly the Russian peasant who 
destroyed tVie magnificent cavalry of Murat, first in 
the world, under whose victorious onslaught all European 
armies fled; it was this very army that the Russian peas­
ant destroyed. . . . Indeed, the war against the invading
Napoleon was solidly a national war. In his strategy 
Napoleon counted the number of his troops and the troops 
of Alexander, but he had to fight against the Russian 
people, about whom he had forgotten. It was the Russian 
people, who delivered the fatal blow to the greatest 
commander in the history of the w o r l d . ^ 8
In the 1936 publication, Tarle had stated that the 
invasion of Russia in 1812 was just another one of Napoleon's 
wars. However, in the new work, he again changed his inter­
pretation without any explanation.
Of all of Napoleon’s wars, the War of 1812 was the 
most openly imperialistic, the one dictated in the inter­
ests of the predatory policies of Napoleon and the French
B o u r g e o i s i e . ^ 9
According to Tarle, Napoleon’s primary objective was
to make Russia economically subject to the interests of 
the French bourgeoisie and to create a permanent threat
^ Ibid. , pp. 628-630. 
Ibid., p . 438.
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against Russia in the form of a Vassal Poland to which 
Lithuania and White Russia were to be joined.5^
Another theme stressed by Tarle in his biography
of Napoleon was the Marxist conception of class struggle.
Due to the emphasis on patriotism in his new work, Tarle
assigned a secondary role to this notion, although he did
51not ignore it completely. He stated,
Of course, the class struggle, that is the struggle 
of the peasants against the landlords, did not stop in 
1812. It did not stop in one year, one month, or after 
1812. The expulsion of the enemy from the territory of
Russia became the primary task of the Russian peasants
during the second half of 1812.52
In short, the French threat merely postponed the peasants’
struggle against the landed gentry.
It has been suggested that Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia
was shaped by the pre-war tensions on the international scene.
Tarle seemed "to envisage an impending German attack and
53
turned to the past for guidance and assurance." When the 
work was translated into English in 1942, Tarle wrote a new
50
Ibid., p . 439.
5 1 Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian
Under the Soviet Regime," p. 207.
^^Sochinen.iya, Vol. VII, p. 621.
5 3Sir Lewis Namier, Facing East (New York: Harper and
Row, 1966), p. 99; See also the following reviews of Napoleon’s 
Invasion of Russia: George M. Dutcher, Journal of Modern
History, XIV (December, 1942), pp. 537-538; O.J. Frederiksen, 
Russian Review, II (Autumn, 1942), pp. 115-116; Dietrich Gerhard 
The American Historical Review, Vol. 48 (January, 1943), pp. 309 
312.
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introduction in which he compared the Napoleonic invasion
with that of the Nazis, pointing out that the Germans would
be destroyed like the French.
The Soviet press received Tarle’s new study of Napoleon
with great enthusiasm. N. Kruzhkov, who reviewed the book in
Pravda declared, "It is a book dealing with the heroism of
the Russian people. All who hold dear the heroic past of
5 5Russia will read Tarle’s book with great interest." Erusa- 
limskii, the chief editor of the collected works of Tarle, 
stated, "Both studies of Napoleon were shaped by the tradi­
tions of bourgeois historiography and written in the atmos-
56phere of the cult of the personality." However, in spite
of these shortcomings,
the books, Napoleon and Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia, 
played a positive role in stimulating patriotism among 
wide circles of Soviet people. They will be reminded 
and they will recall the great lessons of history and 
fate which inevitably awaits all who have the foolish 
idea that they can subjugate the Soviet p e o p l e . 57
Until the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact in
1939, Tarle supplied the regime with numerous anti-Fascist
54 Eugene Tarle, Napoleon1s Invasion of Russia, trans. 
G.M. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942); Sochineniya,
Vol. VII, pp. 759-762.
55N. Kruzhkov, Review of Nashestvie Napoleona na 
Rossiyu, by E. Tarle, Pravda, July 13, 1938, p. 4.
^^Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVII.
5 7 , . ,Ibid.
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tracts which served to counter the anti—Communist propaganda 
being produced in Germany. These articles were written 
within the spirit of the so-called Popular Front policy to 
give the impression in the Western Democracies that the 
Soviet Union was the leader in the struggle against Fascism.
In many respects, they were similar to the anti-German essays
C O
which Tarle wrote during the First World War. One of the
first articles^ in this vein, written specifically for the
commemoration of the one hundred twenty-fifth anniversary of
59Borodino, appeared m  Red Star. Tarle declared,
The Russian people who had their national independence 
threatened in 1812 did not have the slightest reason to 
be frightened. Neither do the Russian people today need 
to be alarmed, particularly when some ridiculous pygmies 
divide up Russia on the map.60
Although the historical opinions of Pokrovsky had
been condemned by the government, his theory that the Entente
Powers caused the First World War had not been revised. In
1938 Tarle presented the new official view of the origins of
61
the First World War. He rejected the politically outmoded
5®Chapter II, pp. 57-60; Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXIX; 
Hosch, Evgeni j Viktorovic Tarle (1875— 1955 )~ und Seine S tel lung 
in der Sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 121.
59 "Borodino, k 125-Letiyu," Krasnaya Zvezda, September 
2, 1938, p. 1.
60t, .Ibid.
fi 1 "Novye Pokazaniya o Mirovoy Imperialisticheskoy Voine," 
Sochineniya, Vol. XI, pp. 743-751.
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thesis of Pokrovsky and placed the blame for the war squarely 
on Germany.
The greatest part in the responsibility for the out­
break of the First World War rests on Germany, on the 
German bourgeoisie, on the landed aristocracy, and the 
military clique. Whatever the vain attempts at deliber­
ate lies originating in Fascist Germany and Japan and pre­
sented by their sergeant majors of "scholarship,” this 
truth will not be shaken in the present and in the future.
In an article devoted to the Spanish Civil War, Tarle
r o
voiced the sentiments of the Soviet government. He praised 
the heroic actions of the Spanish people who were the first 
victims of Fascist aggression.
Every day we read about the selfless heroic struggle 
carried on by the men and women of Spain against the 
armed to the teeth Fascist troops who have at their dis­
posal the military arsenals of the Fascist states—  
Germany, Italy, and Portugal.^4
Tarle was quick to respond to the Nazi policy of 
Lebensraum proposed by Hitler in Mein Kampf. In a long 
essay in Istorik Marksist entitled, "Eastern Living Space 
and Fascist Geopolitics," which was later included in the 
book Against the Fascist Falsification of History, Tarle 
challenged the "pseudo-scientific" validity of this thesis
^ Ibid . , p . 751.
"Ispanskii Narod v B o r ’be za Svobodu," Sochineniya, 
Vol. XI, pp. 642-652.
k^Ibid., p. 642.
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6 5
by Nazi ideologists. He argued that the science of geo­
politics was being distorted by the Nazis in a theoretical 
attempt to justify their plans for eastward expansion. In 
reality, it was a scheme to establish German hegemony first 
in Europe and later throughout the world. A few months 
before the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact, Tarle 
delivered a major speech at Leningrad State University as 
part of the program celebrating its one hundred twentieth
anniversary. In it he denounced the "infamous Fascist
6 7falsifiers of history."
The signing of the Non-Aggression Pact with Nazi 
Germany in 1939 surprised Soviet historians. On the one 
hand, they were ordered to treat the arch enemy of the Slavs, 
the Germans, as friends of the Russian people; while on the 
other hand, they were urged to point out the traditional 
hostility which existed between Russia and the West. As a 
result, until the Nazi attack in 1941, historians tried 
desperately to rewrite history to support the new departure
f 5E. Tarle, "Vostochnoe Prostrantsvo i Fashistskaya 
Geopolitika," istorik Marksist, No. 2 (1938), pp. 89-105;
E.V. Tarle, A . F . Efimov, A.V. Mishulin, S.D. Skazkin, A . D . 
Ubal'tsov, S.V. Zinich i F.I. Nomovich (ed.). Protiv Fash- 
istskoy Falsifikatsii Istorii (Moskva: Akademii Nauk SSSR,
1939 ).
6 ^Tarle, "Vostochnoe Prostrantsvo i Fashistskaya 
Geopolitika," theme of article; Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVI, 
Sochineniya, Vol. XI, p. V.
^Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVI.
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6 8in Soviet foreign policy.
During this period, Tarle stopped writing anti—German 
articles and turned his attention to Western diplomacy, par­
ticularly the tactics employed by Great Britain and France 
in their relations with Russia. Just before the German 
attack, he contributed several articles to a work entitled
The History of Diplomacy which was edited by V.P. Potemkin,
. . 69Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The essays in this book
were chiefly a comparison of the "progressive” nature of
Soviet foreign policy with the contemptuous methods of
70"bourgeois" diplomacy. This theme was expounded upon by 
Tarle in a chapter entitled, "The Methods of Bourgeois Dip­
lomacy." He wrote,
The strategy and tactics of the diplomacy of the 
capitalist world is extraordinarily diversified and in­
dividualistic. Thus it is difficult to determine the _  
principle tactics and lines of it /bourgeois diplomacy;/, 
especially when it changes not only every day, but some­
times in the course of a few h o u r s . ^
Tarle continued to denounce "bourgeois" diplomacy:
On the one hand, it tried to hide its aggressiveness 
with defensive tactics; and on the other, with supposedly
6 8
See Chapter I, p. 26.
69V.P. Potemkin, (ed.) Istoriya Diplomatii, 3 Vols. 
(Moskva, 1941-1945).
70
Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVIII.
71"0 Priemakh Burzhuaznoy Diplomatii," Istoriya 
Diplomatii, Vol. 3, p. 702; Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXIX.
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ideological motives. These tactics were merely peace 
loving masks used by the imperialists in their aggressive 
plans to destroy world communism and the Soviet Union . 72
He concluded by declaring that
imperialist diplomacy has always sought to intervene in 
the internal affairs of states by using the struggle of 
two opposing political factions to further the ends of its 
aggressive plans . 72
A recent reviewer stated the relevance of this work:
Although the essays in this work by E.V. Tarle were 
written on the basis of his experience with the materials 
of the period of the First World War and its preparation 
and also on the origins of World War II, the methods of 
imperialist diplomacy can be applied to the aggressive 
powers on the contemporary historical scene; they confirm 
the correctness of his conclusions and observations.7^
The most significant work produced by Tarle between
1939 and 1941 was the first volume of his study of the Crimean 
75War. Before this publication, Tarle wrote several artxcles
during this period devoted to various aspects of the Crimean
War which were marked by their anti-British and French ten-
*7 r
dencies. In the most scathing of these essays, "Anglo-
^ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXIX.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
7 5E.V. Tarle, Krymskaya Voina. 2 Vols. (Moskva-Leningrad 
1941-1943); Sochineniya, Vol. VIII, pp. 5-559; Sochineniya, Vol 
IX, pp. 7-625.
n r
See the following articles, "Nakanune Krymskoy Voine," 
Krasnaya N o v ’, No. 11-12 (1940), pp. 217-269; "Angliiskaya 
Politika ot Krymskoy Kampanii do Nashikh Dnei," Literaturny 
Sovremennik, No. 7 (1940), pp. 136-152; "Posol'stvo Menshikova
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French Diplomacy and the Crimean W a r ," Tarle argued that as
a rule the British had always been disposed to wage wars at
7 7
the expense of their allies. One of the main features of
British policy had been the development of a traditional
hatred directed against Russia. The English had always
planned to destroy Russia, but this scheme had failed. To
implement this program, the British tried to conclude several
alliances with the French, who, for reasons of state, refused
to become involved in such a plan which they considered con-
78trary to their long range diplomatic objectives.
In the first volume of The Crimean War, Tarle analyzed
pre-war British diplomacy. He argued that it was marked by
duplicity, indicative of the traditional English hatred of
Russia. From the standpoint of British-Russian affairs at
that time, perhaps it was an attempt by Tarle to remind the
Russian public of the historical antagonisms which existed
between the two states in order to justify the apparent good
79relations with Nazi Germany. It must be pointed out that
i Razryv mezhdu Rossiei i Turtsiei 1853," Literaturny Sovrem- 
ennik, No. 10-1*1 (1940), pp. 135-161; MAnglo-Frantsuzkie 
Otnosheniya v Period Krymskoy Voiny," Uchitel1skaya Gazeta,
March 5, 1940; "Baltiiskaya Kampaniya 1854 Goda," Leningrad- 
skaya Pravda, December 17 and 18, 1940.
7 7"Anglo-Frantsuzskaya Diplomatiya i Krymskaya V o m a , "  
Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 4 (1940), pp. 98-112.
70
Ibid., theme of article.
7 9 Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego,"
p. 127.
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Tarle reversed his opinion about the role played by Lord 
Aberdeen prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In a review 
of Harold Temperley’s book, England and the Near East: The
Crimea which appeared in Istorik Marksist in 1937, Tarle 
wrote,
The final chapters of the book which are devoted to 
the initial steps of the diplomacy of the Crimean War are 
fully captured in an interesting manner. The thoughtless 
"headlong" diplomacy of Nicholas I, Menshikov's mission 
to Constantinople and his provocative escapades, the 
violent struggle during meetings of the British cabinet 
between Lord Aberdeen who did not want war with Russia, 
and Lord Palmerston who, as early as 1852, considered 
war with Russia inevitable— all this was described very 
clearly, with numerous new details.80
Tarle now contended that the aims of the Lords Strat­
ford de Redcliffe, Palmerston, and Aberdeen were similar: to
involve Russia in a war. In Constantinople, Redcliffe bol­
stered the Turkish determination to resist Russian demands; 
in London, Palmerston continually clamored for a declaration 
of war; and Aberdeen held friendly discussions with Ambassador 
Brunnow informing him that the British would do everything 
possible to avoid a conflict. Upon receiving Brunnow's 
reports, Nicholas I thought he had been given a free hand in 
the Ottoman Empire by the British and consequently his policy
80 E.V. Tarle, Review of England and the Near East: 
The Crimea, by Harold Temperley, Istorik Marksist, No." 3 
7X937), p. 191.
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toward the Turks became more uncompromising. It was the 
villain Aberdeen, however, who skillfully provoked war with 
Russia "by concealing British objectives under the guise of
O
a peace loving policy."
Like his Napoleon * s Invasion of Russia, Tarle accen­
tuated the themes of patriotism and heroism. In spite of the 
economic backwardness of serfdom-bound Russia, the shortage 
of weapons, equipment and ammunition, the ineptitude of 
Nicholas I, and the incompetence of statesmen and generals; 
the Russian soldier, sailor, and especially the people per­
formed magnificently during the course of the war in the 
face of these overwhelming obstacles. Two military figures, 
Admiral Nakhimov, and V.A. Kornilov, marvelous examples of 
the Stalinist "cult of the personality" distinguished them­
selves even though they were hampered in their efforts by
8 2
Nicholas I and his bungling bureaucracy.
Tarle was awarded the Stalin Prize First Class for 
the first volume of his Crimean W a r , considered by one Soviet 
historian as "a model of simplicity and of clear exposition
8 3
based on a wide range of published and archival materials,"
O 1
Sochineniya, Vol. VII, p. 7, theme of the work. 
^ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXXI.
O Q
Sochineniya, Vol. VII, p. 8.
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and by a leading Western scholar of Russian history as
the most important contribution to the history of the 
Crimean War made by a Russian historian since the 
appearance between 1908 and 1912 of Zaionchkovsky's 
incompleted work, which only reached the end of 1854.
These attributes notwithstanding, Tarle neglected several 
important aspects of the Crimean War. He failed to cover 
at length the economic origins of the conflict. He gave 
little attention to the domestic scene during the reign 
of Nicholas X l  Above all, he overlooked the financial situa­
tion and the horrible economic and social condition which 
created unrest among units of the army, and discontent among
the peasants. These last factors contributed significantly
8 5to the defeat of Russia.
When German forces invaded the Soviet Union on June 22,
1941, Tarle quickly responded to the needs of the government
by taking an active role in helping to implement the emergency
8 6
historical directives set down by the Party.
The main task of present day Soviet historians is 
to help to educate millions of Soviet patriots in 
the spirit of the fighting historical tradition of our 
heroic past as well as to expose German imperialism.
ft A B.H. Sumner, Review of Krymskaya Voina (The Crimean 
War), by E.V. Tarle, The Slavonic and East European Review, 
XXV (April, 1947), p.“ 78.
®^Ibid., p. 579; Sochineniya, Vol. VIII, p. 8 .
®^E. Yaroslavskii, ”0 Blizhaishikh Zadachakh Istorich- 
eskoy Nauki v SSSR," Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 6 (1942), 
pp. 17-24.
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The reactionary part played by the Germans throughout all 
of Russian history must be made clear and even with ref­
erence to the early medieval history of Western Europe, 
it must be shown that it was the Slavs, and not to the 
Germans that belonged a really creative role .8 7
During the initial stages of the war, when it looked as if
the Soviet Union would be defeated, Tarle wrote several
patriotic pamphlets designed to stiffen the will of the
masses to resist the invading Nazis. The best example of
this type of literature produced by Tarle was an article
entitled "The Beginning of the End" which appeared in the
journal Bolshevik during the bleak days of 1941. Tarle
compared Napoleon's invasion of Russia with the recent
German attack and praised the part played by the people
in helping to destroy the French army. Just as the defeat
of Napoleon was inevitable, so would the Germans be crushed
on the soil of Russia and the supremacy of Fascism in Europe
88would come to an end.
Through the use of historical examples, Tarle also 
helped to raise the morale of the Red Army. His article,
0 7
From V.G. Volgin, E.V. Tarle, and A.M. Pankratova (ed.). 
Dvadsat' Pyat1' Let Istoricheskoy Nauki v SSSR (Moskva-Lenin- 
grad: Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1942). Reviewed by Michael Kar­
povich, The American Slavic and East European Review, IV 
(August, 1945), p"I 228.
88"Nachalo Kontsa," Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 11-18; 
Sochineniya, Vol. VII, p. 6 ; Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXXI;
See also "1812-1941/42" and "Pervoe Avgusta," Sochineniya,
Vol. XII, pp. 58-63.
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"The Teutonic Knights and Their Successors," in which he
glorified the crushing defeat inflicted on the Order by
Alexander Nevsky, was written expressly for this pu r p o s e . ^
The anti-patriotic historical views of Pokrovsky were
also savagely attacked by Tarle during the war years. While
this school dominated historical scholarship,
what went on in essence was the moral disarmament of 
the Russian people. If a nation consists only of 
Oblomovs, is such a nation worth much? Is it possible 
that the "fair-skinned Aryans" are really right in com­
mitting their atrocities? Is General Reichanau right in 
saying that there are no cultural values in Russia? Many 
who showed this tendency in their historical work did 
not think of these consequences and might have been 
horrified if they had seen them. But, objectively, 
their work was harmful.90
When Stalin began to belabor the West to open a
second front in Europe, Tarle echoed this policy in several
articles. He continually wrote that it would hasten the
defeat of Germany and its military-political satellites;
but he also argued that the United States, which had promised
89 "Tevtonskie Rytsari i ikh Nasledniki, "S o c h m e n i y a , 
Vol. VII, pp. 44-58; See also E.V. Tarle "Geroicheskie Trad- 
itsii Russkogo Flota," Krasnoflotets, No. 3 (1944), p. 32; 
E.V. Tarle "Istoricheskaya Zasluga Krasnoy Armii," Ogonek, 
No. 5 (1944), p. 7.
90 B.D. Grekov and E.V. Tarle, "Soviet Historical Re­
search," p. 231; Also quoted in Anatole G. Mazour, Modern 
Russian Historiography, p. 210; In Dvadsat 1 Pyat 1 Let Istor- 
Icheskoy Nauki v SSSR, the Pokrovsky school was denounced 
for "vulgar economic materialism, naked sociologizing, and 
a nihilistic attitude to greatness in history. It damaged 
the cause of educating the young generation in the spirit of 
Soviet patriotism by ignoring the heroic tradition of the 
Russian people."
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to open a second front as soon as possible, had failed to
91live up to its pledge.
Besides his publications, Tarle undertook several 
propaganda tours of the Soviet Union during the war. In 
1943 he spoke in several large cities as well as in small 
towns and villages. His lectures were devoted to patrio­
tic themes, the problems of the war, and the international 
position of the Soviet Union. He also gave several lectures 
to front line army units, particularly about the War of 1812.
In September of 1943, as the featured speaker at a general 
meeting of the Academy of Science, he gave an address entitled, 
’’The Crimes of Hitler Germany.” Tarle also served as a
ranking member of the Extraordinary State Commission for the
92
Investigation of the Crimes of the German Fascist Invaders.
9 1"Koalitsionnye Voiny” and "Vtoromu Antifashistskomu 
Mitingu Sovetskikh Uchenykh,” Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 69-74.
9 2 Sochineniya, Vol. I, pp. XXXI-XXXII; E. Tarle, ’’Pis'mo 
v Redaktsiyu Zhurnala Bolshevik," Bolshevik, No. 19 (1951), 
p . 71.
CHAPTER VI
COLD WAR HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE LAST TEN YEARS 
OF TARLE'S CAREER (1945-1955)
Tarle's unique relationship with the regime until 
his death in 1955 best serves to illustrate the political 
nature of Soviet historiography since the end of World War 
II. As a leading historian and an important public figure 
who functioned as ideological spokesman for the post-war 
policies of the Soviet Union, Tarle played a major role in 
helping to propagandize the anti-Western line adopted by the 
Party. In his numerous articles, books, and speeches during 
this decade, he repeatedly denounced the '’aggressive” actions 
of the United States and Great Britain, the wartime allies of 
the Soviet Union, who, after 1945, were considered enemies 
of mankind. Despite his lofty position, Tarle was attacked 
by the Party for failing to revise some of his conclusions 
in his pre-war works. Now regarded as either distortions 
or perversions of historical truth, these views were no 
longer compatible with the Cold War policies inaugurated by 
the Party soon after the end of hostilities. 1
1See Chapter I, pp. 26-34; E.V. Tarle, "0 Krymskoy 
Voyne," Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 4 (1945), pp. 112-113;
S. Kozhukov, "K Voprosu ob Otsenka Roli M.I. Kutuzova v
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As the expedient wartime friendship and cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and the West began to deteriorate 
rather quickly after 1945, Stalin directed historians to 
promote the idea that Russia had single-handedly saved Europe 
and Asia from Nazi domination. Stalin’s pronouncement prompted 
Tarle to deliver a significant lecture on April 3, 1945 at 
Moscow State University, in which he claimed that during World 
War II the United States and Great Britain contributed very 
little to the defeat of Nazi Germany. He also asserted that 
since the Napoleonic Wars, Russia had either liberated or 
helped to rid Europe of French and German despotism. To sup­
port his thesis, Tarle argued that Russian armies crushed the 
forces of Napoleon in the ’’Fatherland War” of 1812, and during 
World War I they played a key role in the struggle against the 
hordes of Kaiser William II. Above all, however, in Russian 
and Soviet history, loomed the Red Army which earned and 
rightly deserved the title ’’the savior of mankind,” for,
during the Second World War, it prevented the triumph of
2
fascism and thus saved the world from enslavement.
Otechestvennoy Voyne 1812 Goda,” B o l 1shevik, No. 15 (August, 
1951), pp. 21-35; E.V. Tarle, "Pis'mo v Redaktsiyu Zhurnala 
’B o l ’shevik,1” B o l 'shevik, No. 19 (October, 1951), pp. 71-77; 
”0t Redaktsii Zhurnala ’B o l ’s h e v i k " B o l 1shevik, No. 19 
(October, 1951), pp. 77-80.
2 Sochineniya, Vol. I, pp. XXXIV and XXXV; Sochineniya, 
Vol. XII, pp. 7-8; Sochineniya, Vol. XII, ”9 Maya,” pp. 218- 
222; Sochineniya, Vol. XII, "SSSR-Mirovaya Derzhava," pp. 2 39-
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A week after Winston Churchill delivered his "Iron 
Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri, Tarle wrote a critique 
of it for the Party in Izvestiia. 3 He contended that Churchill 
had two major objectives: he tried to create an anti—Soviet
climate of opinion in the United States to destroy the tradi­
tional friendship which existed between the American and 
Russian people; and he deliberately attempted to maneuver 
America’s policy makers into taking an uncompromising stand 
in their relations with the Soviet Union. Eventually this
situation would lead to a major confrontation between the two
4
states and, as a consequence, a third world war would begin. 
According to Tarle, a showdown between Russia and America was 
unnecessary because both powers had traditionally enjoyed 
friendly relations despite the fact that since the Bolshevik 
Revolution, reactionary circles in the United States had been 
hostile to the Soviet Union. The case of Great Britain, how­
ever, was vastly different. Historically, England had been 
the natural enemy of Russia and America and, for that reason, 
Tarle argued for the maintenance and continuation of cordial
248; Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Great Russian Messianism in 
Postwar Soviet Ideology," Continuity and Change in Soviet 
Thought, ed. Ernest J. Simmons (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1955), p. 540.
3 Sochineniya, Vol. XII, "Po Povodu Rechi Cherchillya,"
pp. 211-218.
^Ibid., p . 215.
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relations between the two states. It also appeared that
Tarle was hinting about the possibility of the conclusion
of an anti-British pact between the United States and the 
5
Soviet Union. From the vantage point of the Soviet govern­
ment in the spring of 1946, Great Britain was the foe, not 
the United States. It was Churchill, who, after all, had 
warned the West of Russia’s aggressive designs and had sug­
gested in his "Iron Curtain Speech” that the United States 
take the lead to check any Soviet attempt to dominate Europe.
For a number of reasons, Tarle’s optimistic observa­
tions about the possibility of continued Soviet-American 
friendship and cooperation never materialized. In the summer 
of 1946, Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin's chief assistant, launched 
a full scale anti-Western ideological campaign which set the
g
stage for the Cold War. The following year, Russian-American 
relations worsened when President Truman decided that the 
United States must take an active role in European affairs 
to prevent any further Soviet expansion, especially in the 
area of the Balkans. The Truman Doctrine was announced pre­
cisely for this purpose. It was designed to supply economic 
and technical assistance to Greece, then threatened by Communist 
insurrgents who were being supported by Moscow, and to Turkey, 
which was being subjected to constant Soviet diplomatic pressure.
^Ibid., pp. 215-222.
^See Chapter I, pp. 27-29.
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Two months after the Truman declaration, the Marshall Plan,
a long range coordinated program of massive aid aimed at
bolstering the economic recovery of Europe, was inaugurated.
The introduction of the Truman Doctrine and the
Marshall Plan ended any hope for a detente between the
United States and the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine
was denounced in the Soviet press as a
new intrusion of the United States into the internal 
affairs of other states, a violation of the United 
Nations Charter, and an example of the post-war imper­
ialistic policy of the United States.^
The Marshall Plan was condemned as
an American scheme to control Europe, an attempt to 
divide Europe into two camps, and a plot by Wall Street 
and American monopolies to avert the approaching depres­
sion . 8
Soon after the Truman proclamation and the introduc­
tion of the Marshall Plan, Tarle became the Party historian 
for foreign affairs. Until his death in 1955, he defended the 
"peaceful1' objectives of Soviet foreign policy, attacked the 
aggressive aims of American diplomacy, and voiced Stalin's 
view that the Soviet Union was a beleaguered fortress of
n
See editorials in Pravda, Izvestiia, and other
newspapers and journals following the announcement of the
Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.
8 Ibid., "Zhdanov on the Founding of the Cominform," 
Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev, ed. L. Jay Oliva 
(Boston! D.C. Heath and Company, 1965), pp. 241-243.
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socialism existing in the midst of a hostile capitalist 
9
world. The first significant article written by Tarle in 
this vein appeared in Izvestiia on New Years Day of 1948.10 
In it, he attacked Truman, Marshall, Vandenberg, Hoover, 
Dulles, and Dewey, the chief architects and spokesmen for 
United States expansionism and imperialism. 11
If the tireless activities of Truman, Marshall, 
and numerous representatives and senators of both 
branches of Congress has been to bring about some 
kind of consolidation of the forces of world reaction, 
then there is no way for the ringleaders of this 
policy to try to disguise it in any way. This h a s ^  
been their major political goal for the past year.
Tarle contended that the Marshall Plan was designed
to '’liquidate the independence of all states and Bizonia
was created for the purpose of resurrecting German terror 
13once again." As for the future, he wrote,
The struggle between two world outlooks and two 
systems, the struggle of ideologies and the diplomatic 
struggle, will naturally continue. However, the results 
of 1947 show quite clearly the consolidation of the
9
Sochineniya, Vol. I, pp. XXXII-XXXV; Sochineniya,
Vol. XII, pp. 7-8; Barghoorn, "The Soviet Union Between War 
and Cold War," p. 2.
^ " B o r ' b a  za Mir i Demokratiyu," Sochineniya, Vol. XII, 
pp. 254-258.
^ Ibid . , p . 254 .
1 ^_Ibid. , p. 256.
1 3"Konets Balkanskoy Porokhovoy Bochki," Sochineniya, 
Vol. XII, p. 261.
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forces of world democracy which is an ill omen for the 
forces of reaction gathered together under the banner 
of Wall Street. People do not want to serve the God 
of war and gold. The struggle for peace and for demo-,, 
cracy now, in essence, becomes the equivalent concept.
In 1948 a revised edition of Tarle's biography of 
Talleyrand, based on many previously unknown sources discovered 
by the author in the Russian Archives, was published. 15 Tarle 
apparently rewrote his previous (1939) study of Talleyrand to 
foster the anti-Western line adopted by the regime. The work 
obviously reflected the Party's historical directives con­
cerning the way Soviet scholars ought to interpret European 
history and those significant personalities of the past who
had been glorified in numerous books written by "bourgeois"
16historians of the West. Thus, one objective of the Talley­
rand biography was to destroy the legendary "genius like"
14 "Bor'ba za Mir i Demokratiyu," S o c h m e n i y a , Vol. XII,
p. 2 58.
15E.V. Tarle, Taleiran (Moskva-Leningrad: Akademii
Nauk SSSR, 1948); Sochineniva, Vol. XI, pp. 11-232; Jacques 
Godechot, Review of Talleyrand, by E.V. Tarle, Annales Histor- 
iques de la Revolution Francaise, XXXIII (January-March, 1961), 
p. 136; Franco Venturi, "E.V. Tarle," Historiens Du XX Siecle 
(Geneve: L'Institut d'Historie de la Faculty des Lettres de
L'Universite de Geneve, 1966), p. 135.
1 5 Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVIII; See Chapter I, 
pp. 26-34; Godechot, Review of Talleyrand, p. 136; A. Molok, 
Review of Talleyrand, by E.V. Tarle, Voprosy Istorii, No. 10 
(October, 1948), p. 157; D. Fedotoff White, Review of Talley- 
rand, by E.V. Tarle, The American Historical Review, LX (Octo­
ber , 1949), p. 125; Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," p. 217.
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image of Talleyrand, which, in Tarle’s view, had been created
in the works of such well-known ’'bourgeois” historians as
Crane Brinton, Duff.Cooper, d ’Emile Dard, Guglielmo Ferrero,
17
and others. Tarle portrayed Talleyrand as one of the 
"founders of bourgeois diplomacy" whose entire career as a 
statesman was predicated on "bourgeois principles," namely, 
acts of treachery and deceit, which were so typical of the
18methods employed by current diplomats of the Western powers.
Another purpose in revising the biography of Talley­
rand, according to Tarle, was "to distinguish Talleyrand’s
style of diplomacy from the traditional practices of the
19past which made him a successful diplomat." Tarle wrote,
Talleyrand was a diplomat who ascended from the 
bourgeois class at the beginning of the period of 
middle class domination, the triumph of capitalism, 
and the downfall of the feudal-manorial system. It 
was Talleyrand who first discovered the modifications 
which would take place in old diplomatic practices and 
precisely the direction in which these practices would 
follow.2°
Although Talleyrand double-crossed almost everyone he served, 
and became wealthy by selling secret documents to the enemies
1 7 Sochineniya, Vol. XI, pp. 228-232; Godechot, Review 
of Talleyrand, pp. 137-138.
^ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVIII.
1 9 Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Taleiran— Diplomat Rannego
Burzhuaznogo Perioda," p. 11.
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of France, Tarle argued that he never betrayed his class in­
terests which were those of the aspiring bourgeoisie. Talley­
rand believed that the victory of the middle class was in­
evitable. In Tarle’s opinion then, the key to Talleyrand’s 
successes was derived from the fact that he was able to
adjust to the changing socio-economic conditions marked by
21the rise to prominence of the middle class.
Despite the fact that the biography of Talleyrand
was a good example of Cold War historiography, Western
historians, nevertheless, reviewed it favorably. Jacques
Godechot claimed that
after one reads beyond the initial pages where Marxist- 
Leninist principles of history are strongly asserted,
Tarle's biography of Talleyrand is scarcely different 
from any work which would be written bv a conscientious 
historian, regardless of the country. 2
D. Fedotoff White stated,
After offering . . . Marxist-Leninist propositions,
Tarle, having done what is considered the right thing in 
Soviet Russia, proceeds to write a brilliant and well- 
informed popular life of Talleyrand in a clear, readable 
prose . . . .  In short, this book is an interesting, if 
one sided, story of Talleyrand’s life .23
Franco Venturi asserted, "One could accept a Marxist framework
2 1 Ibid; See also Godechot's and White’s Review of
Talleyrand
? 0 Godechot, Review of Talleyrand, p. 136.
2 3 White, Review of Talleyrand, p. 126.
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and still write a book full of movement and life. Tarle has
accomplished this in his unbiased interpretation of Talley- 
24
rand.” One Soviet historian, on the other hand, who 
evaluated the book in light of its political importance, 
perhaps came closer to the true meaning of the work.
In his book, E.V. Tarle debunks the cult of Talleyrand 
popularized in America. He brings down the father of 
bourgeois diplomacy from his pedestal and exposes those 
corrupters of a historical figure by showing who the 
bourgeois chooses for its hero. Tarle also strikes a 
blow at the unprincipled self-interests of contemporary 
imperialistic diplomacy. He understands perfectly that 
the time of complete domination by bourgeois diplomacy 
has already gone forever and that in the world today the 
most progressive influence lies in Soviet diplomacy which 
expresses the interests of socialist societies.
As for any Soviet criticism of the biography, another reviewer
wrote,
It is only a pity that the author did not develop in 
greater detail his thesis that Talleyrand, as one of the 
founders of bourgeois diplomacy in France, employed 
methods in his activities which were different from the 
methods of feudal-absolutist diplomacy. 26
Tarle’s biography of Talleyrand was his last major 
monograph to deal with the subject of Western diplomacy. 
However, as the Cold War intensified, he began to publish 
numerous short, popular articles for the Party, on the same
2 4 Venturi, "E.V. Tarle," Historians Du XX Siecle, p. 135
2 ~*Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVIII.
2 6 Molok, Review of Talleyrand, p. 160.
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topic, which appeared in newspapers and journals. In all 
of them, Tarle repeatedly denounced Western foreign policy, 
planned and organized by reactionary circles in both the 
Pentagon and Wall Street for the purpose of waging war 
against Russia, and praised Soviet diplomacy which, by its 
nature, consistently struggled for peaceful solutions.
When a scheme for Franco-German cooperation was formulated, 
Tarle condemned the plan in an essay published in Izvestiia
27entitled MThe European Council and Franco-German Relations.” 
Tarle resurrected an old thesis which viewed France and 
Germany as traditional enemies. In reality, he argued, the 
plan was a step toward the revival of German militarism. Any 
agreement between the two states was necessary in the long 
range preparation for a third world war in which German and 
French armies would be used as cannon fodder by the United 
States against the Soviet Union. France in this case, said 
Tarle, was merely a tool of Wall Street and the "gangster” 
bankers of Paris. He concluded the article, reminding the
2 8
French that the Soviet Union had saved them from "Hitlerism.”
In December 1949, Tarle wrote an essay in Trud entitled,
7 7E.V. Tarle, "Evropeiskii Sovet i Franko-Germanskie 
Otnosheniya,” Izvestiia, September 11, 1949, p. 3.
2 8 Ibid.; See also E.V. Tarle, "Severo-Atlanticheskii 
Pakt," Novyi Mir, No. 5 (January, 1949), pp. 270-272; E.V. Tarle 
"Voll-Strit-Khozyain S.Sh.A.,” Novyi M i r , No. 10 (July, 1949),
pp. 260-262.
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"The Victorious Stalinist Foreign Policy . " 29 The article
was important because, for the first time, Tarle glorified
Stalin, a mandatory order of the Party, especially for
historians, and in keeping with the intensification of the
30"cult of the personality." Tarle asserted,
Comrade Stalin will go down in the history of world 
politics as not only an exceptional strategist and organ­
izer of unparalleled victories, but also as a wise leader 
of the foreign policy of the first socialist state. Stalin 
approaches the seventieth birthday of his glorious life 
at the pinnacle of his political successes, strength, 
and glory. The gigantic scale of these successes in the 
sphere of foreign policy is explained by the striking 
variety and exceptional power of his gifts. A scientific 
analysis gave Stalin a breadth of historical foresight 
of which there is no sign among the leaders of the cap­
italist c a m p .
After his tribute to Stalin, Tarle promptly condemned United 
States policy. He denounced Truman's order to drop the Atom 
Bomb on the defenseless population of Hiroshima which killed 
over ninety thousand innocent civilians. According to Tarle, 
the leaders of the United States, particularly Forrestal,
CDSP, Vol. I, No. 35 (January 24, 1950), pp. 44-45; 
E.V. Tarle, "The Victorious Stalinist Foreign Policy," Trud, 
December 21, 1949, p. 4. It is interesting to note that this 
particular article does not appear in the bibliography compiled 
by the editors of the collected works of Tarle. Perhaps it 
was ommitted for political reasons. During the time of pub­
lication, Stalin and the "cult of the personality" were de­
nounced by Khrushchev and the Party.
3°See Chapter I, pp. 33-34.
3 1 Tarle, "The Victorious Stalinist Foreign Policy,"
p . 4.
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wished to annihilate the people of the Soviet Union in the 
32
same manner. Tarle ended the article by spelling out the 
objectives of Soviet diplomacy.
The main motive of the foreign policy of our state is 
to struggle for the establishment of an enduring peace .
. . . Soviet diplomacy categorically states that the
principle of full national independence of great and
small powers is an axiom which does not require any
p r o o f . 33
After Tarle published his first New Years Day article,
it seemed that a tradition had been established. On the first
day of the year, the Party expected him to write an essay in
which he analyzed and compared the policies of the Soviet
Union with the United States. In 1950, an excellent example
of this type of literature, "Two Worlds— Two Tallies," appeared
34in the first issue of Izvestiia. Tarle argued that during 
the past year, the United States and its puppets had suffered 
repeated setbacks. American imperialism had been crushed in 
China and the Marshall Plan had failed. The renegade and 
and fascist Tito, along with his clique, had been exposed by
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
3 4 E.V. Tarle, "Dva Mira-Dva Itoga," Izvestiia, January 
1, 1950, p. 2; See also the following articles which appeared 
on New Years Day: E.V. Tarle, "K Istorii Antisovetskoy Poli-
tiki Amerikanskogo Imperializma," Bol* shevik, No. 1 (January, 
1951), pp. 57-69; E.V. Tarle, "Filosofy Atomnoy Bomby v 
Razdume i na Rasput’e," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 1 (January- 
February, 1952), pp. 141-144.
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Stalin as a lackey of United States imperialism. The refusal 
of the United States to share its Atom Bomb secrets with Great 
Britain, revealed the inherent weakness of NATO. In fact, 
Tarle contended, Franco-German and Anglo-American differences 
were so pronounced, that they precluded any possibility for 
these states to reach a joint military agreement, or for that 
matter, a common policy. Whereas United States imperialism 
had failed, Tarle asserted that the peaceful foreign policy 
of the Soviet Union had been successful. He pointed to the 
creation of the German Democratic Republic and the establish­
ment of friendly relations with China as examples of pacific 
Russian victories, scored at the expense of the bellicose 
West. Under Stalin’s leadership, the Soviet Union had made 
its intentions quite clear to the world at the United Nations. 
It had repeatedly argued to ban the Atom Bomb and for all
states to devote their energies to "peaceful domestic recon- 
35struction."
When the Party unleashed its violent attack against 
all manifestations of bourgeois culture, Tarle wrote several 
articles to support this policy. His attention, however, was 
centered on Western historiography, particularly its British 
and American spokesmen, labeled by Tarle as "falsifiers of
3 5 Tarle, "Dva-Mira-Dva Itoga," p. 2.
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3 6
history." In his first essay of this type, entitled "English 
Falsification concerning the Origin of the Crimean War," pub­
lished in Voprosy Istorii, he assessed G.H. Temperley's and
G.B. Henderson's new book, Crimean War Diplomacy and Other
3 7
Historical Essays. Tarle also evaluated Temperley's England
and the Near East: The Crimea, a work which he had reviewed
O O
favorably in Istorik Marksist in 1937. Later he revised his 
opinion of the book in his two volume study of the Crimean War. 
In this publication, Tarle not only reaffirmed his negative 
judgment of the Temperley work, but, for good measure, he also 
condemned the recent Henderson-Temperley study as well.
These two new samples of British writing concerning 
the Crimean War are useful in two respects; in the first 
place, they show how not to write the history of the 
origin of the great mid-nineteenth century clash; in the 
second place, they are an added reminder to Soviet scholars 
of their vital duty of scholarship and to the fatherland. 
That duty is to struggle against the poisonous weapons 
of historical falsification, concealment, and distortion, 
which our enemies use so often in depicting the Russian 
past and present under all kinds of covers and for a var­
iety of r e a s o n s . ^
o r
E.V. Tarle, "Angliiskie F a l 'sifikatsii o Nachale 
Krymskoy Voyny," Voprosy Istorii, No. 3 (1949), pp. 119-125;
E.V. Tarle, "Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna v Krivom Zerkale" (Po 
povodu f a l 'sifikatsii istorii Vtoroy mirovoy voyny anglo-amer. 
istoriografiei) , B o l 'shevik, No. 21 (November, 1949), pp. GO­
TO; Tarle, "K Istorii Antisovetskoy Politiki Amerikanskogo 
Imperializma, pp. 71-77.
3 7 Tarle, "Angliiskie F a l 'sifikatsii o Nachale Kryms­
koy Voiny," pp. 119-125.
^ S e e  Chapter V, p. 160.
3 ^Tarle, "Angliiskie Fa l 'sifikatsii o Nachale Kryms­
koy Voiny, p. 125.
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In another article, Tarle attacked the Western 
interpretation of the Second World W a r .40 He argued that 
the works produced on this subject by American, British, and 
French historians, "the falsifiers of history," were merely 
"scientific rubbish" and "cock and bull stories . " 4 1 To 
support this thesis, Tarle stated that these historians 
slandered the Soviet Union by contending that its foreign 
policy was an extension of the aggressive tendencies of 
Tsarist diplomacy. Thus, the Soviet Union was made to appear 
as a state which sought to aggrandize its territory.
Tarle defended the conclusion of the Non-Aggression 
Pact with Nazi Germany in 1939. He declared that at the time, 
Great Britain and France, in secret collusion with the United 
States, had egged Hitler on to attack the Soviet Union. Accord­
ing to Tarle, this was exactly the current policy of these 
states. Their purpose in creating the West German Federation
was to revive Hitlerism in order to prepare for another attack
42on the Soviet Union.
In Tarle’s opinion, the anti-Soviet literature pub­
lished in the United States and Great Britain had two specific 
aims. First,
40Tarle, "Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna v Krivom Zerkale," 
pp. 66-70.
4 1 Ibid., pp. 60-61.
A ?
Ibid., p . 65.
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to show that the role of the Soviet Union during World 
War II was by no means great and its participation was 
not as indispensable to victory as the whole world ad­
mitted it to have been in 1945 when Hitlerite Germany
capitulated.43
And second,
to show that both Western Europe and the United States 
committed a terrible blunder in allowing Russia to 
insist on Germany’s unconditional surrender instead of 
concluding peace and restoring the German war machine 
for future German revenge upon the Soviet Union in
conjunction with the Anglo-Saxons.4 4
Tarle concluded the article and reminded the Western powers
that Soviet armies had saved their forces from almost certain
defeat during the Battle of the Bulge after several German
45divisions had broken through American lines.
Tarle also reprimanded American historians of Soviet 
Russia who maintained that the attitude of the United States 
government toward the Soviet regime "was once based on the 
principle of benevolent non-intervention in Russian affairs 
and on an unwillingness to harm in any way the young Soviet
Republic." This interpretation was "a lie and a fabricated
47 .legend," he maintained. The truth, Tarle claimed, was
4 3 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
44 Ibid.
45
Ibid., p . 69.
4 6 Tarle, "K Istorii Antisovetskoy Politiki Amerikanskogo 
Imperializma," pp. 57-58.
4'''ibid., p . 58.
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that since the Bolshevik Revolution, the United States had 
deliberately plotted against the Soviet government and, on 
occasions, even resorted to force in an attempt to crush it. 
Between 1918 and 1921, American troops were dispatched to 
Northern Russia and Siberia; during the Civil War, the United 
States actively supported counter-revolutionary forces. In 
the 1930fs, it extended unlimited credit to Nazi Germany, 
which helped Hitler immeasurably to prepare for the attack on 
the Soviet Union. Even during the "Great Fatherland War" 
the United States begrudgingly assisted the Soviet Union.
Its leaders realized that without Soviet aid, the United 
States could never hope to defeat the combined forces of 
Germany, Italy, and Japan. As for the Cold War, Tarle 
claimed that it began because "Wall Street, the State Depart­
ment, President Truman, and the semi-official imperialist
48
American press were organized to harass the Soviet Union."
In short then, from 1917 to 1950 American ruling circles con-
49
spired to destroy the Soviet Union.
Soon after the end of World War II, the Party, in a 
move reminiscent of the thirties, launched a new campaign 
to stimulate Soviet patriotism. It was expected that all
4 ^Ibid. , pp. 65-66.
4 5 Ibid. This is the thesis of the article.
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intellectuals would help to implement the program in some 
w a y , for the Party considered it to be the patriotic duty 
of all Soviet citizens. Naturally, an important role was 
assigned to the historian. 50
Several studies written by Tarle reflected this trend. 
More significant was the fact that he combined this aspect 
of post-war Soviet historiography with the Party directive 
which ordered the historian to denigrate Western interpreta­
tions of Russian history.5'*'
Tarle not only shed new light on the important phases 
of patriotic history, but he also revised many of the con­
clusions made by the noble and bourgeois schools of histor­
iography which belittled the significant part played by 
the Russian fleet in the struggle against the armed might 
of Napoleonic France on the Mediterranean Sea.~^
Tarle wrote many books and articles about the heroic
53exploits of the Russian Navy and its brilliant commanders.
A typical example was his short monograph, Admiral F.F. Ushakov 
on the Mediterranean Sea, 1789-1800, a work based on unpublished 
Naval documents, materials from the various State Historical
See chapter I, pp. 28-34; Barghoorn, ,TGreat Russian 
Messianism in Postwar Soviet Ideology," pp. 531-549; Barghoorn, 
"Stalinism and the Russian Cultural Heritage," pp. 178-203.
51Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXXI; Sochineniya, Vol. X,
pp. 6 -8 .
5^Sochineniya, Vol. I, pp. XXXII-XXXIII; Sochineniya,
V o l . X , p . 5.
5 5As examples, see the following books: M. Nakhimov;
Russkii Flot i_ Vneshnyaya Politiki Petra _I; Admiral Ushakov na
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Archives of the Soviet Union, Western sources, and personal 
papers of Ushakov, the commander of the Russian squadron 
during the Mediterranean expedition. Besides portraying 
Admiral Ushakov as a great naval officer, who even surpassed 
the feats of his British counterpart, Lord Nelson, Tarle also 
showed that
the true creators of the prominent victories scored by 
the Russian Navy were the simple folk— seamen and non­
commissioned officers— who distinguished themselves 
courageously, but after every battle were modest in 
describing their exploits.
On the behest of the Party in the Fall of 1949, Tarle
agreed to devote most of his time to preparing a three volume
study which focused on the theme of "The Russian People in the
Struggle Against Aggressors from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth 
5 6Centuries." After accepting this assignment, Tarle wrote in 
the newspaper Trud, "Never in the course of my long life have 
I worked upon a theme of inspiration and ardor comparable to
Sredizemnom More (1798-1800); Chesmenskii Boy: Pervaya Russkaya
Ekspeditsiya _v Arkhipelag (1769-1774); Ek'speditsiya Admirala 
Senyavina _v Sredizemnoe More- CT805 —1807~7T
j4Admiral Ushakov na Sredizemnom More (1798-1800), 
Sochineniya,-Vol. X, pp. 95-175; Sochineniya, Vol. X, pp. 5-7; 
Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXXII.
^ S o c h i n e n i y a , Vol. X, p. 5 and pp. 222-229; Tarle's 
glorification of the heroic exploits of the seamen and non­
commissioned officers is similar to the picture he presents 
of the common soldier in his previous studies of Napoleon 
and the Crimean War.
5 6 E.V. Tarle, "Podzhigatelyam Voiny ne Udastsya Zapugat' 
Svobodolyubivye Narody," Trud, October 2, 1949, p. 2; Sochinen­
iya , Vol. I, p. XXXIII.
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5 7
this." The projected plan for this multi-volume work was
to show how the patriotic efforts of the masses in the 
struggle for national independence during three critical 
periods of history, the Swedish invasion of 1708-1709, 
the Napoleonic invasion of 1812, and the German—Fascist 
invasion of 1941, helped to foil the attempts of aggres­
sors from enslaving the Russian people .58
Tarle never completed the project, as he died in 1955.
However, in 1958 his research on the first period of history
provided the basis for the posthumous publication of a long
book, entitled The Great Northern War and the Swedish Invasion 
59of Russia♦ The heroes in the struggle against the armies 
of Charles XII were the Russian people and their tsar, Peter 
the Great. Throughout the course of the war, the peasant 
continuously made tremendous sacrifices, and the ordinary 
soldier fought bravely. Peter’s dynamic personality, his 
ability as a military commander, and his reforms, particu­
larly the modernization of the Russian army and the creation 
of a navy were likewise important factors in the decisive
5 7 Tarle, "Podzhigatelyam Voyny ne Udastsya Zapugat’ 
Svobodolyubivye Narody," p. 2.
5 8 Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXXIII; Sochineniya, Vol. X, 
p. 6 and p p . '366-367; Ibid.
^ Severnaya Voyne i_ Shvedskoe Nashestvie na Rossiyu 
Sochineniya, Vol. X, pp. 363—806 ; Prior to the publication 
of this work, Tarle wrote several articles on this theme.
For example, see the following: "Severnaya Voyna i Shvedskoe
Nashestvie na Rossiyu (Referat Doklada)," Vestnik Akademii 
Nauk SSSR, No. 7 (1949), pp. 61-63; "Karl XII v 1708-1709," 
Voprosy Istorii, No. 6 (1950), pp. 22—56; "Poltavskaya 
Pobeda," Krasnyi Flot, July 8 , 1949; "Poltavskaya Pobeda,"
Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 9, 1949.
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defeat of the Swedish invaders. In Tarle’s view, this
combination was too much for the Swedes and their capable
leader, Charles XII, to overcome. As a result, they were
forced to sue for peace on Russian terms. In glorifying the
role the masses played during the Great Northern War, Tarle
rejected the conclusions of such ’’Russian bourgeois historians"
as Klyuchevsky, who contended that, "It was not the heroism
of the Russian people which paved the way for the victory at
Poltava, but rather the mistakes made by the inept Charles 
6 0XII." However, Tarle's assessment of Russia's international 
posture after the war with Sweden, especially its position 
vis _a vis Great Britain was similar to Western "bourgeois 
historians." Like B.H. Sumner and others, he concluded 
that after the Treaty of Nystadt, Russia replaced Sweden 
as the dominant northern European state. Beginning with 
Peter I, Russia became a major power which played an increas­
ingly important part in continental affairs. ^ 1
Despite his tireless activities on behalf of the regime 
after 1945, Tarle was nevertheless censured by the Party for 
certain erroneous conclusions in two of his pre-war works, 
Napoleon and Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. His views now 
conflicted with a series of Party directives which required
^ Sochineniya, Vol. X, p. 8 .
61Ibid., pp. 6-8 and pp. 798-800.
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the historian
to struggle against manifestations of survivals of pre- 
revolutionary liberal-bourgeois historiography which laud 
the West in every way and minimize Russia and to disclose 
an adequately critical attitude toward foreign documenta­
tion. 62
Tarle was attacked particularly for his interpretation of
Marshall Kutuzov’s strategy and leadership during the "Father-
land War" and the role that the Russian army played in it. His
opinions contradicted Stalin’s pronouncements concerning the
military tactics he used in defeating the Germans. Interesting
was the fact that during the early stages of the war, Stalin
announced that Soviet setbacks were caused by inadequate war
supplies and the lack of a second front. He even admitted
that "our government made not a few errors, we experienced
at moments a desperate situation in 1941-1942 when our army
was retreating, abandoning our native villages and towns . . .
6 3because there was no other way out." In 1947, however Stalin 
claimed that he had successfully employed a complex master plan 
during the course of World War II which was similar to the 
strategy used by Kutuzov in routing Napoleon’s armies.
The ancient Parthians know about such a counter offensive
62"Za Patrioticheskuyu Sovetskuyu Nauku," Vestnik 
Akademii Nauk., No. 4 (April, 1949), pp. 7-8; also quoted in 
Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the
Soviet Regime," p. 210.
^ 3 I. Stalin, 0 Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne Sovetskogo 
Soyuza (Moskva, 19527, pp. 196-197; Also quoted in Erickson,
"E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime,"
p . 210.
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when they drew the Roman General Crassus and his army into 
the depths of their country and then striking in a counter 
offensive, destroyed them. Our gifted General Kutozov, 
who destroyed Napoleon and his army with the help of a 
well organized counter offensive, knew this well .6 4
On the basis of this pronouncement, it was now clear 
that Stalin's new evaluation of Kutuzov contradicted Tarle's 
previous assessment of the General's strategy in the "Father­
land War." Most significant though, in light of the Party's 
attack on Tarle, was that after war, Stalin began to picture 
himself as a military genius, the savior of Russia and mankind, 
and the prototype of the great Marshall Kutuzov, who, "as in 1812,
ordered his armies to fall back under the pressure of a stronger
6 5and better organized foe." The tactics of Kutuzov were again
repeated by Stalin during the Great Fatherland War and
with the help of the vastness of Russian territory, the 
over extension and severance of the enemy's supply lines, 
the severity of the climate, and the political short 
sightedness, the lack of resourcefullness, and mistakes 
of the enemy,
the German armies were crushed . ^ 6
Western historians have concurred that Tarle was the
6 4 I. Stalin, "Otvet tov. Stalina," Bol'shevik, No. 3 
(February, 1947), p. 8 ; Also quoted in the following works: 
Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the
Soviet Regime," p. 211; Mathew P. Gallagher, The Soviet History 
of World War II (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 52;
Hollingsworth, "The Napoleonic Invasion of Russia and Recent 
Soviet Historical Writing," p. 39.
^ 5Y a r e s h ,  "The Campaign of 1812," Rewriting Russian 
History, p. 287.
66Ibid., pp. 287-288.
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most prominent victim of Stalin’s reappraisal of Kutuzov’s
strategy in the "Fatherland War” and the doctrine of the counter 
G 7
offensive. In an article written by S. Kozhukov in the Party 
journal B o l * shevik in 1951, Tarle was rebuked for his views of 
Kutuzov in his book, Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia .8 8 Kozhukov 
accused him of falsifying the history of the "Fatherland War." 
Tarle’s uncritical use of foreign sources, particularly the 
works of aristocratic bourgeois historians in his book Napo­
leon ’ s Invasion of Russia, and his neglect of Russian sources, 
according to Kozhukov,
reproduces on the fundamental questions of 1812, the erron­
eous and tendentious views of German, British, and French 
historians and memoir writers— Clausewitz, Bernhardi,
Wilson, de Segur, Thiers, and others— who distorted the 
history of the "Fatherland War" and belittled the roles 
of Kutuzov, the Russian army, and the Russian people in 
the defeat of Napoleon’s a r m y . 69
Furthermore, and as a result, Kozhukov argued,
Deviation from the principle of a comprehensive, objective 
examination of materials and reliance mainly on foreign 
sources has led Academician Tarle into gross errors in his 
elucidation of the Russian peoples' patriotic war of national
fi 7For example see the following: Erickson, "E.V. Tarle:
The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime," pp. 211-216; 
Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War I I , p. 54; Hollings­
worth, "The Napoleonic Invasion of Russia and Recent Soviet 
Historical Writing," pp. 38-40; "A New Purge of Russian History," 
The Economist, Vol. 161 (October 6 , 1951), pp. 808-811; Mazour, 
Modern Russian Historiography, pp. 223-234.
8 8 S. Kozhukov, "K Voprose ob Otsenke Roli M.I. Kutuzova v 
Otechestvennoy Voyne 1812 Goda," pp. 21—35; translated in Sidney 
Harcave (ed.), Readings in Russian History, Vol. I (New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1962), pp. 303-312.
Ibid., p . 304.
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liberation against Napoleon’s army, an army which had 
been carrying out the predatory, aggressive aims of the 
counter revolutionary bourgeoisie of F r a n c e . ^
The attack on Tarle was also marked by several references to
Stalin’s views about the doctrine of the counter offensive.
Thus, Kozhukov criticized him for deviating from the historical
truth in describing Kutuzov’s deeds, especially his strategy
-which was formulated in preparation for the counter offensive
71and for the eventual knockout blow to the forces of Napoleon.
An objective study of the data on 1812, both published 
and archival, exposes the anti-scientific notions of Tarle’s 
conceptions and shows that it was Kutuzov who destroyed 
Napoleon’s army by a well prepared counter offensive and 
by bold pursuit of the enemy along a line parallel to his 
line of retreat.
Kozhukov also contended that Kutuzov was a far superior 
tactician than Napoleon.
Kutuzov was the most outstanding military leader of his 
time who proved beyond a doubt that Russian military science 
was, and still is, superior to Western European military 
science.^3
Tarle failed to show that Kutuzov was a better strategist than
Napoleon, and thus he ’’minimized the role of the heroic Russian
people and their army in the defeat of Napoleon and the liberation
74
of the enslaved peoples of Europe from the Napoleonic yoke."
70 Ibid., p. 305.
71 Ibid., P- 306.
72 Ibid., p. 311.
73 Ibid., P- 306.
74 Ibid., P- 311;
important in "light of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany.
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Kozhukov also admonished Tarle for overemphasizing such
factors as the vast spaces of Russia, cold, hunger, illness,
and desertion, which were important but "by no means the
decisive significance that Tarle tries to give to them."7"^
These factors, as well as Kutuzov's role as a military leader,
were played down by Tarle in his 1938 work on Napoleon in which
.he stressed the resistance of the Russian masses, especially
*1
the heroism of the peasant.
In relieving Napoleon of the responsibility for the des­
truction and the burning of Moscow, Kozhukov argued that Tarle's
book "repeats inventions of Western European historians repre-
77senting Napoleon as a generous military leader." In repeating
these legends about the supposed humanity of Napoleon, "Tarle in
every way whitewashes him, trying to convince the reader that
Napoleon's army started burning towns only during the retreat 
78from Moscow." Although many Russians destroyed possessions
which would have been useful to the French, they did not follow
a scorched earth policy as maintained by Tarle.
Numerous documents indicate that Napoleon's army destroyed, 
plundered, and burned the towns and villages of Russia not 
only after his retreat from Moscow, but also during his ad­
vance on Moscow.79
7^Ibid. , p. 309.
7^See Chapter V, pp. 135-143.
77Harcave, Readings in Russian History, p. 309.
7^Ibid., p. 30 7.
7^Ibid., p. 309.
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In a letter addressed to the editors of B o l ? shevik in
October of the same year, Tarle replied to Kozhukov's criticism
80of his book, Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia. He was aware of 
the fact that after the conclusion of World War II a number of
81previously unknown documents about Kutuzov had been discovered.
Tarle also acknowledged that Min 1947 Josef Vissarionovich Stalin
-gave a formula which shed a new and clear light on the most im-
8 2portant questions of the history of 1812." He referred to his 
projected three volume study based on the theme, "The Russian 
People in the Struggle Against Aggressors from the Eighteenth 
to the Twentieth Century" and declared that he was in the 
process of writing the second book, to be entitled "The In­
vasion of 1812 and the Rout of Napoleon in Russia."
It is not a revised edition, but a new study which will 
probably be more than twice the length of my old book, and
even longer than the book I am now publishing on the Swedish
invasion.83
As for the contents of the new work, Tarle stated that
the plan for the counter offensive "will occupy its due place
84- •for the first time." He also remarked that he was dedicating
80Tarie, "Pis*mo v Redaktsiyu Zhurnala Bol'shevik," 
pp. 71-77.
8 Ibid . , p . 71.
83Ibid . , p . 72 .
83Ibid., p. 71.
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a special chapter to Kutuzov, "a chapter which I am beginning 
not from 1812, but from much earlier. Kutuzov was a great man, 
not only as a strategist and tactician, but also as a diplo-
Tarle recognized that some of his former conclusions need­
ed revision, but he also asserted that "Comrade Kozhukov inten-
.tionally and completely distorts my general view of the war of 
8 6
1812.” To support his contentions, Tarle gave several examples 
from his work on Napoleon. He furthermore commented about his 
use of sources.
Russian sources, both from archives and libraries are 
the basis of my new book, just as they were the foundation 
of my old book. But to exclude foreign sources altogether, 
merely because they are foreign, is, in my opinion, incor­
rect. Sometimes the involuntary enemy admission of Russian 
successes can be particularly valuable.^7
Tarle concluded his letter to the editors of Bol'shevik, stating
that,
Comrade Kozhukov systematically ignores what I say and 
frequently repeat in my book, but he attributes to me things 
I never even thought of saying, and then triumphantly refutes 
them. Those who have read my book (and there are many, es­
pecially in the Army during the war) will know my attitude 
to the resistance of the Russian people, to Kutuzov, and 
to the invading enemy. But those who have not read my book 
or who have forgotten my true words have the right to expect 
that I should recall what my opinion really was without any 
distortions. For this reason alone I have quoted here my 
own thoughts and not those attributed to me by Kozhukov.
8 5 , . ,Ibid.
86_, • Ibid., p. 72.
87Ibid., P- 73.
88Ibid., P- 76.
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The editors of Bo l 1shevik replied quickly to Tarle's 
letter,. They were pleased that he admitted the necessity for 
revising his opinions about the war of 1812, particularly Ku­
tuzov’s role in it, and that he had started to write a new
89work on this subject. However, they agreed with Kozhukov,
repeated his accusations, and declared that Tarle’s objections
-were groundless.
It is quite impossible to agree with Academician Tarle 
when he attempts to explain the serious errors in his book 
by the haste allegedly imposed on him by the publishers 
and also by lack of knowledge of many sources on the history 
of 1812. The fundamental reason for the errors made in 
Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia is in our view, not haste or 
insufficient knowledge and use of sources, but an uncritical 
handling of sources, and incorrect interpretation of sources.
Tarle never completed his proposed new book on Napoleon.
He wrote, however, a long article in Voprosy Istorii, entitled
"Michael Kutuzov— General and Diplomat," which expressed the
91views of Kozhukov and the editors of Bol’shevik. "Thus Tarle
had not only recanted in the Party press to satisfy his critics,
92
but their remarks influenced his scholarly writings." In the 
essay, Tarle portrayed Kutuzov as a great Russian patriot, an
89"0t Redaktsii Zhurnala Bol’shevik," pp. 77-78.
"ibid., pp. 79-80.
91E.V. Tarle, "Mikhael Illarionovich Kutuzov— Polkovodets 
i Diplomat," Voprosy Istorii, No. 3 (March, 1952), pp. 34-82.
92Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under
the Soviet Regime," p. 213.
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outstanding military leader and a skilled diplomat "whose
talents had been concealed by writers in foreign countries
and masked even more dishonestly than those of Suvorov or
93
Peter the Great." Tarle stressed that Kutuzov’s military
strategy was distinctly Russian and for this reason "he
defeated the best army and the best military leader in the
world at the time." In 1935 Tarle depicted Napoleon "as the
94greatest military genius in world history."
Tarle praised Kutuzov’s diplomacy, which was contrary 
to what he wrote in 1938. In 1952, he stated,
In the range of all the history of Russia, undoubtedly 
there was not a diplomat more talented than Kutuzov. His 
aim first was to destroy Napoleon’s armies in Russia, and 
then to liberate Europe from his predatory Empire.95
In 1938 he wrote,
Kutuzov had no intention of liberating Europe, this he 
regarded as the business of Europe itself. . . . Kutuzov
did not even desire a close contact with the rear guard of 
the retreating French Emperor. His reluctance did not arise 
from cowardice. From his point of view, which he_had a.dopted 
after deep meditation, new engagements with the /enemy/ were 
unnecessary.96
9 3Tarle, "Mikhael Illarionovich Kutuzov— Polkovodets l 
Diplomat," pp. 81-82; Also quoted in Erickson, "E.V. Tarle:
The Career of- a Historian under the Soviet Regime," p. 214.
94Tarle, Bonaparte, p. 10; Also quoted in Erickson,
"E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian Under the Soviet Regime,"
p. 214.
^Ta r l e ,  "Mikhael Illarionovich Kutuzov— Polkovodets i 
Diplomat," p. 68; Also quoted in Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The
Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime," p. 214.
^^Tarle, Nashestvie Napoleona na Rossiyu, pp. 288-289.
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Tarle changed his interpretations of the "Fatherland 
War" and of Kutuzov in the.article to prevent any further attacks 
on him by the Party. His new views of Kutuzov’s role in the War 
of 1812 conformed to the political trends in Soviet historiogra­
phy at the time. Perhaps Tarle well remembered his experiences 
between 1928 and 1931 and feared the possibility of being arrested, 
tried, and exiled once more. As for his conclusions, they
were primarily value judgments about events or individuals 
connected with Napoleon's invasion of Russia; and even 
though Tarle mentioned the use of a variety of original 
sources, he never supported his findings with this new 
evidence.97
Despite the Party's attack, Tarle continued to remain 
at his teaching post. Unitl his retirement in 1953, because of 
illness, he taught courses in modern European history, gave 
special lectures, conducted seminars, and advised graduate stu­
dents at Leningrad State University, Moscow State University,
98
and the Moscow Institute of International Relations. He was 
instrumental in training many of the present day Soviet histor-
Q  Q
ians. For his work, Tarle was decorated three times with the 
Stalin prize, awarded the Order of Lenin on his seventy-fifth 
birthday, and was given honorary degrees from the Sorbonne,
97Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under
the Soviet Regime," p. 215.
98Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXXII; Manfred, "Evgenii 
Viktorovich Tarle," p. 17.
99The book edited by Manfred is a Festschrift in Tarle’s 
honor by his former students.
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the Universities of Brno, Oslo, Algiers, and Prague.1 0 0
Just before his death, Tarle wrote a short article 
while he was in the hospital in which he analyzed Soviet 
diplomacy since the Bolshevik Revolution. 1 0 1 In Tarle's view, 
from the Lenin Peace Decrees adopted on January 8 , 1917,
Soviet diplomacy has operated on the basis of true 
democratic principles which has been the great wisjh of 
millions of people from all ends of our planet. _/This 
idea./ has been fostered and encouraged by Soviet di­
plomacy which has constantly aimed in the direction of 
the creation of collective security in order to strength­
en cooperation among all states.1 0 ^
On January 6 , 1955, E.V. Tarle died. Two days later,
a laudatory obituary appeared in a short column in Izvestiia
which conveniently failed to mention any of the difficulties
103he encountered during his long productive career.
Academician Eugene Viktorovich Tarle, outstanding Soviet 
scholar and historian, remarkable teacher and publicist and 
member of the Soviet Peace Committee, has passed away in 
his 80th year, after a severe illness.
During his long years of creative life, Academician 
Tarle wrote many valuable scholarly works on the history 
of our homeland and the countries of Western Europe during 
the Middle Ages, recent, and modern times. The most im­
portant of these works are his basic researches into the
1 Q°Sochineniya , Vol. I, p. XXXV; Manfred, "Evgenii Vik­
torovich Tarle,” p. 17.
101”Nasha Diplomatiya,” Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 395-
400.
1 0 2 Ibid., p. 400.
1 0 3 CDSP, Vol. XII, No. 1 (February 16, 1955), p. 39. 
"Obituary— E.V. Tarle," Izvestiia, January 8 , 1955, p. 4.
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history of the Fatherland War of 1812, and of the Crimean 
War 1853—1856. Many books by Academician Tarle have become 
widely known abroad, as well as in the Soviet Union. As a 
Professor at Leningrad and Moscow Universities, E.V. Tarle 
accomplished a great deal of work in training cadres of 
Soviet historians.
Academician Tarle had a remarkable combination of bril­
liant talent as an historian and outstanding ability as a 
journalist, acutely and passionately responsive to major 
events in international political life. During the Great 
Fatherland War, he wrote several brilliant patriotic articles. 
After the war, Academician Tarle constantly exposed the plots 
of the imperialist instigators of a new world war.
The scholarly services of E.V. Tarle, who made a great 
contribution to the study of world history, were recognized 
by scholars throughout the world. He was elected a Member 
of the Academy of Sciences in Oslo, Corresponding Member of 
the British Academy for Encouraging Historical, Philosophi­
cal and Philological Sciences, and was given honorary doc­
torates from several Universities. The Soviet government 
highly valued the work of Academician E.V. Tarle and awarded 
him three Orders of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner of 
Labor, and other medals.
Outstanding historian and remarkable publicist, scholar- 
patriot, active fighter for the cause of peace, tireless 
worker, man of great charm— thus Academician Tarle will 
forever remain in our memory.104
Perhaps E.V. Tarle's relationship with the regime is the 
best example of the problems which have confronted the historian 
in the Soviet Union. Since the Bolshevik Revolution, and partic­
ularly after 1928, the historian has been used to promote the 
domestic and foreign line of the Party. Thus, until the present 
day, the role of the historian has been circumscribed, as he 
must write history within a framework of political relevance in 
order to explain the past. And although the rehabilitation of
199
Pokrovsky has not occurred as yet, his statement that "history 
is politics projected into the past" expresses the way in which 
the Party has and still views the meaning of history and thus 
the precise duties of the historian in explaining events is 
to justify the policies of the regime.
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